



DARFUR COMMUNITY  
PEACE AND STABILITY  
FUND PHASE II  
EVALUATION



2017



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


## ACRONYMS

<b>AA</b>	Administrative Agent
<b>ARC</b>	American Refugee Committee
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CBO</b>	Community-Based Organizations
<b>CBRS</b>	Community Based Reconciliation Mechanisms
<b>CfP</b>	Call for Proposals
<b>CRS</b>	Catholic Relief Services
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DCPSF</b>	Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund
<b>DDPD</b>	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
<b>DPA</b>	Darfur Peace Agreement
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>GoS</b>	Government of Sudan
<b>INGO</b>	International Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>IP</b>	Implementing Partner
<b>KII</b>	Key Informant Interview
<b>NNGO</b>	National Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>MPTF</b>	Multi Partner Trust Fund
<b>RC</b>	Resident Coordinator
<b>RSF</b>	Rapid Support Forces
<b>SC</b>	Steering Committee
<b>SHF</b>	Sudan Humanitarian Fund
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAMID</b>	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
<b>UNDF</b>	United Nations Fund for Recovery and Reconstruction and Development in Darfur
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>VfM</b>	Value for Money
<b>ToC</b>	Theory of Change
<b>TS</b>	Technical Secretariat



## GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE





## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Background DCPSF

The Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF) is a multi-partner trust fund established in 2007. Its objective is to achieve local-level peace, stability, and sustainable growth by supporting inclusive and sustainable Darfur-wide peace negotiations using a community-based, bottom-up approach to ensure communities are stabilized and the trust and confidence between communities eroded from years of conflict is restored, paving the way towards early recovery.

The DCPSF Phase II started in 2011 and was planned to continue until December 2017, though the Steering Committee (SC) guiding the Fund extended Phase II until 2020 in the spring of 2017. The objective of Phase II is to support Darfur-wide peace efforts by addressing local peace and stability issues through inclusive and sustainable engagement. DCPSF supports peacebuilding activities through funding projects implemented by the United Nations, international non-government organisations, and national non-governmental organisations, using an open tender process.

### Evaluation Purpose

Forcier Consulting was contracted to carry out an evaluation of Phase II to both assess the successes and failures of the Phase to date, and to advise the future strategy of the Fund. Following individual meetings with key stakeholders including SC members, it was decided that the evaluation would focus on assessing the strategic elements of the DCPSF. As such, a methodological approach using three levels of analysis (project level, programme level and process level) was developed in order to produce a holistic view of the Fund's operation and achievements. The overall approach taken by the evaluation team was to seek contribution (as opposed to attribution) to outcomes and impact at those three levels:

- **Project-level operations**, which focuses on the OECD DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability) to assess the functioning of individual peacebuilding projects supported by the DCPSF during Phase II;
- **Programme-level operations**, which reviews the DCPSF's strategy to create effects and lasting results beyond the project level using the OECD DAC evaluation criteria. The key questions of this level relates to how the Fund operates as a whole to ensure that the individual projects combined together produce something more than the sum of their parts.
- **Process-level operations**, which evaluates the various structures and procedures that guide the DCPSF and its functioning. The key priorities of this level of analysis related to how the Fund itself is structured, how it selects projects and partners, and how it evolves to adjust to the changing context.

Specific attention is given to the crosscutting issues of gender and overall inclusiveness, cooperation and coordination, and conflict-sensitivity. For gender, the evaluation reviewed the Fund's ability to promote gender sensitivity and transform gender roles, as well as encouraging changes in attitude and behaviour.

### Evaluation Methodology

The tools used for the evaluation include a wide range of secondary data sources, as well as primary data collection in 8 programming locations.<sup>1</sup> The selection of projects took place in collaboration with DCPSF,

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<sup>1</sup> Originally, data collection was planned in 12 programming locations (4 per state), but data collection in North Darfur was not possible, i.e. only 8 programming locations could be covered.



and projects included in the sample were chosen based on the following factors: state; windows; type of the project; thematic areas of the project; length of the project; end date. A range of data collection tools were developed for collecting both quantitative and qualitative sources of data. For quantitative data collection, the evaluation team designed and implemented a household survey with community members inclusive of direct and indirect beneficiaries (542 household surveys in total). Qualitative data was collected with multiple types of respondents in order to elicit narrative and in-depth information about the project activities. This included Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), both strategic, high-level KIIs and field-based, local KIIs with beneficiaries (60 KIIs in total), as well as Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries (15 FGDs in total).

### **Limitations**

As the study intended to focus on the DCPSF's overall strategy and functioning, transcending solely project outputs, the information collected on individual project-level indicators were limited to aggregated secondary data from project implementer and DCPSF reporting. Furthermore, caution is needed in relation to the interpretation of outcome findings. While findings may suggest that the DCPSF has made significant contributions to a number of outcomes, it may not be impossible to distinguish contributions from the DCPSF and other external influences. Moreover, since the study only includes data collection in two out of the five Darfur States, results cannot automatically be generalized for the whole of Darfur, as there is significant regional diversity. The evaluation team attempted to mitigate this through a thorough desk review and interviews with implementers, experts, and other stakeholders. Lastly, the household survey that is conducted at the household level in relatively stable communities where programming is present is likely to miss some of the most troublesome youth that do not fit in such households.

### **Findings at Project Level**

The programming locations where DCPSF is and has been active have a need, and are largely conducive to, peacebuilding, reconciliation, and preparing the ground for early recovery and development activities. The DCPSFs model, supporting community-level peacebuilding interventions that focus on restoring social cohesion, trust, and confidence in and between communities, as a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding in Darfur, was consequently well received by beneficiaries and stakeholders. On the basis of conflict analyses and needs assessments, partners were able to tailor projects to the specific context. The ToC and indicators are furthermore loose enough to allow partners to tailor the interventions to the local context to a very high degree, and address issues from multiple angles, building physical/economic, social, and human capital, by using a rich set of programming tools. Moreover, the design of most projects, which included the combination of 'hard' and 'soft' activities and a high degree of community participation, was found to be highly relevant and appropriate for the local context in Darfur. However, communities did not always perceive the activities as peacebuilding, which is likely due to the careful partner communication due to the perceived sensitivity of the topic. This did not seem to be a limiting factor in the actual outcomes of the project, but may challenge some of the programming logic of community members attributing development to peace dividends particularly.

The majority of projects faced delays in one or more phases of the project. Most problematic in this regard were the delays relating to the approval process. The issue is systematic in the country context, and even though it is challenging to estimate how long it will take to receive approval for projects, more realistic timelines need to be set, as well as better mechanisms to adapt to the circumstances when they arrive. In addition, while there are no systematic Value for Money indicators set out for the projects and analysis into this aspect is therefore limited, there exist agreement among stakeholders that partners provide high Value for Money.



Beneficiaries, in general, showed high satisfaction with project activities and satisfaction correlated positively with consultation in the project design. CBRMs were found to be effective in solving conflict within communities, and were still operational at all the visited locations, including those where partner support has finished. At a higher level, the projects were found to have a lasting impact on increasing trust between and within communities, reducing conflict, and increasing economic interaction between communities, often measurable even after projects had finished. Nevertheless, some issues continue to exist. For CBRMs, a crucial problem remains that they do not have an enforcement mechanism and can only effectively address lower level conflicts at the community level. For this to effectively change, involvement of the government is needed. However, as one of the main strengths of the CBRMs is their perceived independence, risk-mitigation plans should be in place when these linkages are built carefully and gradually, potentially under to umbrella of the another actor.

A relevant question related to the sustainability of the work was whether the CBRMs would continue to retain full capacity after project funding ended, though all the CBRMs in the eight visited locations were operating effectively and with a high degree of perceived legitimacy among community members. While partners are encouraged to build partnerships at all levels, this has not yet reached an optimal level and needs further development. In addition, in order to ensure community buy-in, which was currently found to be moderately high, more efforts are needed to include marginalized groups, such as women, youth, and minorities in the CBRMs, as their involvement remained below desired levels in regards to actualised decision-making power. Consequently, youth were found to be the least likely to accept the verdict of a CBRM, which is worrying considering the large role youth play in conflict (fed by low livelihoods opportunities, the breakdown of families and social structures, high payoffs from antisocial activities, etc.), and a challenge that requires active follow-up for sustainability.

### **Findings at Programme Level**

At the programme level, DCPSF is unique from other funds in the sense that it explicitly focuses on peacebuilding. In this regard, it is complementary to other UN funds in Sudan, although collaboration and information sharing between the three main UN funds is not formalised or consistent, but rather ad hoc. On the humanitarian-development-security nexus, DCPSF occupies a longer-term peacebuilding and early recovery point, aiming to address underlying root causes of conflicts on the local level, paving the way for development activities. This is highly relevant in a context like Darfur, where conflict is a large factor in driving humanitarian need. The structures in the UN system exist to build on the synergies, through both a humanitarian and a development fund, and activities are currently in place to improve these, but at the time of evaluation this had not reached programmatically meaningful levels. With the limited ability of DCPSF to continue projects and engagement in stabilised communities, due to both its mandate and budget, continued development and provision of peace dividends through synergies with other funding sources is vital.

The importance of a funding mechanism such as DCPSF is likely to only grow in the near- and medium-term future of Darfur. With the winding down of UNAMID peacekeeping forces, the continuing tensions in both higher and lower levels, and complex issues faced by communities in Darfur, a flexible tool with the core purpose of contributing to peaceful co-existence is vital. As noted at the project level, the ToC of DCPSF allows for a holistic approach to community issues, allowing it to address root causes and build conflict resilience effectively. It also has the potential to effectively inform other actors programming in Darfur and use its expertise to help mainstream conflict sensitive approaches, which should be front and centre for any actor operating in a protracted conflict environment.



The key question for the programme level is, however, whether DCPSF was able to be more than the sum of its parts, i.e. contribute to peace in the region through a substantial number of community-level projects. Its success in this regard is much less clear than at the project level. This is in part because clear parameters for success have not been laid out and no proper monitoring at the programme level has been developed. While there is a Theory of Change, it is not specific and operationalised enough on the programme level and there is no clear programming logic on how the projects should tie together as a whole and achieve more than the sum of its parts. If this should be through bottom-up approaches, pursued by Output 4, the programming modality of DCPSF being project through individual NGOs is an issue as they are generally unable or unwilling (due to sensitivity of the issue) to pursue higher agendas, leading the programming to be more bottom-level peacebuilding than a bottom-up approach that contributes to peacebuilding in a wider sense. The process for the selection of projects for funding was also observed to focus on project-level merits rather than contributions to the overall strategy. Although the mechanism of conflict analysis should enable the strategic guidance of project selection, in its current form it does not clearly lead to measurable effects.

Furthermore, as projects are largely operating as independent units, this has according to implementers made it difficult to engage with issues and conflict drivers that transcend the immediate project geography, which in itself is constrained through formal restrictions. For instance, cross-locality and cross-state issues are difficult to address. Multiple DCPSF partners discussed the possibility of groupings projects into consortium approaches, allowing for the affected area to be covered more effectively. Although DCPSF allowed for consortium applications in the most recent funding round, the budget was constrained to that of a single project, which lead to diminished interest among implementers. Consortium approaches would also allow for further economies of scale that could contribute to more harmonised ME systems, thus improving the measurability of impacts beyond the community level.

Despite these limitations, DCPSF has likely contributed to regional peace efforts. The number of disputes that CBRMs have resolved, thus avoiding escalation, has certainly been a positive, though unquantifiable at the current moment, factor in fostering stability, and evidence of improved trust in both intra- and inter-community relations certainly reduces the potential of dispute escalation. However, the current approach of the DCPSF is still too fragmented and too focused on individual projects to result in an outcome and impact on a wider scale that is measurably to more than the sum of their parts.

### **Findings at Process Level**

Selection of partners occurred through an intensive process. However, there is some uncertainty if awarding was to some extent more supply driven than demand driven in the sense that the selection of projects was more a question of what was there, rather than a question of strategic and (conflict) analysis-driven prioritization. Closely related to this, there exist a large need to build the capacity of national NGOs. However, there is also a lot of unclarity about the existing capacity of national non-governmental organisations. When more focus is given to capacity building of national non-governmental organisations, not only would this increase the potential of more strategic selection of partners and projects, but this would also contribute to the sustainability of the programme.

The Technical Secretariat was found to be highly collaborative with the implementing partners. DCPSF offers its partners a large degree of flexibility to adjust to the rapidly changing environment in Darfur, something most other funds do not offer. Due to this, implementing partners can adjust easily and implementing partners feel that they have space to experiment. This unique feature of the DCPSF enables them to keep their project activities highly relevant and appropriate during changing circumstances, as well as generate lessons learnt for dissemination among partners (though the actualisation of this is still limited). As a multi-year funding



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mechanism, this programmatic adaptiveness is a vital strength of DCPSF in staying relevant in the changing context of Darfur.

However, there is a need for the DCPSF to become more of a way leader. In a general context of waning levels of funding and international attention directed towards Darfur, the capacity available at embassies for focussing on peacebuilding measures is shrinking. This creates a lot of opportunities for the DCPSF to take more of a substantial and coordinating role. In addition, there is a need to ensure the DCPSF continually improves itself through a well-coordinated learning process. This learning process should aim to establish best practices and lessons learned and build future programming on the basis of these findings. By structurally collecting information related to the best functioning models, the DCPSF can develop methodologies and tools by which its partners, especially national partners, can further evolve. In addition, this could significantly enhance the sustainability of the DCPSF.

### **Crosscutting Themes**

With regards to coordination and cooperation, DCPSF was found to be an engaged partner. In addition, DCPSF made efforts to ensure collaboration among IPs. However, since IPs are often competing for the same funds, this does not tend to actualise into high degrees of co-operation.

At a higher level, coordination with other UN funds was limited and often occurred on an ad-hoc basis. Collaboration, however, would not only make it possible to complement soft activities more effectively with hard activities, it would also provide opportunities to more effectively address the root causes of conflict, and avoid duplication of efforts. Furthermore, the DCPSF did not collaborate with the GoS. Engagement with the GoS could lead to increased levels of accountability, higher sustainability of efforts, and also increased trust between the DCPSF and the GoS. However, this engagement carries risks as one of the community-perceived strengths of DCPSF programming is its independence. As such, how and by whom the engagement is pursued should be carefully discussed within UNDP, the donors, and the implementing partners.

Inclusiveness is the second crosscutting theme included in the analysis. While significant efforts had been made to ensure inclusion of women, youth and minorities into, for example, the CBRMs, CBRMs remain mostly run by men, elites, and powerful individuals. Women often held meaningless positions within CBRMs and consequently their decision-making power had not effectively increased. However, it has to be taken into account that including females in decision making bodies is a transformative process which will take years. Some female beneficiaries seemingly understood this and perceived their CBRM membership as having a high symbolic value. The inclusion of women and youth in the bodies that they historically had no position in is in itself progress that should not be underestimated, especially as this had continued even in CBRMs from past projects that had no active supervision. Moreover, some women, although only a few, were found to have meaningful positions within the CBRMs. Analysing these cases revealed that they had gain in decision power naturally by showing their capacity in conflict resolution and peace building. What distinguished these female members of the CBRMs from other female members was their confidence and personality, as well as their educational attainment.

Livelihood activities were utilised to ensure female economic empowerment. For multiple reasons, however, most women did not feel empowered through these programmes, with economic power not necessarily translating to decision-making power. Continued attention is needed and it is important to tie economic activities to activities such as gender awareness, gender training, and community dialogue in order to ensure the best possible outcome for female economic empowerment, along with supporting women as groups rather than individuals to amplify their voice through collective action and in order to ensure these activities



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line up better with the mandate of the DCPSF. The engagement of men in income-generation is also vital, both in terms of activating them as income-generators and working towards changing their views on household economics.

Youth, who are considered a major conflict driver by multiple partners, respondents, and reporting, were also included in numerous project activities. While youth held relatively positive perceptions towards the CBRMs, they were still perceived by others as least likely to accept the decisions made by the CBRMs, which is a potential threat to the sustainability of the CBRMs. Livelihood opportunities for youth are vital with huge incentives available through antisocial activities as well as the appeal of migration.

The final crosscutting theme included in the analysis is conflict sensitivity. While the conflict analysis conducted by DCPSF was perceived as useful, most IPs conducted conflict analyses that go beyond the one provided by the DCPSF. The main issue related to the conflict analysis is that it is static and does not accurately reflect changes in the context. Updated information about power dynamics, emerging conflicts, and other factors in the context should be available at all times in order to ensure that the DCPSF as well as its IPs can make well-informed programmatic changes.

Moreover, while IPs often had extensive experience in project delivery along with knowledge of the local context, they do not always have sufficient expertise to conduct proper conflict sensitivity analyses. Many partners referred to Do No Harm practices when discussing conflict sensitivity, often including little or no discussion on how project activities interact with the context, trying to predict negative unintended consequences, or having monitoring mechanisms to capture these.

### **Recommendations**

Based on the evaluations findings and conclusions, a number of recommendations at project-, program- and process-level are proposed, the main ones are described below:

1. Develop a follow-up system for CBRMs to ensure its sustainability
2. Invest in capacity building for CBRMs as well as national non-governmental organizations
3. Revise and further develop the Theory of Change at the programme level
4. Use consortiums with higher budgets to encourage better cooperation between partners
5. Increase collaboration with other UN funds
6. Focus on better integrating of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity in programme activities
7. Strengthen the conflict analysis and ensure the analysis is updated on an ongoing basis



## 1. INTRODUCTION

Acknowledging the needs in Darfur and the limitations imposed by the current climate, the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF) was developed to address a gap in programming and service delivery. As a Multi Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), DCPSF supports community-level peacebuilding interventions that focus on restoring social cohesion, trust, and confidence in and between communities, as a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding in Darfur. As a funding mechanism, DCPSF focuses on longer-term programming as well as prioritizing conflict-sensitive approaches for the promotion of trust and confidence in and between communities, rather than by a strictly defined position in the humanitarian-development nexus. In the MPTF portfolio, it therefore occupies a place between humanitarian (Sudan Humanitarian Fund, SHF) and development (United Nations Darfur Fund, UNDF) funds, with an emphasis on peacebuilding and paving the way for early recovery.

The DCPSF Phase II began in 2011 and was planned to continue until December 2017. However, in the Spring of 2017, the Steering Committee (SC) guiding the Fund extended Phase II until 2020. The objective of Phase II is to support Darfur-wide peace efforts by addressing local peace and stability issues through inclusive and sustainable engagement. In total, four outputs have been developed for Phase II of the Fund:

- 1) **“Effective community-level conflict resolution and prevention platforms in Darfur are in place”**, which is mainly done through reviving traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that have the capacity to solve disputes before they escalate;
- 2) **“Cooperation between communities is enhanced through shared livelihood assets and income generating opportunities activities”**, which aims at promoting positive interactions between conflicting parties and promoting co-operation on issues of common interest, leading to peace dividends in the form of livelihood opportunities and improved household and community resilience;
- 3) **“Cooperation between competing communities over management of natural resources and access to basic social services increased”**, which addresses root and underlying causes of conflict and disputes, both through improving the material situation for the groups involved as well as supporting good governance;
- 4) **“A network of effective collaborative peacebuilding initiatives created and feeding into wider peace fora and Darfur agendas”**, which links local peace efforts to higher-level initiatives.

Through its programming, DCPSF seeks to partner with United Nations (UN) agencies, as well as international and national Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that build trust and confidence by using conflict sensitive and inclusive approaches to address conflict at the community level. DCPSF is furthermore guided by a general strategy deriving from a regional conflict analysis, which ensures that activities are tailored to context specific community needs. Some of the other elements that shape the DCPSF include:

- Responding to gaps in knowledge and understanding regarding issues of land management, gender, and interaction between native and local government administration. DCPSF’s approach includes a learning-by-doing approach, which facilitates the results leading to best practices and lessons learned, as well a deep understanding of the local dynamics;
- Investing resources in Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and NGOs to strengthen their organisational capacity to prioritize, plan, design and implement projects that result in equitable and sustainable growth, addressing issues including livelihoods, vocational training and employability. This includes both



direct programming to support local CSO/NGO capacity, but also by allocating funds that only local organisations can compete for, so that they can improve their capacity through implementation;


- Strengthening the peacebuilding and monitoring & evaluation skills of partner staff to increase their learning abilities.

## 1.1 THEORY OF CHANGE

The Theory of Change (ToC) concentrates on the restoration of ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’ in the diverse communities of Darfur through independently brokered inclusive dialogue processes and consultations, which are further underpinned insofar as material inputs deriving from these consultations, such as services, deliver wide-reaching peace dividends to the community. In other words, as peaceful and inclusive dialogue and cooperation in communities takes place, and this leads to tangible benefits for its members, trust is built and the conditions for lasting peace strengthened. DCPSFs core aim is thus to build social and human capital, and material development is a by-product and a means for doing so, rather than an end in itself. The ToC has two elements and reads:

- 1) “IF processes of dialogue and consultation are independently brokered, THEN trust and confidence amongst diverse communities is restored”
- 2) IF target material inputs (programmes and services) are delivered, THEN community needs are responded to and processes of dialogue and consultation underpinned”.

Figure 1. Theory of Change





## 2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF EVALUATION

Forcier Consulting was contracted to carry out an evaluation of Phase II to both assess the successes and failures of the phase to date, and to advise the future strategy of the Fund (See: Annex 1 for a detailed description of the methodology). The main objectives of this evaluation were:

1. To establish and document the positive impact and any unintended consequences of DCPSF funded activities and the relevance of the DCPSF's overall strategy for community stabilisation in Darfur;
  - a. To validate DCPSF results in terms of achievements toward the Fund goal and outputs;
  - b. To examine to what extent DCPSF interventions supported peaceful co-existence efforts at the community level, strengthened local peace governance, and empowered and enhanced participation of vulnerable groups, particularly in decision-making and resource-sharing;
2. To assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, economy, and sustainability of DCPSF interventions and its contribution to the creation of network of effective collaborative peacebuilding initiatives that feed into wider peace negotiations;
3. To document lessons learned, best practices, success stories, and challenges to inform future initiatives;
4. To formulate informed recommendations on future programmatic vision for DCPSF, including the processes and governance mechanisms of the Fund.

Following individual meetings with key stakeholders, it was decided that the evaluation would focus on assessing the strategic elements of DCPSF. As such, a methodological approach using three level of analysis was developed in order to produce a holistic view of the Fund's operation. The overall approach taken by the evaluation team was to seek contribution (as opposed to attribution) to outcomes and impact at those three levels:

- **Project-level operations**, which focuses on the OECD DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability) to assess the functioning of individual peacebuilding projects supported by the DCPSF during Phase II. This section will also provide an overview of aggregate project outcomes and outputs based on the project documents provided;
- **Programme-level operations**, which reviews the DCPSF's strategy to create effects and lasting results beyond the project level using the OECD DAC evaluation criteria. The key questions of this level relates to how the Fund operates as a whole to ensure that the individual projects combined together produce something more than the sum of their parts.
- **Process-level operations**, which evaluates the various structures and procedures that guide the DCPSF and its functioning. The key priorities of this level of analysis related to how the Fund itself is structured, how it selects projects and partners, and how it evolves to adjust to the changing context.

Specific attention is given to the crosscutting issues of gender and overall inclusiveness, cooperation and coordination, and conflict-sensitivity. Regarding gender in particular, the evaluation reviewed the Fund's ability to promote gender sensitivity and transform gender roles, as well as encouraging changes in attitude and behaviour.



### 3. COUNTRY CONTEXT

The Darfur region covers an area of 493,180 square kilometres<sup>2</sup>, is located in the east of Sudan, and comprises of five federal states: North Darfur, East Darfur, Central Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur. The region, which is slightly smaller than the country of Spain, borders with Chad, Central African Republic and South Sudan, and has a climate ranging from arid in the north to tropical in the south.

*Figure 2. Landscape in West Darfur*



The population in Darfur is comprised of highly diverse ethnic and tribal groups. However, the population can also broadly be divided into (sedentary) farmers and (nomadic) pastoralists. Pastoralists, who herd livestock, can primarily be found in the northern regions of Darfur whereas farmers, who cultivate crops, live mostly in the central and southern parts of Darfur. Not surprisingly, most economic revenue in Darfur is gained through agricultural and livestock activity.

#### 3.1 HISTORY

While conflicts in Darfur have occurred throughout history, the current conflict started in 2003 when armed groups attacked government installations as a means to protest the government of Sudan (GoS), which they accused of ongoing economic marginalization and insecurity. The GoS responded by deploying forces to bring back stability. However, the situation was not stabilized and thousands of people fled to seek refuge in other regions or neighbouring Chad. After the conflict gained a more international character, Chad, in 2004, brokered negotiations that led to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the GoS and two rebel groups. From that moment, troops of the African Union (AU) were deployed in Darfur to observe and preserve peace. However, even though the number of troops deployed by the AU was increased over time, progress was limited and the situation remained highly instable.

In May 2006, the situation appeared to turn for the better when the GoS and one rebel group signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Fighting continued, nevertheless, since some other rebel groups rejected the deal. In 2007, the UN deployed the United Nations-African Union Mission (UNAMID) to bring stability to Darfur while peace talks on a final settlement continued. The peace talks, which took place in Libya, led

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<sup>2</sup> "Sudan's Geography". Globaldreamers.org.




the GoS to declare an unilateral ceasefire. However, clashes between armed groups persisted since important rebel groups had again not been involved in the talks.

In 2011, there was again hope for improvement when several groups involved in the conflict signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). The DDPD marked a crucial milestone in the Darfur peace process as it paved the way for the official integration of Darfur as a region into the national political system. However, the situation in Darfur further destabilized and people continued to flee their homes.

In February 2014, Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were deployed in Jebel Marra in Central Darfur and South Darfur. No significant improvements resulted from this and 2015 and 2016 were highly instable years. In 2017, finally, the different armed groups that are active in Darfur signed unilateral ceasefires. Despite this, Darfur today is far from achieving a state of stable or durable peace. There are regular flare-ups, but conflict has changed from high level of action and military activity between the GoS and rebel forces, to mainly local, intertribal conflict with intermittent and isolated encounters between the GoS and rebel groups – though the potential for escalation remains. In addition, power dynamics in the region have changed through the presence of the RSF and large-scale displacement, which complicates the situation by constantly shifting dynamics, making the situation unpredictable. What's left is an area that is not effectively controlled by any single actor, with large issues with lawlessness and banditry.

### 3.2 ROOT CAUSES

Figure 3. Root Causes of Conflict in Darfur



The situation in Darfur is extremely complex and numerous factors, including political, security, environmental, socio-economic, and socio-cultural, have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect on the region. The complex dynamics between rebel forces, armed groups, foreign militias, tribes and ethnic groups, and pastoralists and farmers are only adding to the complexity of the situation. To fully understand the conflict, moreover, one needs to understand that the conflict dynamics and root causes of conflict differ between regions. Below, two root causes that play an important role in all regions of Darfur will be discussed:

#### Identity

Since pre-colonial times, tribes have co-existed in Darfur, making use of existing structures to share power and natural resources. Decades of conflict, from years of conquest and the road to independence, inter-communal conflict, violent extraction of natural resources, and the struggle with South Sudan, however, have led to disintegration of Darfur's social fabric, and broken trust and confidence between its tribes and ethnic



groups. Consequently, inter- and intra-tribal conflicts, which always occurred, have increased in frequency. While the differences between tribes are not always clearly delineated, a rough distinction can be made between tribes generating income through farming (sedentary tribes) and tribes generating income through pastoral farming (nomadic tribes).

Conflicts between pastoralists and farmers are triggered when, for example, nomadic tribes move through farming areas owned by sedentary tribes and their livestock destroy crops, when livestock is stolen, or when tribes make use of water sources that other tribes perceive as theirs. Settling these conflicts is complicated for at least two reasons. First, with a national literacy rate of 54%<sup>3</sup> and significantly lower rates of literacy among rural residents compared to urban residents, engagement of pastoralists, who have even lower literacy rates compared to other rural groups, in the peace processes is particularly challenging. Secondly, sedentary farmers perceive to have had less access to essential services, causing grievances towards international and national NGOs, the government, but also other communities, making them less willing to be involved in reconciliation processes.

### Natural Resources

Since the majority of the Darfuri people are either sedentary farmers or nomadic pastoralist, land and water are crucial resources. Since pre-colonial times, both groups have struggled to share these resources without conflict. However, due to the decrease of rainfall since the 1970s as well as the increase in population of humans and livestock, tension between these groups has increased. Tensions rise to a high when pastoralists, who traditionally dwell mainly in North Darfur, are forced to migrate southwards more in search for grazing lands for their livestock. Sedentary farmers see their crops being damaged as livestock passes through their fields. Moreover, the decreased availability of land has forced sedentary farmers to cultivate their lands year-round, reducing its fertility and blocking a number of migration routes for pastoralists.

## 3.3 CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Traditionally, local conflicts in Darfur are resolved through the joudia:

*“The traditional joudia is held either immediately or spontaneously after the disagreement takes place or after the ajaweed are invited by the parties of conflict. The council can be formed from a group of 3 to 9 members provided that they are accepted by both parties as neutral and credible. But generally, people make use of what is known as village angles (the sheikh or dimlij, the imam) in addition to the ajaweed of the village and sometimes the ajaweed of the neighboring villages. When it is in session, it can tackle cases like; injuries, killings, theft or robbery, land aggression, confrontations between nomads and sedentary, tribal conflicts, family troubles.”<sup>4</sup>*

Since the joudia only involves elderly males, other groups, including women and youth, are excluded from the peace process. For women, their exclusion bears significant consequences since they are disproportionately affected during war and conflict. In Darfur, for example, violence against women is common and due to the conflict, the number of female-headed households has increased exponentially. These households are often less resilient compared to male-headed households and are more likely to be confronted with crime. Due to their exclusion from the joudia, however, women’s views and perceptions are not represented in the reconciliation process. Aside from the consequences for women, excluding women from peace processes is

<sup>3</sup> Literacy Statistics Metadata Information Table”. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. September 2015.

<sup>4</sup> Isam, M. I. (2013) The “Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in Darfur: From an Anthropological Perspective”, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 4(9):135.



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also known to be inefficient and ineffective,<sup>5</sup> and could potentially have a negative effect on stability since women have had a strong influence on conflict. A good example of this are the Hakamat women, influential female singers who instigate and incite tribal war leaders to flight.

Youth are also excluded from the joudia, which is important since over 50 % of the population of Darfur is aged 16 or below<sup>6</sup>, making youth a large part of the Darfuri population. Youth unemployment and youth partaking in criminal, violent livelihood generation is rampant, while youth are also increasingly searching for a sense of community and belonging. The loss of parents combined with the desire for revanche, but also the lack of livelihood opportunities, and interest in traditional livelihoods such as farming and herding leads to youth seeking alternative, criminal livelihoods, as payoffs from such activities are substantially higher. The ability of communities to control this type of activity is significantly reduced by the youth's rejection of traditional structures where elders control decision-making.

### 3.4 RESTORING PEACE

Today, 4,8 million people are in need for humanitarian assistance in Darfur.<sup>7</sup> The current situation limits an ordered sequencing of international assistance, as the phasing between humanitarian assistance, peace building and stabilization, early recovery, and development aid is not clear-cut. Instead, the situation in Darfur varies strongly by region, displaying diverse needs per locality. Certain areas remain in need of humanitarian assistance and activities that prepare the ground for early recovery, while insecurity in other areas render longer-term development investments impossible. As such, Darfur presents an intricate myriad of needs and different stages of peace building and stabilization.

Meanwhile, international support for Darfur is waning. Major donors are switching from emergency relief to early recovery. UNAMID is reducing its peacekeeping mission, which endangers positive development, as the need for humanitarian support, especially in the area of protection, remains necessary. While some armed groups have left, others have simply been replaced. This had led to a security vacuum that communities are unable to fill by themselves. Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and the international community also cannot protect the communities from those who are armed. Security, as such, remains the most pressing need, and is the prerequisite for the delivery of humanitarian aid, peace, stability, and development – and eventually voluntary return.

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<sup>5</sup> Laura Kray & Linda Babcock, Gender in Negotiations: A Motivated Social Cognitive Analysis, in *Negotiation Theory and Research* 203 (Leigh L. Thompson ed., 2006)

<sup>6</sup> Beyond Emergency Relief: Longer-term trends and priorities for UN agencies in Darfur" (PDF). *United Nations Environment Programme*. 30 September 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview. October 2017.



## 4. FINDINGS AT PROJECT LEVEL

At the project level, the analysis concentrates on the level to which the DCPSF has been able to produce the desired quality of peace-building programming at the community level, using the individual projects as the unit of analysis.

### 4.1 RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS

In this section, findings are presented concerning the extent to which projects were tailored to local peacebuilding needs and adapted to the local context.

The programming locations where DCPSF is and has been active have a need, and are largely conducive to, peacebuilding, reconciliation, and preparing the ground for early recovery and development activities. While the social fabric in communities has been significantly weakened due to years of conflict, community members are conflict fatigue and exhibit readiness for more sustainable solutions. This is, for example, visible among Hakama women who traditionally chant songs to instigate tribal war leaders to fight, but who are now also involved in peace building initiatives in their communities. The

*“Communities in Darfur are seeking togetherness. This is a trend that should be supported in order to prevent sliding back into conflict. With the conflict subsiding, there is room for people-to-people dialogue and diplomacy.”*  
- Implementing Partner -

DCPSFs model, supporting community-level peacebuilding interventions that focus on restoring social cohesion, trust, and confidence in and between communities, as a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding in Darfur, was consequently both applauded by beneficiaries as well as stakeholder, even though voices for the inclusion of more top-down activities and approaches are slowly becoming louder.

While communities in Darfur have become open to peacebuilding initiatives, the context in which conflicts take place differs widely between communities. As such, it is paramount that projects are tailored to the specific peace building needs in each of the programming areas. DCPSF understands this needs and therefore requires all IPs to submit a short conflict analysis in their application. Through this, IPs can display their knowledge about the root causes and triggers of conflict in specific areas and illustrate how project activities are tailored to the local needs. While the conflict analyses done by IPs were observed to vary in quality, both international and local IPs were assessed to have detailed knowledge about the root causes of conflict in their project areas. The substantial expertise on the local context with regards to conflict was for most IPs partly due to their extended and long-term presence in the area. However, a few IPs did report having used DCPSF funding to reach areas that they had no experience working in, which could have a negative effect on the relevance and appropriateness of the project design. Nevertheless, the implemented projects were observed and reported to be meaningful, and appropriately targeted root conflict drivers and triggers in the communities with tools that have a high potential to contribute to peace at the community level. In line with this, a substantial majority of respondents consider that the project design (86%) and implementation (85%) were done in a way that takes account of local dynamics.

Based on the conflict analyses and needs assessments done in the project areas, almost all IPs designed projects which combined so-called ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ activities. The soft activities (i.e. brokered processes of dialogue and consultation), which include workshops and trainings, focus on rebuilding social capital and human connections. Hard project activities (i.e. delivery of material inputs), including services and infrastructure,



address pressing needs as well as several root causes of conflict, such as the scarcity or lack of natural resources, while at the same time underpinning processes of dialogue and consultation. Beneficiaries offered unsolicited praise for this hard and soft activity strategy, pointing out the complementarity in on the one hand reducing conflict-inducing issues, and on the other hand strengthening capacities to deal with issues that are left. Particularly, with regards to water shortages, beneficiaries appreciated the coherence in addressing the immediate source of conflict (water scarcity) and supporting the development of institutionalized mechanisms (water user committees) for establishing proactive conflict mitigation systems. In the past, the competition over scarce resources (e.g. water) could easily escalate because of the non-existence of a body responsible for mitigating tension and conflict.

*“All community leaders were asked for input before the project started. This ensured all activities were relevant for this community. In addition, we helped with the selection of vulnerable people.”*  
- CBRM Leader -

The participatory nature of projects was another element in the project design consistently praised and highlighted by beneficiaries and stakeholders. Most IPs designed their projects to involve a variety of stakeholders, including community leaders and members, in the project design, implementation, and evaluation. Consequently, a high sense of involvement and ownership was observed, and communities were imbued with a sense of self-respect and a reduction in the sense of dependency. In essence, this participatory model itself already

contributes to the fulfilment of outcomes as it brings different stakeholders together and opens doors for communication and dialogue. However, there were some IPs who struggled to ensure community participation. In one observed project, the community leaders had not been involved in the selection of beneficiaries and, as a direct consequence of this, community members questioned the selection criteria for beneficiaries and were unwilling to contribute to project activities. Thus, it is advisable for IPs to clearly strategize and design how different stakeholders, especially community leaders and members, will be involved in all phases of the project. The most appropriate project design involves community members at an early stage and keeps continued communication, both gathering inputs and feeding back results, with community members throughout all project phases.

Despite the overall satisfaction and approval of project designs, some concerns were also raised, particularly relating to the duration of projects. As a significant proportion of projects lasted for less than two years, stakeholders questioned the ability of IPs to increase trust and confidence within and between communities as this is seen a lengthy process. Indeed, there is a high likelihood that the effect and impact of project activities is not visible after one year and, as such, it is advisable to support projects longer in duration in order to ensure trust and confidence can be matured over time.

### **Soft Activities**

The establishment and support of Community Based Reconciliation Mechanisms (CBRMs) is a core activity in each DCPSF-funded project. While the concept of CBRMs is relatively similar in all projects, IPs were given freedom to design CBRMs in various ways to ensure their relevance and appropriateness to the local context. Consequently, a significant proportion of IPs established CBRMs based on the Ajaweed Council (joudia), one of the most respected social institutions in Darfur used to resolve conflicts.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Isam, M. I. (2013) The “Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in Darfur: From an Antropological Perspective”, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 4(9):134.



New community-level conflict resolution mechanisms were also designed since some IPs found the traditional mechanisms less appropriate for the current context: *“CBRMs are less effective when based on traditional mechanisms because communities are modernizing and traditional structures are becoming less relevant.”*<sup>9</sup> As such, the CBRMs mostly built on, but are not limited by, traditional mechanisms, which is vital to their continued relevance and appropriateness. The wide variety of designs through which IPs implemented CBRMs, which included Crop Protection Committees, Village Peace Committees, Youth Committees, Women Committees and various associations and unions, moreover evidences the efforts made by IPs to tailor mechanisms to local conflict drivers and peace-building needs.

While the CBRMs were found to be a relevant mechanism to address community-level tribal and ethnic conflict, provided that different ethnic groups within the community were represented, it has no relevance for higher-level conflict between the GoS and armed groups or rebels. In addition, the capacity of the structures to effectively enforce conflict resolutions remains low, especially in cases involving murder and other serious crimes, and its legitimacy could be questioned. Nevertheless, fact is that a lot of conflicts exist at the community level, but have the potential to escalate if not resolved quickly. Moreover, without the direct involvement of community members it is unlikely that lasting peace will be established in Darfur. Thus, bottom-up approaches led and owned by community members can be considered relevant and appropriate insofar that it can be tailored to local peace and conflict dynamics, reflect local priorities, and that it can be managed completely by community members.

*“The bottom-up approach of community-level peace committees and councils allows for CBRMs to be linked horizontally and vertically within the DCPSF system. However, this is currently not done to its full extend.”*  
- Implementing Partner -

### Hard Activities

The majority of DCPSF-funded projects also included services and infrastructure as activities into its programmes. Such activities could include the construction or rehabilitation of waterpoints, demarcation of migratory routes, restoration of communal pastures, provision of health services, etc. In general, beneficiaries warmly welcomed these activities and agreed that they addressed some of the most pressing needs within the targeted communities. Most often praised were the activities related to the provision of safe water sources as many of the communities did not have access to a safe water source before the start of the project. In addition, while these hard activities were sometimes perceived by beneficiaries as service delivery rather than peacebuilding, qualitative interviews did clearly reveal that they were a relevant and appropriate mechanism to address one or more of the root causes of conflict within the community.

*“Access to clean water and conflicts between farmers and pastoralist over water were major issues in the past. Now, we have a water tanks and farmers and pastoralist both have their own place to get water from.”*  
- Beneficiaries -

Despite this, some of the activities that related particularly to economic empowerment and livelihoods were found to be less appropriate. For example, women in West Darfur had received oil presses as a means of livelihood by the Rural Community Development Organisation. The women, however, had difficulty handling the heavy machinery and had not received any training. Furthermore, no mechanism was in place to ensure the machine would be repaired in case it breaks down. As such, the machines were no longer in use

<sup>9</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 8 June 2017.



in the visited location. This situation could have been prevented if the IPs had more carefully considered their beneficiary group and incorporated mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of the project activity.

Figure 1: Oil Press (Left) and Main Source of Water for Beneficiaries Before Instalment of Waterpoint (Right)



## 4.2 EFFICIENCY

In this section, the extent to which IPs achieve their outputs/outcomes within the allocated time and with the allocated resources is considered.

The majority of projects faced delays in one or more phases of the project. First, multiple IPs reported delays during the contract signing phase. As a direct consequence of the delayed signing of the project agreement between them and the DCPSF, delays in the disbursement of funds were reported. Secondly, delays were reported during the approval phase. This type of delays were reported by the majority of IPs, were the most significant in terms of length, and sometimes had a significant impact on the project implementation. For example, training activities may be delayed 6 months and as a consequence take place during the harvesting season when most people do not have time to attend such activities. The issue is systematic in the country context, and even though it is challenging to estimate how long it will take to receive approval for projects, more realistic timelines need to be set, as well as better mechanisms to adapt to the circumstances when they arrive (such as pushing activities forward to a time when they are meaningful again rather than pushing for outputs regardless of meaningfulness). Finally, a variety of factors caused delays during the project implementation phase. Most of these delays are hard to predict and therefore hard to include in the project planning. Overall, the delays in the different phases of the project caused multiple IPs to request for no-cost extensions.


*“It is hard to estimate how long it will take to receive permission from the local authorities to start the project. This is primarily due to the fact that peacebuilding remains a sensitive topic and authorities are hesitant to cooperate on these projects.”*

**- Implementing Partner -**



Budget overruns were reported by fewer IPs. Some of the budget overruns were related to project delays, but most were related to inflation of the SDG. Inflation rates in Sudan have increased over the past ten years, but since 2016 inflation rates have increased exponentially. In July 2017, for example, the inflation rating was 34%. For IPs, this had serious consequences on their budget and the possibilities to implement activities according to plan. As such, it is recommended to assess the options to adjust budgets during the project phases in order to accurately reflect inflation rates.

Figure 4. Causes for Delays and Budget Overruns



Despite the delays and budget overruns, beneficiaries perceived the projects to be highly efficient. Almost no comments were made about inefficient use of funds and only a few delays were reported. When projects were delayed, this was mostly communicated to the community in order to manage expectations and prevent disappointment.

One activity that was reported to be less efficient involved the distribution of seeds by Catholic Relief Services. While seeds were welcomed by beneficiaries, the seeds were distributed too late in the season resulting in disappointing harvests. It is vital to ensure that planning and procurement processes are reviewed so that seeds and any seasonal equipment is delivered in time to be used.

No fraud was observed or reported, even though this was also not directly inquired. During one interview, however, a community leader reported that a much higher amount of money had been distributed to the IP than what had been spent. With only one such report, no conclusion can be drawn about the potential of fraudulent use of funds. Beneficiaries don't necessarily often have a full picture of the project budgets, which can contribute to unrealistic expectations from partners and perceptions of underspending in communities.

Closely related to the concept of efficiency is the concept of Value for Money (VfM). When analysing VfM, not only the minimum price of an project activity needs to be taken into account, but also the maximum efficiency and effectiveness of the project activity, as well as equity. Since there are no systematic Value for Money indicators set out for the projects, analysis into this aspect is limited and hard conclusions cannot be drawn. However, stakeholders were in agreement that IPs provided high VfM even though some issues existed. For example, due to the low amount of available funds within the DCPSF, IPs felt pressured into implementing project activities with lower standards than what they would normally do, and often used other funding sources to complement their DCPSF projects (though this can also be interpreted as a positive VfM example as funds are used complementarily). This was especially the case for waterpoints. In addition, some remarks were made that IPs spend significant amounts of money on overheads and that money should be invested more effectively towards the beneficiaries.



### 4.3 EFFECTIVENESS

This section concerns the extent to which IPs have attained their goals.

In order to assess the overall effectiveness of projects implemented by the DCPSF, respondents were first asked the extent to which projects in their areas were implemented and delivered as promised. Overall, just 42% (n=169) indicated that promised project activities were fully delivered as promised, while a further 45% (n=183) reported that the activities were delivered somewhat as promised. Respondents in South Darfur were more likely to express satisfaction with broader project implementation, as shown in the figure below. In South Darfur, 50% (n=109) of respondents report that project activities were delivered fully as promised, compared to 33% (n=60) of respondents in West Darfur. Also of note are the high number of respondents who refused to respond to the question, a phenomenon that was concentrated in West Darfur; it is possible that respondents who refused to respond were hesitant to express negative opinions regarding the project. Therefore, the share of respondents who were dissatisfied with project implementation in West Darfur may actually be understated, to the extent that refusals represent likely negative opinions.

Figure 5. Was Project Delivered as Promised, by State





Figure 6. Share of Respondents who Feel Project Activities were Delivered as Promised, by Subgroups



There do not appear to be large gaps in satisfaction with project delivery across demographic subgroups. Youth and women are approximately as likely to report that projects were fully delivered as promised as



adults and men, respectively, as shown in the figure below. However, minority respondents were much less likely to be satisfied with project delivery: among minority respondents, just 20% (n=20) report full delivery, compared to 43% (n=149) among non-minority respondents.

Importantly, satisfaction with project delivery is also correlated with the extent to which respondents feel that their communities were consulted regarding the projects before their implementation. The majority of respondents report that members of their communities were either consulted “very much” or “somewhat.” Nonetheless, satisfaction with project delivery is clearly correlated with perceptions of consultation, as shown in the table below. Among respondents who report the highest levels of consultation, 72% (n=124) of respondents report that their local projects were delivered fully as promised. In contrast, among respondents reporting lower levels of consultation – either that their communities were consulted “somewhat” or that even less consultation occurred – just 24% (n=39) and 9% (n=6) of respondents report that projects were delivered fully as promised. Extensive community engagement, therefore, seems to be a strong predictor of satisfaction with project implementation.<sup>10</sup>

*Table 1. Satisfaction with Project Delivery as a Function of Pre-Project Consultation*

Response	Limited/no consultation	Some consultation	Significant consultation
<b>Yes, fully</b>	9%	24%	72%
<b>Yes, somewhat</b>	51%	65%	25%
<b>No, not at all</b>	41%	11%	3%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%

In the subchapters below, the effectiveness of activities under each of the outputs will be assessed. Aggregate data for each indicator will be analysed in order to assess the effectiveness of activities under each output. While some of the indicators are at the impact level, for the purpose of keeping the indicators together, they are all discussed in the chapters below. For the overall outcomes of the DCPSF, those are discussed under the impact section.

### **Output 1: Community-level Conflict Resolution Mechanisms**

From partner reporting (final reports)<sup>11</sup>, the level of achievement to key indicators for output 1 was high. Data for two indicators, however, could not be analysed:

- 1.1 Number of community based resolution mechanisms (CBRM) functioning
- 1.7 Number of vulnerable group representatives (women, youth, minorities) actively participating within CBRM

For indicator 1.1, the data could not be used as it was not always clear if partners were talking about CBRMs or other activities. For example, some partners also reported communal spaces under this indicator. For indicator 1.7, some partners reported the number of vulnerable persons in a CBRM, some the percentage of vulnerable persons in a CBRM, and some only reported if there were vulnerable persons included in the CBRM. This made the data unusable for comparison between projects.

<sup>10</sup> Speculatively, extensive consultation could improve project planning and implementation; alternatively, consultation could serve to set reasonable expectations and clarify the purpose of projects in advance, ensuring that community members are aware of what will be done and can judge implementation against a reasonable standard.

<sup>11</sup> More final reports were available than those used, but not all reports reported on specific indicators and sometimes the reporting was not usable for comparison between projects.



Table 2. Aggregate Result Output 1

Output 1	All	North Darfur	East Darfur	South Darfur	Central Darfur	West Darfur
<b>1.2 Percentage of community members with access to CBRM</b>	89% (25 projects)	85 % (4 projects)	98% (1 project)	93 % (6 projects)	100% (1 project)	85% (8 projects)
<b>1.3 Percentage of community members stating satisfaction with CBRM</b>	86% (23 projects)	81 % (3 projects)	99% (1 project)	91% (6 projects)	70% (1 project)	85% (7 projects)
<b>1.4 Percentage of the number of cases submitted that are successfully addressed</b>	88% (28 projects)	85% (4 projects)	97% (3 projects)	77% (7 projects)	100% (1 project)	91% (7 projects)
<b>1.5 Percentage of community members stating an increase in the percentage of cases submitted and successfully addressed</b>	83% (21 projects)	86% (2 projects)	98% (1 project)	78% (6 projects)	100% (1 project)	82% (6 projects)
<b>1.6 Percentage of community members stating a decrease in communal conflicts because of the presence of CBRM</b>	83% (21 projects)	83% (2 projects)	100% (1 project)	73% (6 projects)	90% (1 project)	87% (6 projects)

For the remaining indicators, it was reported that 89% of community members had access to CBRMs, 86% of community members were satisfied with the CBRMs, 88% of conflicts submitted to the CBRM were solved, 83% of community members stated that there had been an increase in the number of cases submitted and solved, and 83% of community members stated that there had been a decrease in communal conflict due to the CBRM. These percentages are high, but it needs to be taken into account that there was variation in terms of sampling methods, with multiple partners seemingly relying on direct beneficiaries rather than sampling the population as a whole, which would be more recommended to measure community-level effects. Some partners also relied on focus groups discussions and consequently often reported percentages unrealistically high (100%). It is thus not unlikely that the real percentages lay well below the reported percentages (except for indicator 1.4 – the random sampling method used in the evaluation suggests that only 77% of community members are aware of the CBRM to begin with). Considering the issues with partner reporting, it is not possible to give meaningful recommendations relating to the differences between states since those differences may well be the result of different data collection methods.

Nevertheless, data collected by the evaluation team also indicates very positive results from output 1 activities. While beneficiaries generally responded positively to all the implemented projects in their communities, when asked to single out particularly effective projects most pointed to the CBRM-related activities, indicating that the CBRMs indeed were the most effective mechanisms for local peace governance. This is not surprising, due to the significance of the CBRMs within the DCPSF framework.



*“The training I have received about peace building and conflict resolution has made me come to realize that if I want my community to develop, we will need to work together.”*

**- Community Leader -**

Before IPs implemented their projects, communities had relied on joudia as the primary mechanism for local peace governance. Even though the joudia have been able to solve numerous conflicts, some features of the joudia limited their effectiveness. First, joudia existed mostly of elderly men and did not represent all ethnic groups. As a consequence, decisions made by the joudia were not always accepted by the involved parties, especially youth. In addition, joudia were formed with different members for each case. Consequently, the members of the

joudia did not receive training in conflict resolution and peace building. Lastly, due to years of conflict, trust and confidence within and between communities was low and most community members did not interact with people from different ethnic groups or tribes.

Taking the situation into account, IPs would need to address trust within and between communities, representation within CBRMs, and knowledge of CBRM members. In order to realize this, IPs used broadly similar approaches which were tailored to the specific local context.

For example, one IP (Adventist Development and Relief Agency) in West Darfur started to address trust within the community through the establishment of a Community Development Committee (CDC). Members of the CDC consisted of people from different ethnic groups and included women and youth. The CDC was mobilized when disaster strikes. After a disaster, the CDC would make a community action plan and mobilize support for those that are affected by the disaster. All members of the CDC were given training in conflict resolution and peace building. This reportedly led to more interaction between different groups within the community and a change in attitude on how disputes should be handled. After the CDC was effectively functioning, a CBRM was established. The CBRM consisted

of a number of CDC members as well as a number of members not involved in the CDC. Again, focus was put on representation of different ethnic groups as well as women and youth. According to beneficiaries, this approach was highly effective and ensured a stark decrease in the number of disputes in and between communities.

#### Case Story

*“Not so long ago, a man stole a camel from a village in West Darfur. He came from the village in which he stole the camel and traveled the next day to a faraway market in order to sell the camel. What he did not realize is that the owner had already found out about the theft and they had come to realize he was the perpetrator. In the past, the victim would immediately have attacked the thief, possibly murdering him. However, the story ended different. The victim decided to go to the CBRM in order to ask for a solution for this problem. The CBRM, in which representatives of both ethnic groups (perpetrator and victim) are members decided to assess the price of the camel. A decision was made that the perpetrator has to pay back the money for the camel as well as some additional money for the crime he had committed. However, the man did not have this much money. He paid a significant amount of the money back immediately and made an agreement to pay the remainder back in installments.”*

**- Beneficiary -**



The results from the quantitative survey also broadly support the effectiveness of CBRM-related activities. Overall, 77% (n=419) of the respondents in the household survey were aware of CBRMs. As shown in the figure below, there were minor differences in awareness across states, with respondents in South Darfur marginally more likely (81%) to report being aware of a CBRM in their community than those in West Darfur (74%).<sup>12</sup>


Surprisingly, members of disadvantaged groups do not appear to be less likely to be aware of CBRMs, suggesting that IPs and CBRMs themselves conducted broad-based awareness-raising which reached a diverse set of community members equally. For instance, women were just as likely to report familiarity with the CBRM, and minorities were actually more likely (84.3%, n=91/108) to report awareness of a CBRM than non-minorities, at 76% (n=328/434).

Figure 7. Awareness of CBRMs, Overall and Among Demographic Subgroups



Among respondents who reported awareness of a CBRM in their community, the vast majority reported being satisfied with the CBRM and its operation. Respondents were asked to report their satisfaction with the CBRM in two contexts: the first concerned their general view of the CBRMs and their operation in their communities; the second was focused on respondents who had used the CBRM personally, and assessed whether they were satisfied with the resolution that they received.

Figure 8. Satisfaction with CBRM's Resolution of Their Personal Cases



As the figure above shows, most respondents were satisfied with the resolution of their personal cases. In total, 53% (n=137) of respondents indicated that they were very satisfied with the way that they CBRM

<sup>12</sup> Differences in awareness across states are marginally significant, with a p-value of 0.07.



handled their case, and a further 42% (n=108) stated that they were somewhat satisfied. The results of this question also hint at the share of disputes that the CBRMs handle within communities. Among respondents who were aware of the CBRM in their community, 63% (n=263/419) reported that they had personally used the CBRM – nearly half (45%) had used the CBRM more than once.


The results regarding satisfaction – which are restricted to respondents who have personally had a case before the CBRM – mirror the general satisfaction levels reported by a broader swathe of respondents. Specifically, of respondents who were aware of a CBRM in their community, 57% (n=239) reported that they were very satisfied with its operation, and a further 35% reported that they were somewhat satisfied. Just 8% (n=32) stated that they were either neutral or not at all satisfied with the operation of their local CBRM.

Importantly, levels of satisfaction appear to be correlated with the location of the respondent, as shown in the table below. Respondents in South Darfur report higher rates of satisfaction with their CBRM in both general terms and in terms of their personal cases. Just 44% (n=93) of respondents in West Darfur report being very satisfied with their CBRMs in general terms, and 9% (n=19) indicate that they are not at all satisfied with the organizations. In contrast, no respondents in South Darfur report being entirely dissatisfied with their CBRM in general, and 71% (n=146) report that they are very satisfied.

Table 3. Satisfaction with the Performance of CBRMs, by State

Response	With CBRMs in general		With resolution of personal case	
	West Darfur	South Darfur	West Darfur	South Darfur
<b>Very satisfied</b>	44%	71%	43%	64%
<b>Somewhat satisfied</b>	42%	28%	49%	35%
<b>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</b>	5%	1%	8%	0%
<b>Not at all satisfied</b>	9%	0%	1%	1%

Figure 9. General Satisfaction with CBRMs, among Youth and Adult Respondents



In contrast to these large – and statistically significant – differences in satisfaction levels across states, differences across other demographic groups are less stark. For instance, minority respondents were slightly more likely to report being very satisfied with their CBRMs in general and in their particular cases, though



this difference was small in both substantive and statistical terms. Women were less likely to indicate that they were very satisfied with the CBRMs; however, again, the differences between male and female respondents were not statistically significant. As shown in the figure below, youth were also less likely to report high levels of satisfaction with the CBRMs – just 54% (n=109) of youth report being very satisfied, compared to 60% (n=130) of non-youth (30 years and over) respondents. A similar difference emerged when respondents were asked about the disposition of their personal cases, with youth about 5 percentage points less likely to report being very satisfied with the outcome.<sup>13</sup>

Figure 10: Number of Disputes Addressed Through the CBRM (n=419)





Figure 11: Frequency of Which Conflicts are Successfully Resolved by CBRMs (n=542)



Furthermore, respondents from South Darfur were more positive about the effectiveness of CBRMs, with 62% (n=128) saying all conflicts were addressed by the CBRM. This was significantly higher than the 23% (n=50) in West Darfur. Similar trends were visible when respondents were asked about changes in the number of conflicts resolved by the CBRMs. While 40% (n=166) said this had strongly increased and 37%


<sup>13</sup> In the case of general satisfaction, the gap between youth and non-youth respondents was marginally significant (p=0.08) when using a chi-square test. In contrast, the difference between youth and non-youth in terms of satisfaction with their specific cases was not statistically significant (p=0.81), likely owing to the smaller sample of respondents who have had personal interaction with their local CBRM.



(n=157) said it had increased, this was significantly impacted by the perceived level of trust in a community, the project duration, and the state in which the project was implemented. Noteworthy is the high percentage of respondents that refused to answer this question, suggesting that it was a sensitive issue to address.

Respondents largely agreed that all (53%, n=185) or most (33%, n=117) of the conflicts brought to the CBRM were addressed successfully, and that success rates had increased over the last 12 months. Again, respondents from South Darfur indicated significantly more often that disputes were successfully resolved.

Figure 12. Perceptions of CBRMs, by State (100-point scale)



In order to further analyse differences in perceptions towards the CBRMs, a factor analysis was conducted (See: Methodology). Results indicated that perceptions about the functionality of the CBRMs differ significantly between states. On four of the five created dimensions, respondents in South Darfur provided more positive evaluations of the CBRMs – in each of the four cases, the gap vis-à-vis perceptions among respondents from West Darfur was substantively large and statistically significant. To illustrate, respondents in South Darfur scored CBRMs 86.7 on a 100-point scale, compared to a score of 72.9 in West Darfur, for management quality.

Table 4. Share of Respondents Indicating Strong Agreement with each Statement, by State


Question	West Darfur	South Darfur
<b>Clearly defined roles and responsibilities</b>	45.4	61.5
<b>Clear and fair selection process for members</b>	44.4	65.5
<b>Well-managed</b>	44.6	68.0
<b>Communicates decisions clearly</b>	42.4	65.1
<b>Members are well-trained</b>	40.0	60.2
<b>Clear guidelines for handling cases</b>	38.7	46.3
<b>Will function without support of NGOs</b>	27.9	48.5

It is difficult to interpret the magnitude of these indices (indices gain in interpretative strength through multiple data points), but the gaps identified across states are objectively large: the 13.8 point gap identified between South and West Darfur stems from large differences on each of the seven constituent variables, as



shown in the table below. The gaps observed for each of these seven questions are large; therefore, the 13.8-point gap observed in the aggregate index represents a substantively large difference between states.

Figure 13. Perceptions of CBRMs, by Educational Attainment



To assess perceptions divided by educational attainment, respondents were grouped into five broad categories of educational attainment. The lowest level includes individuals who have completed no formal education; the second lowest level includes those who have completed only religious education. The three upper tiers of educational attainment include those who have attended some primary school, those who completed primary school, and those who completed secondary school or beyond. As the figure below shows, the differences across educational levels are relatively small and inconsistent. For instance, there appears to be a pattern in which more educated individuals perceive CBRMs to be better managed; on the other hand, the opposite pattern obtains in the case of the range of conflicts handled well by CBRMs. Even in these two examples, in which there is a noticeable correlation between education and index score, the differences across groups are small.

All this leads to the conclusion that CBRMs are a highly effective mechanism for local peace governance. However, the wealth of dispute types, and the perceived differences in the CBRMs' ability to address them




lead to some seemingly contradictory findings, such as high satisfaction and support combined with the majorities agreeing that they should not be handling all types of disputes (76%) and that they handle conflicts that they have no expertise in (67%).

Indeed, qualitative interviews reveal that, while beneficiaries assess the CBRMs to be effective mechanisms for solving local disputes, their effectiveness in solving more serious crimes, including murder, is disputed. Most cases involving murder are therefore, as reported by community leaders and beneficiaries, referred to the court in the capital of the state. The CBRM is still involved sometimes in these cases and plays an active role to ensure the situation remains calm and no acts of retaliation are committed. For smaller cases, however, the CBRMs are perceived as more effective since they do not require the involved parties to travel to the state's capital and because people are in general adverse to seek for official interference.

***“While people have changed their attitude towards conflict, when a murder occurs, people still want to commit a revenge murder. Therefore, those cases need to be referred to the court.”***  
**- Community Leader -**

Figure 14: Types of Conflicts Resolved by the CBRMs, According to Community Members (n=263)



The household survey as well as the desk review show that CBRMs are, nevertheless, used for a variety of different disputes - the vast majorities of conflicts resolved by the CBRMs were conflicts between farmers and herders, which is in line with the conflict dynamics identified in the projects areas and the analysis of conflict drivers regionally. The figure above shows the type of conflict handled by the CBRMs according to respondents in the household survey and the figure below shows the type of conflicts handled by the CBRMs according to the desk review.

The desk review, which was only based on documents from 6<sup>14</sup> projects reveals that 28<sup>15</sup> CBRMs handled 375 cases in the span of a year. Most cases handled relate to crop destruction, followed by family disputes and


<sup>14</sup> Annual reports with this type of data was only available for 6 projects

<sup>15</sup> For one project, the result appeared not to be split up by individual CBRMs (UNDP). For these results, the data is assumed to be from one CBRM



crimes (no murder). As such, while the qualitative interviews indicate that CBRMs are unable to deal with cases of serious crimes, this data indicates that some CBRMs are able to solve murder cases. Further research is needed to explore what lies behind the finding that some CBRMs are unable to deal with more serious crime cases. Furthermore, 91% of all cases brought to the CBRM were solved successfully and 4% was referred to the court. This is indicative of a very high effectiveness of the CBRMs.

Figure 15. Types of Conflicts Addressed, Solved, and Referred by the CBRMs



## Output 2: Shared Livelihood Assets and Income Generating Opportunities

Table 5. Aggregate Result Output 2

Output 2	All	North Darfur	East Darfur	South Darfur	Central Darfur	West Darfur
<b>2.3 Percentage of community members stating an increase in the economic interventions between diverse communities</b>	82% (17 projects)	84% (2 projects)	100% (1 project)	73% (5 projects)	78% (1 project)	82% (5 projects)



Again, partner reporting (final reports)<sup>16</sup> was used to measure the level of achievement to key indicators for output 2. The results indicated a high level of success, but two indicators could not be used for comparison:

- 2.1 Number of community initiatives that deliver collaborative livelihoods & income generating opportunities (including joint labour, trading, community youth and women)
- 2.2 Number of new/re-established markets that enable diverse communities to interact/cooperate

For indicator 2.1, the data could not be used for comparison due to the variety of initiatives that were reported by partners. In addition, some partners reported each persons involved in an activity (e.g. training) as a separate initiative while others would report the activity (e.g. training) as one initiative. For indicator 2.2 it was often unclear if partners were talking about markets or only market stalls. For future reporting, it is recommended to revisit the indicators and develop indicators that do not allow for different interpretation. Focus should also be given to ensure data from indicators can easily be compared between partners. Only then can the results of all partners be used to assess which partners yield the best results and what differences between states exist.

For the remaining indicator (2.3), it was reported that 82% of community members stated an increase in the economic interventions between diverse communities. As with the indicators under output 1, however, there was wide variation in terms of sampling methods, with multiple partners seemingly relying on focus groups discussion or surveys among direct beneficiaries rather than sampling the population as a whole.

Beneficiaries, nevertheless, were generally satisfied with the activities conducted under this output. While some beneficiaries explained that the activities had led to an increase in livelihood opportunities, others reported issues with the implemented activities, the main issue being that while a lot of women had been able to increase their income, this was only seasonal.

*Table 6. Construction and Rehabilitation of Markets, in Respondent's and Neighboring Communities*

Response	West Darfur	South Darfur	Total
<b>In Respondents' Community</b>			
<b>No new markets or rehabilitation</b>	45%	54%	49%
<b>Rehabilitation</b>	21%	15%	18%
<b>New Market</b>	5%	7%	6%
<b>Both Rehabilitation and a New Market</b>	29%	25%	27%
<b>In Neighbouring Communities</b>			
<b>No new markets or rehabilitation</b>	54%	61%	57%
<b>Rehabilitation</b>	6%	13%	10%
<b>New Market</b>	6%	8%	7%
<b>Both Rehabilitation and a New Market</b>	34%	18%	26%

Questions from the quantitative survey, which focused primarily on the construction and rehabilitation, intended to improve livelihoods opportunities for community members, and encourage economic interaction within and across communities, revealed high usage and satisfaction among beneficiaries. Implementation of

<sup>16</sup> More final reports were available than those used, but not all reports reported on specific indicators and sometimes the reporting was not usable for comparison between projects.




market construction and rehabilitation, however, was not as extensive as the formation of CBRMs described above. As shown in the table above, approximately half (51%, n=275/542) of respondents were aware of a newly-constructed or rehabilitated market – or both – in their communities. These rates were slightly lower, unsurprisingly, when respondents were asked about implementation in neighbouring communities, with 43% (n=230/537) of respondents stating that they were aware of a market that had been constructed or rehabilitated in a neighbouring community. Performance on this metric was marginally better in West Darfur than in South Darfur, with a higher share of respondents in West Darfur reporting that a market had been constructed or rehabilitated in both their own communities and in neighbouring communities.

Usage of the new or improved facilities appears to be widespread and broad-based. Among those who live in a community with a new or refurbished market, the vast majority (91%, n=249/275) use the market to buy and sell products. Surprisingly, a nearly equal share of respondents report that they use newly-established or refurbished market facilities in neighbouring communities – where such facilities were made available, 88% (n=203/230) of respondents report that they use them to buy and sell products, despite the fact that they are in neighbouring communities.

In the case of both local markets and markets in neighbouring communities, there is a slight bias toward usage of the markets by locals. This is not altogether surprising, because individuals are naturally more likely to use markets within their community, strictly as a function of proximity. However, this gap between usage by locals versus usage by members of neighbouring communities is small – much smaller than might be expected if conflict or tension were preventing individuals from different communities from interacting. The median respondent indicated, in the case of either newly-constructed or refurbished markets, that they were used equally by members of their own community and members of neighbouring communities.

Figure 16. Satisfaction with New and Rehabilitated Markets



To illustrate, consider respondents who report that a market was constructed or refurbished in a nearby community. As noted above, the median respondent indicated that these markets were used equally by “locals” and by members of other communities, including their own. Just 10% (n=23/230) of respondents believed that those markets were used exclusively by members of the communities where they were built, and another 21% (n=48/230) believed that they were used mostly by members of those communities. A



surprisingly high share of respondents (68%, n=156/230) reported that markets in neighbouring communities were used equally, or even more often, by “outsiders.”<sup>17</sup>

Among communities where markets had been constructed or refurbished, there is relatively high satisfaction with the new facilities. As shown in the figure below, 50% (n=137/275) of respondents were very satisfied with facilities provided in their own communities, and 50% (n=116/230) were very satisfied with facilities provided in neighbouring communities. Dissatisfaction is extremely low in both cases.

### Output 3: Management of Natural Resources and Access to basic Social Services Increased

Table 7. Aggregate Result Output 3

Output 3	All	North Darfur	East Darfur	South Darfur	Central Darfur	West Darfur
<b>3.4 Percentage of community members confirming communal consensus around restoration of migratory routes/ pasture/fodder /communal forests</b>	88% (16 projects)	77% (2 projects)	100% (1 project)	88% (6 projects)	N/A	89% (4 projects)
<b>3.6 Percentage of community members stating an increase in the number of interactions between diverse communities through basic services (health initiatives, schools, vocational education, water)</b>	90% (19 projects)	81% (2 projects)	100% (1 project)	90% (6 projects)	N/A	88% (5 projects)

From partner reporting (final reports)<sup>18</sup>, the level of achievement to key indicators for output 3 appeared to be high. Most indicators (4), however, had to be excluded from the analysis:

- 3.1 Number of community based management mechanisms for natural resource (water, pasture, forest reserves, migration routes, minerals, etc.)
- 3.2 Number of migratory routes demarcated / cleared /rehabilitated through communal consensus
- 3.3 Number of areas of restoration of communal pasture/fodder/ communal forests

*“I really appreciate the projects implemented in this community, but the scale is insufficient. More projects are needed to establish sustainable peace and to develop the community.”*

**- Beneficiaries -**

<sup>17</sup> Notably, minorities were no less likely to make use of local markets or markets in neighbouring communities than non-minority respondents.

<sup>18</sup> More final reports were available than those used, but not all reports reported on specific indicators and sometimes the reporting was not usable for comparison between projects.

### 3.5 Number of social service infrastructure rehabilitated/newly built

For indicator 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, a comparison between projects was not possible due to the differences in reporting style as well as the wide variety of activities that fall under each of these indicators. For example, some partners reported the number of migration routes demarcated, while others reported how many kilometres of migration route were demarcation. As for output 2, the evaluation teams recommends to revisit the indicators and develop new indicators that do not allow for different interpretations and can be easily used for comparison between partners.

For the remaining indicator, it was reported that 88% of community members confirmed communal consensus around restoration of migratory routes/pasture/fodder/communal forests and that 90% of community members stating an increase in the number of interactions between diverse communities through basic services (health initiatives, schools, vocational education, water). As with the indicators under output 1 and 2, however, there was wide variation in terms of sampling methods. Consequently, for now, it is impossible to accurately analyse partner effectiveness or differences between states.

*“Conflicts used to be common in this community, most often between people from different ethnic groups. However, now we send our children to the same school and we make use of the same waterpoint”*  
**- Beneficiaries -**

Figure 17. Waterpoint in West Darfur (Left) and School Rehabilitation in West Darfur (Right)



Nevertheless, results from the qualitative interviews reveal high satisfaction among beneficiaries with the activities implemented under this output, especially the construction of waterpoints. Most beneficiaries also agreed that these hard activities had a positive effect on conflict as they brought together people from different



background and learned them to cooperate with each other. The main issue reported by beneficiaries relates to the scale of the activities. Most beneficiaries agreed that in order to create sustainable peace, more activities addressing the root causes of conflict are needed.

#### **Output 4: A network of Peacebuilding Initiatives**

From partner reporting (final reports)<sup>19</sup>, it could not be established what the level of achievement to key indicators for output 4 was because all three outputs below were not comparable between projects:

- 4.1 Number of civil society organizations able to prioritize, plan, design and implement priority projects leading to equitable and sustainable growth (including livelihoods, vocational training, employability)
- 4.2 Number of Civil Society implementing and practicing peacebuilding activities
- 4.3 Number of collective interaction of conflict resolution mechanisms with state and regional fora and agenda

The overall operationalisation of output 4 is weak and more could be done to implement Output 4. IPs should be encouraged and obliged to participate in exchange of good practice and networking, for which a more precise definition of activities, as well as the relevant platforms and possibilities need to be created by DCPSF.

#### **4.4 IMPACT**

This section considers the extent to which Implementing Partners and their projects have led to intended or unintended, direct or indirect, positive and negative impacts. In contrast to effectiveness, which largely measures the implementation of the programme in terms of outputs, impact concerns downstream effects of the programme on key outcomes of interest, such as trust, peacebuilding, and economic interactions within and between communities alike. In this section, we show that – in the areas included in the evaluation – there were marked increases in trust and economic interactions, and a similarly stark decrease in the number of intra- and inter-communal conflicts. Tentatively, it appears that these changes can be contributed at least in part to the impact of programme efforts.

##### **Economic Interaction**

The first aspect of impact evaluated in the project-level portion of this report focuses on economic interactions. DCPSF programming was designed, in part, to increase economic interactions between and within communities. Trade between communities has the potential to increase trust and foster the creation of mutually beneficial local trading networks. Interactions in the marketplace can foster understanding between diverse communities. Moreover, by encouraging local trade, DCPSF sought to increase livelihoods and income-generating opportunities for beneficiaries.

Economic interactions within and between communities are common, according to respondents, but they are not as free-flowing as they could be. Respondents were asked to indicate when economic interactions take place within and between communities; they selected from five response options, representing increasingly less common interactions:

- Economic interactions are common every day and at all times of day

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
<sup>19</sup> More final reports were available than those used, but not all reports reported on specific indicators and sometimes the reporting was not usable for comparison between projects.



- Economic interactions are common every day, but only at specific times
- Economic interactions are common only on certain days, but at all times
- Economic interactions are common only on certain days and at specific times
- Economic interactions are uncommon

If interaction can occur at any time of day, on any day, it indicates that economic interactions are casual and straightforward. If interactions occur either only at specific times, on specific days, or both, it suggests increasingly more restrictive bounds in which interactions can occur, which limit interactions and also suggest less extra-market interaction is occurring (i.e. socializing). Finally, in the most extreme case, economic interactions are uncommon altogether.

Figure 18: Frequency of Economic Interaction Within and Between Communities



As the figure above illustrates, individuals operate under a widely varying set of boundaries when seeking to engage in market transactions. For around one-quarter of respondents, they are able to engage in transactions on any day, and at all times of day, with either members of their own community or members of neighbouring communities. Somewhat more common, however, is the case where market interactions happen primarily on specific days, but at all times during those days (i.e. “market days”).

While there do not appear to be major distinctions between intra- and inter-communal interactions with respect to frequency – though intra-communal interactions are marginally more frequent than inter-communal interactions – there are significant differences at the state level and among certain demographic groups. Most dramatically, respondents in South Darfur are much more likely to report that economic transactions can happen on any day and at any time than their counterparts in West Darfur; in the case of inter-communal interactions, they are over five times more likely to select the most common or frequency option, compared to West Darfuris. Youth are also more likely to report frequent economic interactions; however, the difference between youth and non-youth is not statistically significant.


At the same time, minority respondents are significantly less likely to report that economic transactions happen on the most casual or liberal calendar. In the case of intra-communal economic interactions, just 20%



(n=22/108) of minority respondents indicated that they could trade any day at nearly any time, while 30% (n=129/432) of non-minority respondents answered similarly. It is possible that minorities, owing to their marginalized position, may be more cautious regarding market transactions, or may be side-lined via some other mechanism. This finding could help explain why minority respondents do not report as large of gains in trust as others – if such respondents are unable to freely interact with others in the market, they may build social networks of trust more slowly.

Unsurprisingly, when asked to assess changes in economic interactions over time, respondents overwhelmingly report that transactions have increased over the year prior. The figure below shows that increases in transactions were reported almost equally for both intra- and inter-communal interactions.

Figure 19: Perceived Changes in Frequency of Economic Transactions, Within and Between Communities



While youth and South Darfuris were both more likely to report frequent economic interactions, both groups are also more likely than their peers to report an increase in economic interactions over the prior year. For instance, 30% (n=75/252) of youth report that intra-communal trade has increased a lot over the past year, compared to just 22% (n=63/283) among non-youth respondents.<sup>20</sup> South Darfur provides an even starker contrast to its counterpart, Darfur West: respondents in the former are approximately four times more likely than respondents in the former to report that both intra- and inter-communal transactions have increased a lot over the last year.<sup>21</sup>

A final metric for measuring the extent of economic interactions focuses on the construction and/or rehabilitation of markets in beneficiary communities and neighbouring communities. As noted in a previous section, DCPSF programming included construction and/or refurbishing a number of markets, in an attempt to promote livelihoods opportunities for residents in the programme area.

Respondents who live near such a new or refurbished market – either in their village or a neighbouring village – were asked to describe who uses the market facilities for buying and selling goods. If economic interactions between communities are rare, we should observe a situation in which respondents report that markets in

<sup>20</sup> However, differences between youth and non-youth in terms of changes in both intra- and inter-communal trade fail to reach statistical significance.

<sup>21</sup> In both cases, the differences between South and West Darfur are significant at all conventional levels ( $p < .01$ ).



their own communities are primarily used by “locals”, i.e. residents of their community. At the same time, we should observe that markets in neighbouring communities are primarily used by “locals”, i.e. residents of the neighbouring community, as well. In contrast, if “outsiders” or “neighbours” come to a respondent’s community to use the market, it suggests that inter-communal economic transactions are somewhat common; the same logic applies to respondents who report that markets in neighbouring villages attract many “outsiders.”

*Table 8: Use of Markets by "Locals" and "Neighbours" as a Measure of Economic Interaction*

Who uses market?	Market in home community	Market in neighbouring community
<b>Only locals</b>	10%	10%
<b>Mostly locals</b>	26%	21%
<b>Equally locals and neighbours</b>	46%	46%
<b>Mostly neighbours</b>	17%	21%
<b>Only neighbours</b>	1%	2%

The results of this analysis are provided in the table below. Immediately, it is clear that the median respondent sees markets being shared by both “locals” (defined relative to the market’s location) and “neighbours” (again, defined relative to the market’s location). Among respondents who live in villages with a new or refurbished market, 46% (n=126/272) stated that the market is used equally by local residents and individuals from neighbouring communities. Importantly, a significant minority (17%, n=45/272) of respondents report that their local market is used more frequently by their neighbours than by “locals.” The same pattern holds for markets that were built or refurbished in neighbouring communities.

This result suggests that economic interactions are relatively unhampered in many project communities. Market days may occur less frequently than they could, but there appears to be significant mixing of communities in the marketplace, which means that interaction – in both economic and social terms – is inevitable. Moreover, there does not appear to be a perception that a neighbouring village’s market is closed to you, which we would expect if there were significant inter-communal tensions that prevented traveling with products (due to insecurity) or entering a different communities’ market.

The latter argument – that economic interactions are not foreclosed by tensions – is buttressed by the fact that a majority (89%, n=203/229) of respondents indicate that they make use of new or refurbished markets in neighbouring villages. If local tensions were severe or spilled over into the economic realm, such participation in markets outside of one’s own village would be difficult. In reality, female and minority respondents are actually more likely to report using neighbouring markets than male and non-minority respondents, respectively, providing further suggestive evidence that economic interactions are generally unimpeded by insecurity at the local level.

### **Trust**

The second aspect of impact evaluated in the project-level portion of this report focuses on trust. One of the key goals of DCPSF is to foster increased trust within communities fractured by decades of conflict. Specifically, the programme sought to increase trust within communities (intra-communal) and between diverse communities (inter-communal). As trust is a building block of stable economic and social interactions, it is a fundamental ingredient for promoting peace and economic recovery in the region.



For the measurement of trust, the evaluation team relies on two data sources. The first is reporting from IPs, who sampled community members to determine whether trust had been restored to project communities, and whether local leaders had agreed to participate in a collaborative approach to address root causes of conflict in the area.

From partner reporting, the level of achievement to key indicators was high, as reported in the table below. From a sample of 32 projects where final reports were available, 82% (85% for window 1 and 75% for window 2) of community members declared that trust and confidence was restored, and 85% (88% for window 1 and 76% for window 2) of tribal and civil society leaders sampled agreed to common and collaborative approaches for addressing root causes of conflict. It has to be taken into account, however, that there was variation in terms of sampling methods, with multiple partners seemingly relying on direct beneficiaries rather than sampling the population as a whole, which would be more recommended to measure community-level effects. It is thus not unlikely that the real percentages lay below the reported percentages. Furthermore, the evaluation team considers the tools that measure these key outcomes for partners to be imperfectly operationalised. Trust and confidence are complex terms, as is “restored”. The answer options relating to a binary yes/no imperfectly capture the nuance of increasing trust. Further work on capturing the various aspects of trust should be conducted, and the tools harmonised across partners, in order to produce more consistent and comparable data allowing for deeper analysis.

Table 9. Aggregate Result for Outcomes


Outcome	All	North Darfur	East Darfur	South Darfur	Central Darfur	West Darfur
<b>1. % of community members sampled declaring that trust &amp; confidence is restored</b>	82% (25 projects)	82% (3 projects)	88% (1 project)	78% (6 projects)	91% (1 project)	84% (8 projects)
<b>2. % of tribal/civil society leaders sampled agreeing to a common and/or collaborative approach on how to address root causes of conflict</b>	88% (20 projects)	81% (2 projects)	94% (1 project)	88% (6 projects)	86% (1 project)	87% (7 projects)

The second data source regarding trust is drawn from the quantitative household survey conducted as part of this evaluation. In general, data from this alternative source supports the reporting provided above. As we show below, both intra-communal and inter-communal trust has increased over the last 12 months, based on reports from a sample of 542 respondents.

First, it is important to note that respondents report relatively high levels of trust in general, not accounting for changes over time. As the figure below shows, over half of respondents (51%, n=274/542) report that intra-communal trust is very high, and a further 39% (n=209/542) perceive it to be somewhat high. Given the conflictual nature of Darfuri society, a surprisingly small share of respondents indicated that intra-communal trust was either somewhat or very low.



Figure 20. Perceived Intra- and Inter-Communal Trust Levels



Results are slightly less encouraging in the case of inter-communal trust levels (i.e. trust between one's community and other, neighbouring communities). As the graph above shows, respondents were less likely to indicate that inter-communal trust was very high, relative to trust within communities. Nonetheless, inter-communal trust was generally somewhat higher or very high, with a significant minority (13%, n=69/542) taking the neutral option and declaring that trust is neither high nor low.

Trust of both kinds appears to be higher in South Darfur and among youth, in general. Respondents in South Darfur were twice as likely as their peers in West Darfur to indicate that intra-communal trust was very high; the gap is similarly high in the case of inter-communal trust. Meanwhile, youth are slightly more likely to report high intra- and inter-communal trust levels, though the differences between youth and adult respondents was not statistically significant at conventional levels.

Several factors were found to significantly influence the perceived trust in the community. For example, respondents who were aware of CBRMs in their community were significantly more likely to rate trust higher, suggesting that CBRMs do not only effectively address conflicts but also lead to higher levels of trust between community members, a key programming goal. Due to this impact, some IPs also implemented the concept in their wider peace and governance programming.<sup>22</sup> In addition, respondents in South Darfur perceived trust to be higher than those in West Darfur, as do beneficiaries of a project with a longer duration. This shows that the longer a project was implemented, the higher beneficiaries rate trust in their community – providing initial, tentative evidence that DCPSF programming had a direct impact on trust levels.

***“We have seen that over time, trust can be matured: people regain a sense of community and stop organizing themselves along tribal lines.”***  
**- Implementing Partner -**

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 24 May 2017.



Despite the high levels of trust reported, respondents also reported significant increases in trust over one year prior.<sup>23</sup> As shown in the table below, the median respondent reported that intra- and inter-communal trust alike increased a bit over the stated period. This result masks the extent to which trust is reported to have increased, however – while fully 74% (n=401/539) of respondents reported that intra-communal trust had increased, either a little or a lot, just 6% (n=32/539) of respondents reported the opposite, that intra-communal trust had decreased. Nearly identical findings obtain in the case of inter-communal trust.

As with overall levels of trust, South Darfur respondents are more likely to report significant increases in trust – of both kinds – than their West Darfur counterparts. The former are approximately twice as likely to report that intra-communal trust has increased a lot, and more than twice as likely to report that inter-communal trust has increased a lot. In contrast, minority respondents are less likely to report an increase in both kinds of trust, though the gap between minorities and non-minorities is relatively small and fails to achieve statistical significance.

*Table 10: Changes in Perceived Trust over the Previous Year*

Change in Trust	Intra-Communal	Inter-Communal
<b>Increased a lot</b>	34%	34%
<b>Increased a bit</b>	41%	42%
<b>Neither increased nor decreased</b>	20%	2%
<b>Decreased a bit</b>	5%	3%
<b>Decreased a lot</b>	1%	1%

Although self-reported trust has clearly increased over the prior 12 months, it is not clear that this change can be attributed to DCPSF programming or individual projects funded through DCPSF. A number of secular trends or idiosyncratic shocks could explain a rapid increase in trust, even in the absence of the DCPSF intervention; for instance, a widespread decline in inter-communal conflict – perhaps changed by shifting patterns of alliances – could increase trust across both communities that have and communities that have not received programmatic intervention. In the absence of a comparison group to control for over-time trends that would have occurred in the absence of intervention, it is not possible to determine the true impact of DCPSF programming on trust levels.


Although we cannot attribute shifts in trust to project activities directly in the absence of a suitable control or comparison group, we employ an imperfect alternative, in which we ask respondents whether project activities themselves were responsible for changes in trust. The results from this question – in the context of inter-communal trust – broken down by state, are reported in the figure below. Overall, 35% (n=155/445) stated that inter-communal trust increased strongly as a result of project activities, while a further 42% (n=185/445) claim that trust increased more moderately as a result of project activities.

As the graph below illustrates, residents of South Darfur were much more likely to attribute changes in trust to project activities; this fits with their generally more optimistic view of intra- and inter-communal trust alike – they reported both higher levels of trust and greater gains in trust than residents of West Darfur.

<sup>23</sup> Conclusions based on changes in trust levels should be interpreted with caution – self-reported values on characteristics like trust are notoriously difficult for respondents to provide accurately, and may be subject to a number of cognitive and social biases. For instance respondents are aware that the project sought to increase trust, they may misrepresent the extent to which trust has increased, to satisfy an organisation that has helped their community (a common version of this bias is often called “courtesy bias”).



Figure 21: Changes in Inter-Communal Trust Attributed to Project Activities, by State



In contrast to respondents from South Darfur, minority respondents appear to be particularly pessimistic regarding trust in their communities. While minority respondents reported similar levels of current trust as their majority neighbours, they were less likely to report an increase in either intra- or inter-communal trust. Similarly they are less likely to attribute positive changes in trust to project activities: just 17% (n=17/98) of minority respondents reported that trust had increased significantly in response to project activities, compared to 40% (n=138/347) among majority respondents.

Beyond basic demographic factors, a number of other considerations appear to influence respondents' reports regarding changes in trust. Because of the centrality of the CBRMs to programming – and the role that representation on the CBRMs plays in local communities – the evaluation team hypothesized that members of traditionally marginalized groups (women, youth, and minorities) would be more likely to report increases in trust when they felt that they were properly and fairly represented on the CBRM. At the same time, members of such groups that felt their group was underrepresented would be less likely to report increases in trust.

Table 11: Perceived Representation as a Predictor of Perceived Changes in Trust

Trust has increased a lot	Feel well-represented	Feel underrepresented
<b>Intra-Communal Trust</b>		
<b>Youth</b>	52%	32%
<b>Women</b>	49%	27%
<b>Minorities</b>	45%	24%
<b>Inter-Communal Trust</b>		
<b>Youth</b>	57%	33%
<b>Women</b>	50%	29%
<b>Minorities</b>	38%	24%

To investigate this hypothesis, we defined two categories of these marginalized groups: the first are respondents who report that their group is well-represented in the CBRM, indicating that the CBRM represents their group either very well or somewhat well. The second group are those that feel particularly



underrepresented, reporting that their group has the least access to the CBRM from a list of marginalized groups. We then studied whether these two groups of youth, for instance, reported different changes in trust over the previous year.


The results are provided in the table on the previous page. 52% of youth who feel represented report that intra-communal trust has increased a lot; meanwhile, just 32% of youth who feel underrepresented report the same. A similar pattern can be observed across all three marginalized groups and in terms of both intra- and inter-communal trust. The most likely explanation for this pattern is that respondents' trust in local justice institutions – and, by extension, trust that their neighbours will treat them well – is buttressed by inclusion and representation in local justice institutions.<sup>24</sup> This finding makes plain the importance of descriptive representation, in which individuals are represented directly by members of their group.

### Conflict

The final aspect of impact evaluated in the project-level portion of this report focuses on conflict. In general, the quantitative data collected supports the hypothesis that DCPSF activities were effective in reducing conflict. Respondents' perception of the frequency of conflict is influenced by the duration of the project implemented in their community, as well as the state in which it was implemented. Respondents in South Darfur as well as beneficiaries of projects with longer duration significantly more often reported less conflict. This suggests that projects with longer cycles, even when completed a year or more ago, continued to contribute to more positive perceptions.

Before drawing inferences regarding the impact of the programme on conflict levels, it is important to consider the level of conflict in intervention communities at the current time. The figure below reports the perceived frequency of disputes over the past year. Although it is difficult to gauge the extent of conflict without a frame of reference, disputes appear to be relatively common – approximately half (47%) of respondents report that disputes occur in their community either very or somewhat often.

Figure 22. Perceived Occurrence of Disputes over the Past 12 Months



With respect to conflict frequency, there were no significant differences between youth and adults, or between men and women. Youth and women were equally likely to report frequency disputes, relative to

<sup>24</sup> An alternative interpretation is that respondents who feel represented are more positive in their general outlook, and interpret that broadly positive outlook as an increase in trust. This is a plausible alternative, though it requires an assumption that respondents are unable to distinguish trust from more generalized “positive feelings.”




adults and men, respectively. At the same time, minority respondents were much more likely to report frequent disputes. In fact, 65% (n=70/108) of minority respondents reported that disputes occurred either somewhat or very often in their communities; among non-minority respondents, the same rate was just 43% (n=185/434).<sup>25</sup>

In contrast to the results presented regarding trust, above, respondents in South Darfur were slightly more likely to report frequency conflict.<sup>26</sup> This difference appears to be driven primarily by a large number of West Darfuris reporting that disputes in their communities are either very or somewhat rare; no equivalent group exists among the South Darfuri respondents. This finding contrasts with the generally optimistic results reported regarding trust, with residents of South Darfur reporting high trust and significant gains in trust over the previous year.

While dispute frequencies seem to be relatively high, beneficiaries were generally in agreement that the number of conflicts had decreased in the last year, as shown in the figure below. A large majority of respondents, 79% (n=427/542), perceive the frequency of disputes in their communities to have declined over that time, and the next-largest group believes that the frequency has not changed. Virtually no respondents believe dispute frequency has increased relative to one year prior.

Figure 23: Perceived Change in Occurrence of Disputes over the Past 12 Months



As with trust, shifts in the frequency of conflict are driven partially by geography. Residents of South Darfur are significantly more likely to report a decrease in dispute frequency than residents in West Darfur – nearly half (49%, n=124/255) of South Darfuris claim that the number of disputes has decreased strongly, compared to just 20% (n=58/287) of West Darfuris. This finding fits with those reported earlier, in which South Darfur respondents reported large gains in trust over the same one-year timespan.

When asked whether project activities contributed to greater peace and stability in their communities, respondents attributed a similar amount of credit to project activities as they did when asked about changes in trust. That is, the vast majority of respondents claim that project activities contributed in some way to gains in peace and stability, but the median respondent sees a moderate level of contribution (equivalent to “contributed somewhat”) in the figure below. Respondents in South Darfur were more generous in this


<sup>25</sup> This difference is statistically significant when using a chi-square test ( $p < .01$ ).

<sup>26</sup> Using a chi-square test, the difference between South and West Darfur respondents is statistically significant, with  $p = 0.01$ .



respect, with over half (52%, n=115/221) indicating that project activities contributed greatly to reductions in conflict.

Figure 24: Contribution of Projects to Community Peace and Stability, by State



To gain greater insight into the perceived role of project activities in promoting peace and reducing conflict, we reviewed respondents' answers to two additional questions from the quantitative survey. Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the following two statements:

- The Community-Based Resolution Mechanism in my community has had an effect on the number of disputes in this community
- The CBRM has contributed to improved relations between communities and community members

These questions allow us to triangulate respondents' assessments of the influence that DCPSF programming had on conflict in their communities. Notably, these statements concern only CBRMs; however, since CBRMs are the central consistent component of DCPSF programming – and they are particularly oriented toward conflict resolution – this serves as an appropriate test of their impact on local conflict levels.

Table 12: Perceived CBRM Contributions to Peace, by State

Response	CBRM has impacted number of disputes in community		CBRM has contributed to improved relations between and within communities	
	West Darfur	South Darfur	West Darfur	South Darfur
<b>Strongly agree</b>	42%	58%	47%	67%
<b>Somewhat agree</b>	43%	39%	38%	30%
<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	7%	3%	5%	3%
<b>Somewhat disagree</b>	6%	0%	5%	0%
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2%	1%	4%	1%



As shown in the table on the previous page, the vast majority of respondents believe that CBRMs have impacted the number of disputes and improved relations in communities, as well as between communities. Overall, around half of respondents strongly agree with each statement: 50% (n=206/414) of respondents strongly agree that CBRMs have impacted the number of disputes in their community, and 57% (n=237/417) strongly agree that CBRMs have helped improve relations within and between communities. The table, which breaks down response types by state, also illustrates the fact that respondents from South Darfur are more likely to give credit to CBRMs for affecting change with regard to conflict.<sup>27</sup> This is consistent with the findings reported above, in which South Darfuri respondents were much more likely to claim that project activities had contributed greatly to a reduction in conflict in their communities.

## 4.5 SUSTAINABILITY

This section considers the extent to which IPs achieved results that are likely to continue after project conclusion. To assess the sustainability of achieved results, the strength of partnerships formed between projects and other entities, the extent of community buy-in with regard to CBRMs, and beneficiaries' own perceptions of the sustainability of projects is analysed.

All projects under DCPSF are required to focus on sustainability, primarily through partnerships. Across projects, partnerships take place at different levels:

- Ministries and relevant government
- UN agencies
- Implementing Partners
- Community leaders and members

Developing these partnerships was challenging in a number of ways. First, ministries and relevant government agencies are hesitant to work on matters relating to conflict resolution and peace building. This attitude stands in the way of government agencies becoming involved in project activities and finally taking over. Secondly, partnerships with UN agencies are hard to get off the ground. While the willingness to establish partnership exists, this has not yet resulted in optimal results. Talks, however, have started and it is recommended to continue these. Thirdly, IPs do not effectively share knowledge and tools amongst each other, critically endangering the sustainability of projects. At the moment, information and knowledge sharing occurs within projects, but not between projects. For example, CBRMs were not found to exchange knowledge about how to best handle certain types of conflicts, even though this type of information exchange is likely to result in more effective handling of cases.

On a more positive note, community leaders and members are involved in projects to a large degree and there is significant community buy-in and participation within CBOs/CBRMs. If CBRMs are going to continue to function after the lifecycle of individual projects is complete, they will require significant support from the communities in which they operate. Community buy-in is essential to ensuring that resolutions from the CBRM are honoured; without such buy-in, or active enforcement, resolutions are toothless, and community members will be less likely to take their disputes to the CBRM in the first place. Community support can be expanded over time, but needs a strong base from which to start.


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<sup>27</sup> Outside of these state-level differences, there are no substantively meaningful differences in responses across demographic groups, including minorities/non-minorities, men/women, and youth/adults.



The qualitative evidence suggests that beneficiaries are eager to solve their own issues and keen for structures to be handed over. However, while beneficiaries report a high interest in the continuation of the CBRMs, it needs to be taken into account that beneficiaries often serve self-interest and CBRMs are therefore more likely to become neglected when no follow-up takes place. IPs share this concern, even though the vast majority of CBRMs visited in location where project activities were finished were still functional. There are some IPs who follow-up with CBRMs after a project has finished. However, this is not always possible, especially in cases when an IP discontinues working in a certain area after the project has ended. As such, a follow-up system is necessary to ensure that established structures remain active and sufficiently resourced.

Figure 25: How Often are CBRM Resolutions Respected by Those Involved in a Dispute?



According to data from the household survey, community buy-in, with regard to the CBRMs' role, is moderately high. Overall, 45% (n=182) and 35% (n=141) of respondents stated that CBRM resolutions are respected either very often or somewhat often by parties to the dispute. As shown in the figure below, these numbers mask a significant gap between states, however. Respondents in South Darfur report much higher buy-in from parties to a dispute, with 62% (n=127) of respondents stating that disputing parties very often respect the CBRM's decision. In contrast, West Darfur respondents report much less respect in their communities for the decisions of the CBRMs.

This finding is both reinforced and contradicted by other evidence from the household survey. Respondents were asked to assess the likelihood that a CBRM resolution made today would be honoured one year later. This is a measure of both support for the CBRM among likely disputants, and the ability of CBRMs to enact and enforce their decisions in a meaningful way. As shown in the figure below, respondents were starkly divided according to state: respondents in South Darfur view CBRM decisions as much more likely to be binding even one year later, while just 24% (n=51) of West Darfur respondents believe that a resolution will very likely be honoured one year after it is issued. A significant number of respondents in West Darfur, in fact, believe it is either unlikely or very unlikely that such resolutions would be honoured one year later – West Darfuri respondents appear to be pessimistic regarding both the extent to which community members will abide by CBRM resolutions and, by extension, the sustainability of CBRMs in the medium- and long-term.



Figure 26: How Likely are CBRM Resolutions to be Honoured one Year Later?





Figure 27. CBRM Decisions are not Followed by Those Involved in the Dispute



Respondents were also asked whether CBRM decisions are honoured by those involved in the dispute itself. Like the previous related questions, we find evidence that CBRMs in South Darfur enjoy greater support within their communities. Importantly, the aggregate picture is muddled by the results shown in the figure above. While 45% of respondents, in response to a previous question, indicated that parties to a dispute “very often” respect the decisions of the CBRM, we now find that a majority of respondents believe that CBRM decisions are not followed by those involved in a dispute. This contradiction is puzzling and is not easily resolved. It is possible that respondents interpreted the first question as assessing whether disputants generally honour the CBRM decisions, and the latter question as assessing whether disputants sometimes choose not to honour those same CBRM decisions.

This picture is further complicated by the fact that the vast majority of respondents who have been personally involved in a dispute – in fact, 98% (n=257/263) – consider the dispute to now be resolved. The fact that respondents view their disputes as resolved, rather than requiring further negotiation, or appealing to



alternative methods of dispute resolution, is a strong sign of respect for CBRM decisions.<sup>28</sup> Whatever the explanation for these contradictory findings, the state-level differences in support are still significant, and the broad pattern suggests that CBRMs have only a moderate level of support among the communities in which they operate.

Perceived support for the CBRM, within communities, follows patterns common in the implementation of dispute resolution mechanisms. As IPs in the region are aware, some target groups are less likely to either use the CBRM or honour the decisions that they put forward. It is common for youth, elders, and nomadic groups to be less willing to submit to decisions made by community dispute resolution mechanisms, such as CBRMs. This trend is confirmed in the case of the CBRMs in West and South Darfur: when asked whether nomadic pastoralists accept and respect the authority of the CBRM, a majority of respondents indicated that they do not. In fact, 70% (n=295/419) of respondents indicated that nomadic pastoralists do not respect the authority of the CBRMs.

In addition, a slim majority of respondents indicated that youth are the least likely group to accept CBRM outcomes. In total, 51% (n=212/419) of respondents named youth as the most likely group to dissent from or fail to respect a CBRM decision. The next closest group comprised the elderly – 29% (n=120/419) of respondents believe that the elderly are the group least likely to abide by CBRM decisions. Respondents were more optimistic regarding other groups and their willingness to abide by CBRM decisions, citing minorities and women as the (distant) third- and fourth-most likely groups to disobey CBRM resolutions.

Importantly, a significant share of respondents questioned the impartiality of the CBRMs. As we have noted, a majority of respondents are satisfied with the performance of the CBRMs in both general and personal terms. Even so, nearly half of respondents (49%, n=206/417) either agree or strongly agree that the CBRM sometimes favours one group over another. This type of perceived favouritism is more common in West Darfur, where 61% of respondents agreed that bias of this kind happened. In contrast, just 37% of respondents in South Darfur expressed similar perceptions of bias among the CBRMs.

Even more problematically, the extent to which respondents report CBRM bias appears to be a function of their own social identities or characteristics. That is, minority respondents are much more likely to report that the CBRM sometimes favours one group over another, with 71% (n=64/90) of minority respondents reporting this to be the case. Minorities are especially well-placed to perceive discrimination on the part of the CBRM, since they are likely to be victims of such discrimination. This finding is particularly important because it could undermine support for the CBRMs and their authority among disadvantaged groups. Care must be taken to ensure that CBRMs are considered impartial by all community members; otherwise, their longevity and utility is in serious question.

An individuals' willingness to abide by CBRM decisions is almost certainly a function of myriad factors, including the specifics of the dispute, and the parties' respective backgrounds. While some disputes are likely to be contentious no matter how well-supported the CBRMs are locally, others are more likely to be resolved peacefully if community members are satisfied with the operation of the CBRMs themselves. This means that

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<sup>28</sup> On one hand, individuals stating that they support the resolution they personally received is an ideal test of community buy-in, since respondents who have been engaged in a dispute have practical experience with the CBRMs, and are not expressing merely abstract support. On the other hand, there may be social pressure to express support for the CBRM personally in an interview setting, even if respondents do not actually honour CBRM resolutions. This might explain the relatively high personal support for the CBRM, but reports from respondents that many unnamed individuals in their community do not honour those same resolutions.




community members may judge the CBRMs on a wide range of criteria, including the manner in which they were established, the manner in which they operate, and their perceived fairness.

This latter aspect of CBRM operations – representation of distinct groups, and perceptions of fairness in representation – is especially important in the diverse operating environment in which the IPs work. To study the role of representation – or perceived representation – plays in generating community buy-in among traditionally marginalized groups, we classify respondents according to whether they feel their group is well-represented within the CBRM. In other words, among minorities, we classify minorities as “feeling represented” if they indicate that minorities are represented very well or somewhat well within the CBRM. We similarly classify youth and women on the basis of whether they believe that their respective groups – youth and women – are well-represented.

The figure below illustrates the correlation between representation and satisfaction with CBRM resolutions. As noted previously, among respondents who have personally had a dispute heard before a CBRM, 52% (n=137/263) report being very satisfied with the manner in which their dispute was addressed.

This rate is similar among youth, minorities and women, overall; however, this finding masks significant variation. Among members of these groups who feel their group is not well-represented on the CBRM, satisfaction falls to just 37%. Within the same groups, 70% (n=59/84) of respondents who feel they are well-represented report that they are very satisfied with the handling of their dispute. As shown in the figure below, youth exhibit the largest “representation gap” – when youth feel that they are represented on the CBRM, they are 48 percentage points more likely to feel satisfied in the handling of their own disputes before the CBRM. The importance of descriptive representation – the representation of all relevant social groups by including members of said groups in decision-making roles – cannot be overstated, if community buy-in is to be nurtured, especially among those groups that are least likely to abide by CBRM resolutions.

Figure 28. Satisfaction with CBRM's Handling of Dispute, by Respondent Group



Consultation in project design and implementation is also an important predictor of satisfaction with CBRMs. When asked whether they or other community members were consulted about projects prior to implementation, 56% (n=248/445) indicated that they were either very or largely involved in consultations. Among this group, 67% (n=144/214) are very satisfied with CBRMs in general, and 56% (n=81/145) are very satisfied with the resolution they received in a specific case before the CBRM. In contrast, just 48%



(n=72/150) and 46% (n=43/93) of respondents who report a lack of consultation are very satisfied with CBRMs in general and in their particular cases, respectively. Clearly, both a consultative process and an emphasis on representation of marginalized groups are essential ingredients for building broad-based community buy-in for conflict resolution mechanisms.

Sustaining gains made as a result of conflict and peacebuilding initiatives is always difficult. This is especially true in cases where the most important and widespread intervention focused on establishing a conflict-resolution mechanism. Such projects must ensure that dispute resolution bodies are motivated and able to continue their work. But they must also ensure that community members themselves continue to respect the decisions of the bodies set up for dispute resolution. This is an uphill task.

The evidence provided in this section is mixed. While a majority of respondents believe that resolutions achieved today will be honoured in one year's time, this majority is narrow, and it is contradicted by a number of respondents who stated that many disputing parties do not honour the decisions made by CBRMs in their communities. The impartiality of many CBRMs is also questionable, a problem that can compound feelings of marginalization by key groups, such as youth, minorities, and nomadic pastoralists.

In practice, beneficiaries themselves are sceptical regarding sustainability. Among respondents who report that their household benefitted from project activities, only 34% (n=128/381) believe that benefits will continue to accrue to their households after the end of the project. While 48% (n=184/381) believe that they will continue to benefit somewhat, this is a much lower bar; 18% (n=69/381) believe that the benefits they currently receive from the project will cease at the project's end.<sup>29</sup> As shown in the table below, a similar share of respondents (19%, n=77/399) believe that their communities will cease benefitting from local project activities when those activities are no longer directly supported.<sup>30</sup>

*Table 13. Continued Benefits Following the Project's End, at the Household and Community Level*

Response	Household	Community At-Large
<b>Yes, benefit a lot</b>	34%	40%
<b>Yes, benefit somewhat</b>	48%	40%
<b>No, not benefit at all</b>	18%	19%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

The mixed results in this section urge caution with regard to the winding down of project activities, and suggest that continued support may be necessary to secure the gains made thus far in terms of conflict resolution, intra- and inter-communal trust, and other programme impacts. The findings in this section suggest a few avenues for buttressing the authority of CBRMs in particular: regular consultation with community members, and broad-based representation that incorporates marginalized groups explicitly into areas of decision-making and authority.

<sup>29</sup> This shift is particularly stark because it does not include the 13.7% of respondents who state that their households did not benefit at all from activities undertaken during the project's life.

<sup>30</sup> Expectations regarding future benefits are shaped by location: respondents in South Darfur are much more optimistic regarding future benefits than those in West Darfur. For instance, just 5.6% of respondents in South Darfur believe that community benefits will cease at the conclusion of the project; in contrast, nearly one-third (32.4%) of respondents in West Darfur report the same.



## 5. FINDINGS AT PROGRAMME LEVEL

This section concerns the extent to which DCPSF not only stabilizes communities, but also contributes to durable peace regionally, and whether DCPSF objectives were relevant to the programme areas. As such, DCPSFs relevance is assessed against the backdrop of a larger on-going debate regarding the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus, as well as other external factors influencing the state of affairs in Sudan and Darfur. External factors include the future of economic sanctions on Sudan, which affects prospects of economic development, as well as the anticipated drawdown of the UNAMID forces, which affects security and peace in the region.

### 5.1 RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS

This section considers the extent to which the DCPSF programmatic design is tailored to the peace building needs in Darfur

Aside from the DCPSF, there are currently two large UN funds operating in Darfur. The first is the United Nations Fund for Recovery and Reconstruction and Development in Darfur (UNDRF), which was established in 2014. Its objective is to support the effective implementation of the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) as well as the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur's (DDPS) objective "to support the transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery and development. The second fund is the Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF), which was established in 2006. Its objective is to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan and provide support to the front-line response which contributes to the Multi-Year Sudan Humanitarian Plan.

In the current humanitarian-development-security nexus, DCPSF occupies a longer-term peacebuilding point, aiming to address underlying root causes of conflicts. However, in some cases there is an overlap with humanitarian work, e.g. construction of waterpoints, etc., or with development work, e.g. creation of livelihood opportunities for women. The DCPSF also directly addresses Sustainable Development Goal 16, "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels."

The DCPSF programme has a crucial role to play in peace building and its programme, the importance of the DCPSF is likely to grow in the near future, and is designed in such a way that it distinguishes from other platforms in at least three ways.

*"DCPSF is a triple-nexus fund, with its strengths being its ability to centre peace as a key issue, and focusing on resilience in programming. This is part of a larger trend of funds moving into that direction."*

**- Implementing Partner -**

Firstly, with the drawdown of the UNAMID forces, there is a need for communities to improve their self-protection capacities and become self-reliant. As external protection forces wind down, a security vacuum is likely to occur and persist in light of insufficient political will. Hence, working on low-level communal peace initiatives that aim to restore social capital and human trust on an elementary level is one aspect that makes DCPSF programming relevant and unique. As noted at the project level, the ToC of DCPSF allows for a holistic approach to community issues, allowing it to address root causes and build conflict resilience effectively. It also has the potential to effectively inform other actors programming in Darfur and use its expertise to help mainstream conflict sensitive approaches, which should be front and centre for any actor operating in a protracted conflict environment.



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Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the explicit focus of DCPSF on peacebuilding is unique, particularly narrow, and theoretically complementary to other regional funds or initiatives. By deploying both hard and soft programming activities, DCPSF attempts to address the root causes of conflict and the destruction of social fabric. These activities often result in development programming with a conflict lens.

Thirdly, DCPSF fills a gap by working on social rather than political peace. Considering the conflict dynamics in Darfur, there is a clear distinction between political armed conflict and community level conflict. The degree to which an NGO can affect the environment is that they are only able to work in the community level, as peacebuilding through political intervention is restricted. DCPSF can reduce the conflict between communities but is limited and often unable to affect regional level conflict.<sup>31</sup> However, when the underlying social fabric is positively changed, communities will be better able to utilize peace dividends when the peace comes. DCPSF, in this sense, allows for the cultivation of social peace that can be complemented with political peace.

As such, it can be concluded that DCPSF fill a programmatic gap and has a meaningful approach in the local context. However, the design and size of the Fund is insufficient in order to create sustainable peace in Darfur for two reasons. First, while the DCPSF is addressing some of the root causes of conflict, due to the limited funds available, DCPSF is unable to comprehensively address all or most of the root causes. To address those needs, using estimates from Doha, would require billions of dollars, which is not likely to be invested in the current climate. However, there exists great potential for complementarity with the money spent in Darfur through other funds, and collaboration with other actors should therefore be a key priority of the Fund.<sup>32</sup> The Technical Secretariats of the three main UN funds are currently actively exploring further synergies, and this process should be continued and made concrete in the future.

Secondly, while it is beyond the current mandate of the DSCPF, top-down high-level political dialogue is necessary in order to achieve sustainable peace, especially considering the drawdown of UNAMID which carries the risk of increased conflict involving armed groups. Currently, output 4, which covers more high-level activities, is perceived as highly political by stakeholders and IPs are openly hesitant to move into this sphere. Aside from the fact that output 4 lacks a clear formulation, clear translation to practice, and linkages with other programme elements, multiple stakeholders questioned whether output 4 is what the DCPSF and its partners should be aiming for, and what is realistic to ask from partners in this area. If the DCPSF is to take more overt activities to the political sphere, there exist the risk that they would be perceived as not neutral. Consequently, this carries the risk of reducing the DCPSFs ability to operate effectively at the community level. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the current mechanism of DCPSF, i.e. implementation of relatively small projects by individual partners, would have the requisite leverage and mandate to effectively push change beyond the community level, and doing so through numerous NGOs in a process not clearly coordinated would carry substantial risks to the operational capacity of the entire fund. However, DCPSF should push for dialogue regarding this in larger bodies such as UNDP and the Steering Committee members.

It should be kept in mind, however, that different funding types can be used to address different conflict dynamics, and should be used complementarily. As such, it is recommended to further investigate how the DCPSF can work with other actors/funds to ensure its own bottom-up activities are complemented by top-

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<sup>31</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 7 June 2017.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 14 June 2017.




down activities implemented by other actors/funds. As a first step, it is needed to gain a clear picture about which actors are doing what with regards to high-level peace building activities. When it is clear which actors are involved in what way, a strategy can be developed on how to complement DCPSFs bottom-up activities with more top-down activities from other actors.

## 5.2 EFFICIENCY

This section considers the extent to which the DCPSF strategy of pooling projects amplify the individual effects.

Figure 29. Total number of Projects and Funds Disbursed, by State<sup>33</sup>



More than 35 million USD has been disbursed by the DCPSF during the second phase of the DCPSF. The majority of funds, as can be seen in the table above, is disbursed to international Window 1 partners (74%). Moreover, while Window 2 partners receive about 13% of the total funds, a large amount of this was given to only one partner (Mubadiroon = 722,000.- USD). Overall, national NGOs thus only receive a very small proportion of the DCPSF funds. This reliance on national NGOs is concerning for the sustainability of the DCPSF. Provide significant support to national partners if vital because they often have stronger local links,

<sup>33</sup> For these graphs, projects that were implemented in multiple states were counted in both states, making the total number of projects as well as the total funds disbursed above the actual number.



but also in order to ensure that the links created are longer lasting. However, currently there are still major issues related to the capacity of national NGOs, and selection of national partners should therefore be done with caution.

*Table 14. Funds Disbursed by the DCPSF*

Criteria	Funds (in USD)	Based on # of projects	Funds per project (in USD)
<b>All</b>	35,209,040.-	62 projects	567,888.-
<b>Window 1</b>	25,988,545.-	37 projects	702,393.-
<b>Window 2</b>	4,666,177.-	19 projects	245,588.-
<b>Window 3</b>	4,554,318.-	6 projects	759,053.-
<b>West Darfur</b>	8,267,482.-	13 projects	635,960.-
<b>South Darfur</b>	8,939,583.-	17 projects	525,858.-
<b>East Darfur</b>	3,404,453.-	6 projects	567,409.-
<b>North Darfur</b>	6,256,621.-	15 projects	417,108.-
<b>Central Darfur</b>	1,450,000.-	2 projects	725,000.-
<b>Multiple states</b>	6,890,901.-	9 projects	765,656.-

The real question, however, is whether the DCPSF has been able to increase its efficiency through its pooled approach. The results indicate that this is not the case. Since there is no institutionalized mechanism for coordination between the DCPSF and other pooled funds, duplication of efforts is not prevented. In addition, information sharing between partners, which could ensure more efficient approaches, is very limited. The current approach, as such, is still too fragmented and too focused on individual projects in order to ensure optimal efficiency beyond that of the project level.

### 5.3 EFFECTIVENESS

This section concerns the extent to which DCPSF has been able to amplify the effect of individual projects through its pooled approach. More specifically, it looks at the programme’s amplified effectiveness.

In general, funding for humanitarian projects is moving towards pooled approaches. For peace building and conflict resolution, this is helpful since pooled funds can provide large funds for multiple years. Relative to other funds, however, the resources available within the DCPSF are very limited and this is perceived as one of the main shortcomings to ensure sustainable peace.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, while individual projects had for the most part been effective, they have not pulled in a unified direction. Donors expressed that while a number of – or, indeed the majority of – the projects funded by the DCPSF were useful and “good” in and of themselves, it was less clear that that the projects were aligned in any strategic way which would allow them to project an impact amounting to more than the sum of their parts.<sup>35</sup> As projects are largely operating as independent units, this has according to implementers made it difficult to engage with issues and conflict drivers that transcend the immediate project geography, which in itself is constrained through formal restrictions. For instance, cross-locality and cross-state issues are difficult to address. Multiple DCPSF partners discussed the possibility of groupings projects into consortium approaches, allowing for the affected area to be covered more effectively. Although DCPSF allowed for consortium applications in the most recent funding round, the budget was constrained to that of a single

<sup>34</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 24 May 2017.

<sup>35</sup> Interview with Donor, 30 August 2017.



project, which lead to diminished interest among implementers. Consortium approaches would also allow for further economies of scale that could contribute to more harmonised ME systems, thus improving the measurability of impacts beyond the community level.

While there is a desire to see a more strategically able fund, it needs to be taken into account that the DCPSF functions under challenging conditions, particularly with regards to the prospects of affecting top-down progress<sup>36</sup> due to scrutiny by and (the threat of) interference from the formal authorities.<sup>37</sup> With this risk, it a certain level of realism is necessary with regards to the level of strategy that the fund can achieve. To this effect, the fund was described in terms of being the peacebuilding – at grassroots level – there could be.

From a different perspective, it is possible to argue that the strategic void is a direct result of and – to a wide degree – the very strength of the design of the DCPSF. IPs in particular praised the uniqueness of flexibility and ground-led style of the fund, which was like no other fund. It was pointed out repeatedly by implementers that that the DCPSF by placing “peace” front and centre enabled a form of working, which allowed implementers to address the root causes of conflict rather than merely the consequences of them. It allowed implementers to work directly on peacebuilding, rather than peacebuilding being a sideshow.

Overall, analysing the programme level effectiveness of the DCPSF is complex since adding up the achievements of individual projects is difficult and has not been pursued in a strong way until now. This also affects the possibility of verifying or falsifying the Theory of Change on the programme level. One of the assumptions behind DCPSF’s approach is that local level conflicts, often in one community only, have the potential to escalate and spill over into neighbouring villages or the whole state and beyond. There are numerous cases in the recent past where this has happened. It is therefore realistic to conclude that every potential conflict on the local level, that has been reduced or prevented through local level work also contributes to reducing the overall risk of escalations. However, most projects have targeted individual locations and few links have been made between various projects and their possible cumulative effect. This shortcoming is also reflected in the lack of activities and achievements under Output 4, the cross-fertilisation between projects through networking and exchange of knowledge and best practise.

## 5.4 IMPACT

This section considers the extent to which the DCPSF has led to intended or unintended, direct or indirect, positive and negative impacts (trust, peacebuilding, stability).

While there exist clear evidence the DCPSF has created trust and stability in project locations in Darfur, it is questionable if the DCPSF has achieved wider peace and stability in Darfur. There was agreement that the projects conducted under the fund had generally been useful to beneficiaries. And it was maintained that even getting your foot in the door and supporting some resilience in communities, was a worthwhile achievement,<sup>38</sup> but there were generally questions as to whether these projects had contributed to “peace” in any sustainable manner.

The limited impact on wider peace can be explained by at least three factors. First, the relative small funds available are unlikely to accommodate wider peace. One UN representative asserted the following: *“where DCPSF works, it had an impact on the conflict areas, compared to where they don’t work. But it is a relatively small and*

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<sup>36</sup> Interview with Donor, 22 August 2017.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Donor, 22 August 2017.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with Donor, 22 August 2017.



*geographical targeted impact.*” The limited impact is thus likely in part due to the relative size of the DCPSF fund. Per-project budgets should be higher for the overall impacts on Darfur to be improved.<sup>39</sup> Secondly, the projects funded by DCPSF are relatively short in length and projects are not always followed-up with other projects. It is questionable if sustainable changes in social cohesion can occur within short timeframes. Thirdly, there is a lack of coordination between IPs and with other funds. This type of coordination would be crucial in order to develop a more strategic approach to ensure wider peace in Darfur.

On the other hand, the DCPSF has occasionally and convincingly been able to link individual projects to regional strategies and initiatives. An implementer described the grassroots level work as having the potential to “trickle upwards to the locality and then the state”.<sup>40</sup> Not all, however, agreed with the trickle upwards mechanism implied in this metaphor; some implementers indeed called for more targeted linking to the national level and a pursuit of an active, updated voice there.<sup>41</sup>

Regardless of whether the “trickle up” mechanism works in practice or not, there is no operationalised hypothesis for how it would work, nor any assumptions guiding it, and as such it is impossible to evaluate. It is not clear whether the contribution of DCPSF to regional peace endeavours should be horizontal (stabilisation in key locations organically spreads stability across other locations) or vertical (stabilisation below creates pressure for solutions at a higher level). For a meaningful discussion on DCPSFs wider contributions, a theory of change for the expected effects would be required. The current DCPSF theory of change and partner ME systems only apply to the community level, limiting conversation on the topic to highly anecdotal levels.

## 5.5 SUSTAINABILITY

This section considers the extent to which the DCPSF has achieved change that is likely to continue after project conclusion.

While peacebuilding activities from the DCPSF were accepted by the communities, for them to be sustainable, policy-level efforts are also necessary. CBRMs and other peace building activities supported by the DCPSF are currently primarily relevant at the community level for lower level crimes. CBRMs, at this point, are not able to effectively deal with cases such as murder, something which may change if sufficient capacity building takes place, which will likely have a significant impact on the sustainability.<sup>42</sup> In addition, conflicts that exists between the government and rebels cannot be addressed through CBRMs. Closely related to this, CBRMs, in their current form, lack enforcement mechanisms. Linking traditional mechanisms with formal mechanism could solve this issue, as the formal justice system could provide CBRMs with enforcement means – though many respondents considered the lack of need for escalation as a key benefit of CBRMs.

At the current state, however, DCPSF and IPs are likely to avoid close political involvement as it can have negative consequences.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, one IP stated, “*political aspects have to somehow be addressed as they affect all peace processes*”.<sup>44</sup> Involvement of the government to some degree and potentially under the umbrella of a different actor (e.g. UNDP) could help the GoS understand the peacebuilding projects funded by DCPSF and

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<sup>39</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 24 May 2016.

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 6 June 2017.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 12 June 2017.

<sup>42</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 1 June 2017.

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 5 June 2017.

<sup>44</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 1 June 2017.



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can help DCPSF with the implementation of projects. In order to develop a better relationship with the government, however, policy-level interventions are needed, as well as capacity building activities targeting the GoS. Some key areas in this regard could be IDPs, returnees, land rights, and land administration – issues that cannot be solved at the community-level only and require a policy-level intervention, as it spans a large geographical area and multiple intervention areas. Not only would closed collaboration with the GoS lead to more government involvement, increased levels of accountability, but it could also increase trust between the DCPSF and the GoS.<sup>45</sup>

One way of linking activities with the government is to involve the relevant ministries. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture should be involved in conflicts about natural resources. However, individual IPs are most likely not able to include the government in its activities. As such, it is recommended to ensure involvement from agencies such as the UNDP.<sup>46</sup> If the UNDP would take on a role to include the GoS more in the peacebuilding activities, the IPs may be able to better maintain a status of impartiality.

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<sup>45</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 13 June 2017.

<sup>46</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 5 June 2017.



## 6. FINDINGS AT PROCESS LEVEL

### 6.1 FUNDING AND PARTNER SELECTION

DCPSF accepts funds from governments, inter-governmental or non-governmental organizations, and private-sector organisations. The allocations of funds to partners needs to be approved by the Steering Committee (SC) and eligibility to receive funds from the DCPSD is described as follows:<sup>47</sup>

*“Any Participating UN Organization and IOM that has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Administrative Agent is eligible to receive funding from the DCPSF. Through the MA, NGOs, CSOs and other designated institutions or entities may receive funds directly from the DCPSF based on a programme or project document and agreement concluded with such entities.”*

The funding ceiling for Window 1 is 650.000 USD and 250.000 USD for window 2. International NGOs are allowed to receive funding as a Window 1 partner, while national NGOs can receive funding directly as a Window 2 partner or as a sub-recipient for a Window 1 project.<sup>48</sup>

The different Window requirements were perceived as unfair, especially by national NGOs who assessed their capacities to be similar, if not better, than those of international NGOs. The fact that national NGOs are often contracted by international NGOs for the implementation of projects strengthened this feeling. Moreover, national NGOs felt they were more efficient (i.e. less overheads), more effective, and have a greater impact in communities compared to international NGOs. Subsequently, it was reported that DCPSF did not provide national NGOs with the same level of trust as international NGOs were given. Indeed, the DCPSF was observed to have less favourable views of national compared to international NGOs. The underlying reasons, however, including lower capacity in regards to financial controls and reporting, were at least partly confirmed by the evaluation team during data collection. As such, there was no evidence found that suggests

***“Effectiveness of the Implementing Partners varies according to the organisation’s capacity and resources. In the case of the local organisations, these are usually weaker. This is mainly caused by the long period of time between the application and the start of the project, during which things on the ground have changed, and extensions are the only way to solve this.”***

**Technical Secretariat and Steering Committee**

that the different Window ceilings or Window criteria require changing, though further support for building the capacity of NNGOs on their main obstacles of finances and reporting should be provided. Furthermore, the sheer number of national NGOs reporting this by them perceived favouritism towards international NGOs suggests that more effective communication between the DCPSF and national partners is warranted. This could clarify to national NGOs why Window criteria are in place and consequently ensure grievances are not left unsolved.

While Window requirements may be perceived as unfair by national NGOs, the evaluation team found the requirements overall very unrestricted. Basically, anyone can apply for funds of the DCPSF, whether or not the organization has any experience in the area (though experience is scored within the project selection phase). This carries a high risk. Indeed, donors report that, *“a lot of national NGOs who have no previous experience*


<sup>47</sup> Terms of Reference DCPSF Phase II

<sup>48</sup> Terms of Reference DCPSF Phase II



apply for funds from the DCPSF". In addition, there are some concerns whether all potential applicants are being reached through the tender. Some donors reported that the number of applications has increased over time, but there still appears to be a need for improvement in this regards.

Figure 30. Total Share Window I Projects



Perceptions towards the application process were mixed. While there existed agreement that the process had improved with each round, primarily national NGOs perceived the process to be very intensive, especially considering the amount of fund they were able to receive. It was reported that since a lot of applicants would move on from the concept phase, a large number of NGOs would invest significant efforts in the proposal while not receiving any funds. Indeed, it appeared that the intensive selection process functioned as a deterrent for some national NGOs. Most of the international NGOs, however, perceived the selection process as fair with regards to the amount of effort it required from applicants.

A more crucial question, however, is whether the DCPSF is able to select the most capable partners. There is some uncertainty when answering this question. Donors, for example, expressed concerns over the process leading to the selection of projects, questioning whether awarding was to some extent more *supply* driven than *demand* driven in the sense that the selection of projects was more a question of what was *there*, rather than a question of strategic and (conflict) analysis-driven prioritization.<sup>49</sup> While donors have been asking for a more strategic approach, it is unclear if any progress has been

made.<sup>50</sup>

Also questionable is whether international NGOs subcontract the most capable national NGOs.<sup>51</sup> One national NGO reported, “the process for selecting national partners is vague and this may result in token representation.” International NGOs admittedly struggled to find qualified national NGOs to work with and consequently sometimes ended up working with national NGOs they deemed ‘unqualified’. One of the underlying problems here may be that international NGOs perceived the national NGOs to be service providers and not partners. This very notion currently stands in the way from building long-term durable partnerships aimed at reaching the best possible outcomes.

<sup>49</sup> Interview with Donor, 24 August 2017.

<sup>50</sup> Interview with Donor, 30 August 2017.

<sup>51</sup> All international NGOs are required by authorities to have a local partner.



No matter how the partnerships are perceived, there exists a large need to build the capacity of national NGOs, and international NGOs recognize this need. However, there is also a lot of unclarity about the existing capacity of national NGOs. As far as the evaluation team could find out, it appears as if the last mapping of national NGOs capacities had been done in 2010 and, as such, a new mapping is long overdue. Only when the existing capacities are clear, strategic decision can be made with regards to the key priorities for capacity building. It is therefore recommended to place more emphasis on capacity building, including a mapping of existing capacities among national NGOs. Once a mapping of national NGOs capacities has been done as well as priorities for future capacity building have been set, there is an advantage to work with the same national NGOs over time. This would decrease the number of issues international NGOs have in working with national NGOs and it would create possibilities to move beyond the contractor-service provider relationship towards durable partnerships between national and international NGOs.

### **Locations and Timeframes**

In the last funding rounds, a significant amount of money was disbursed to projects short in duration (<24 months) and in new programming locations. Taking into account that the DCPSF aims to build social cohesion, this raises the question if this selection strategy yields the best results. First, it is questionable if projects can actually achieve a change in social cohesion within such a short timeframe. Second, it is questionable if the impact of projects, assuming they are able to achieve a change in social cohesion, will continue if no follow-up project is being funded in the same area.

In light of the above two questions, it appears as if the DCPSF does too little to ensure institutional memory. Also among IPs there was confusion if the DCPSF aimed to be geographically focused or if the DCPSF aimed to cover as many locations as possible. When projects have ended, there is often little follow-up and new projects are mostly funded in new locations. More important, there appears to be little effort to ensure the impact of project activities continues and exit strategies are not properly in place. Even though the project level section of this report has shown that effects in trust and confidence are visible one year after projects have ended, in the vision of the evaluation team, it is recommended to focus on projects longer in duration and more geographically focused in order to ensure the best possible outcomes.

## **6.2 ADAPTIVENESS TO CHANGING CONTEXT**

In the rapidly changing environment in Darfur, flexibility is needed in order to ensure that IPs can adjust to emerging situations. DCPSF recognizes this need and is known as a highly flexible Fund which grants partners a large degree of freedom to adjust. In this sense, the DCPSF stands out from other funds. Without this freedom, IPs would be restricted to activities and project designs that are well-known, but potentially do not yield the best outcomes. DCPSF staff in the field are perceived to be the driving factor behind the flexibility that is granted to IPs. Various IPs therefore described DCPSF as “a lab,”<sup>52</sup> and “a space where new ideas can be incubated that can also be used elsewhere.”<sup>53</sup> Indeed, some IPs were observed to implement activities originally funded by the DCPSF now in projects unrelated to the DCPSF. As such, it can be concluded that the DCPSF enables IPs to keep their project activities highly relevant during changing circumstances.

Moreover, as the measured outcome for DCPSF is improvement in social cohesion, and the activities in achieving this (apart from the support to CBRMs) are not being prescribed prior to a contextual analysis, the process itself has high potential to retain community-level relevance and adaptability.

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<sup>52</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 16 May 2017.

<sup>53</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 24 May 2017.



Despite the freedom granted to partners to not only design projects with a large degree of freedom, but also adjust projects according to changing circumstances, the conflict analysis, which should function as a guidance tool for change, is lacking insofar that it is not updated regularly. As such, the conflict analysis can only be used right after it is developed since the situation in programming locations may change within weeks. For the conflict analysis to truly evolve in a mechanism to guide the DCPSF as well as its IPs, it is thus of utmost importance to ensure the analysis is updated on an ongoing basis. Only then can the DCPSF make informed decisions about the changes needed in programming locations.

*“The concepts of CBRMs, CBOs, and conflict resolution trainings are endlessly repeated, without realising what exactly is being learned. Instead of repeating the same activities, DCPSF should invest more in harnessing the lessons learned.”*


**Implementing Partner**

Aside from the processes in place to allow projects to adjust to changing circumstances, the DCPSF should aim to evolve as a fund. One way in which this could take place is by ensuring a strong learning process with close communication and feedback loops. Through information sharing, knowledge exchange, and better collaboration, DCPSF can develop a best model and incrementally innovate this model. It is in this area of learning and knowledge sharing that there is room for improvement. At this point, the DCPSF and its partners have sufficient knowledge and experience to develop best practices as well as one or more models for peace building that guide how to

address different types of conflicts. By doing this, partners are still given freedom to adjust to the local context, but are guided by strategies, methods, and activities that are proven effective.

### 6.3 MANAGEMENT

Figure 31. Organogram DCPSF




The DCPSFs operations are guided by the SC. The SC, which exists of contributing donors, an appointed international NGO representative, and a representative(s) of participating UN Organization(s), is overseen



by the UN Resident Coordinator (RC). In addition, the Administrative Agent (AA), the Technical Secretariat (TS), and UNDP will join as ex-officio members. If required, peacebuilding and recovery experts can be included as members in order to provide technical advice.<sup>54</sup>

Figure 32. Organogram Technical Secretariat DCPSF



The TS is responsible for the day-to-day management of the Fund and prepares the ground for decision-making processes related to the DCPSF which require approval of the SC. The TS is an impartial entity which provides technical and substantive support to the SC and ensures the streamlining of preparation, decision-making, and evaluation processes related to DCPSF-financed activities.<sup>55</sup> Under the head of the TS, there is one Communications and Reporting Analyst, one Gender and Peacebuilding Specialist, one Peacebuilding Specialist, and one Administrative Associate. Furthermore, under the Peacebuilding Specialist there are three Monitoring and Evaluation Analysts working in the field (El Fasher, Nyala, and Geneina).

*“DCPSF performs well, but is a little bit unresponsive – they are not evolving at the moment like they should be. The secretariat feels a bit like a secretariat, but does not engage intellectually and substantially. Discussions on DCPSF and UNAMID drawdown do not happen [...] They should evolve with conflicts.”*

**- Donor -**

When analysing the DCPSF, particular focus was given to the extent to which the fund had managed to be catalytic, here understood as the extent to which the fund had been enabling of other stakeholders’ work. Donors generally expressed a desire to see the DCPSF be less of a secretariat and more of a way leader, but this had not yet materialized. In a general context of waning levels of funding and international attention directed towards Darfur, the capacity available at embassies for focussing on peacebuilding measures is shrinking.<sup>56</sup> This creates a lot of opportunities for the DCPSF to take more of a substantial and coordinating role.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Terms of Reference DCPSF Phase II

<sup>55</sup> Terms of Reference DCPSF Phase II

<sup>56</sup> Interview with Donor, 30 August 2017.

<sup>57</sup> Interview with Donor, 24 August 2017.



While there was nuance in donors' perception of how forthcoming the secretariat was, when information (e.g. conflict analyses) was requested, interviews did suggest that donors did not see the DCPSF as proactive in sharing and disseminating knowledge, including conflict analyses, lessons learned, etc.<sup>58</sup><sup>59</sup><sup>60</sup> The underlying issue here is that *"international experts in Sudan tend to have more of a humanitarian background and are less peacebuilding experts"*. There is a need for the secretariat to strengthen its peacebuilding expertise. *"That's what the Secretariat should do, but it doesn't have enough capacity."*<sup>61</sup> This void appears to be due in part to a high turnover of staff in combination with a level of inertia in recruitment, contributed to by the country context factors. After the transition of the DCPSF from the RC to the UNDP, secondments had been promised, but had not happened,<sup>62</sup> and recruitment was too lengthy, often taking up to six months. This fluctuation continuously delayed the consolidation necessary for the secretariat to become fully functional.<sup>63</sup>

### Needed Changes

Based on the findings from the evaluation team, the DCPSF has three key needs that need to be addressed, whether through a change in staff composition or a change in job descriptions. First, there is a need to build on the conflict analysis. The current conflict analysis is insufficient and does not function as a guiding tool since it is not updated regularly. If this capacity is increased and the conflict analysis updated on an ongoing basis, this would allow for the conflict analysis to become an integrated part of the DCPSF and its decision-making processes.

Secondly, there is a strong need for more coordination with other funds, the private sector, universities, and other actors. Increasing collaboration with these different stakeholders has the potential to yield a number of benefits. First, this can prevent that activities are duplicated by activities from other funds and instead complement each other, allowing for an integrated strategy to address more of the root causes of conflict. Lastly, collaboration with the private sector as well as universities could significantly improve the sustainability of the DCPSF.

Thirdly, and closely related to the second point, there is a strong need to ensure the DCPSF continually improves itself through a well-coordinated learning process. This learning process should aim to establish best practices and lessons learned and build future programming on the basis of these findings. By structurally collecting information related to the best functioning models, the DCPSF can develop methodologies and tools by which its partners, especially national partners, can further evolve. In addition, this could significantly enhance the sustainability of the DCPSF as that information can be used even when the DCPSF would discontinue its operations.

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<sup>58</sup> Interview with Donor, 22 August 2017.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with Donor, 24 August 2017.

<sup>60</sup> The evaluation team understands that the conflict analysis was not shared due to concerns over its quality. As this was not known to donors, it nevertheless created the described impression.

<sup>61</sup> Interview with Donor, 24 August 2017.

<sup>62</sup> Interview with Donor, 24 August 2017.

<sup>63</sup> Interview with Donor, 24 August 2017.



## 7. CROSSCUTTING THEMES

This section considers the extent to which implementing partners have included crosscutting themes, such as cooperation and coordination, inclusiveness, and conflict sensitivity, in their project design.

### 7.1 COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

This section considers the extent to which the DCPSF and IPs have cooperated and coordinated with other actors.

#### **Implementing Partners**

In order to increase the effectiveness of IPs and amplify the effect of individual projects, cooperation and coordination between IPs is crucial. When IPs share tools, best practices, and lessons learned, the individual performance of IPs will improve as well as the outcomes at the programme level. While the DCPSF is making efforts to stimulate this type of cooperation and coordination, for example through state-level meetings<sup>64</sup>, this has not yet been realized to its full extent. As such, there is sometimes confusion about who is doing what. The underlying issue, however, is that IPs are often competing for the same funds and consequently apprehensive to share tools and knowledge. Currently, there is no incentive for partners to work together and as such, it is unclear if all partners are using optimal models for conflict resolution, for example.

In order to stimulate cooperation and coordination, enforcement mechanisms are needed. The DCPSF can create an incentive for cooperation, for example by evaluating individual projects more strongly based on their cooperation with other partners. Funding in next rounds can then be made available to those who have cooperated effectively and who have shown willingness to ensure better overall outcomes by sharing their tools and best practices.

Another method to ensure better cooperation between partners is through consortiums, which was mentioned by multiple partners. Working with consortiums has the advantage that partners can share relevant skills, experience and expertise on conflict resolution and peace building in such a way that they complement each other. It thus allows partners to access other partners experience and competencies that they currently do not have access to. In its optimal form, partners who are strong in certain areas should partner with other IPs who are strong in other areas in order to ensure the optimal outcomes of projects.

#### **DCPSF and UN-Funds**

As mentioned in previous chapters, the DCPSF fund is relatively small and consequently, it is unable to address all the root causes of conflict. However, there are two other large funds operating in Darfur, the UNDF and SHF, with concentrations on development and humanitarian response respectively. Currently, limited collaboration has taken place between these three funds and the collaboration that takes place often occurs on an ad-hoc basis.

In order to increase cooperation, it is important to fully understand the linkages and synergies between the funds and their position on the HDP-nexus. Only then can the funds holistically target the needs in the communities and provide valuable contributions to each other's outcomes and objectives. For the DCPSF, this could ensure that more of the roots causes of conflict are effectively addressed and that soft activities

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<sup>64</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 1 June 2017.



implemented through the DCPSF are better complemented by hard activities implemented through the other funds. Moreover, such collaboration also would avoid duplication of efforts.

The need for collaboration between the three funds has become more and more apparent lately. While there are many ways in which collaboration could be strengthened, which should all be considered, one possible method to improve coordination between the three funds is to create a consolidated governance body or governance structure that overarches the three funds. While SHF might fall slightly outside of this, UNDF believes there is room for institutional streamlining of DCPSF and UNDF as many of their activities are complimentary on the project-level. As such, it is recommended to further investigate the possibility to establish such a governance structure in the near future.

## 7.2 INCLUSIVENESS

While the DCPSF has made significant efforts to ensure inclusion of women, youth and minorities into the CBRMs, CBRMs remain mostly run by men, elites, and powerful individuals. Women, youth and minorities are poorly represented or do not participate at all.<sup>65</sup> In the quantitative survey, the median size of a CBRM was 12 members, and all CBRMs had representation of youth, elderly, males, females, majorities, and minorities, to varying degrees. Although CBRMs did not have set guidelines for their composition, respondents agreed that all groups were generally well represented. However, access to the CBRMs differed significantly across different factors. For example, respondents in South Darfur claimed to have significantly better access to CBRMs (98%, n=202) than respondents in West Darfur (88%, n=188). Respondents in South Darfur also significantly more often claimed that everybody in the community has access to CBRMs (83%, n=170) compared to West Darfur (46%, n=98).

### Gender

Since the creation of the DCPSF Gender strategy in 2014, informed by a gender analysis conducted the same year, a more concerted and systematic engagement of women through the Fund's activities has been pursued, also supported by a full-time gender function in the DCPSF secretariat. Underpinning this approach is the assumption that through the right interventions, women in Darfur can gain more voice and agency, as well as increase in engagement with the project, leading to deep impacts in their lives and contributing towards lasting peace in Darfur. The strategy seeks to bridge both the social and economic inequalities between the sexes, as well as supporting women with the increased responsibilities they have been imposed because of the conflict, with an aim to provide a transformative approach that would lead to 'acknowledging women as active stakeholders in the early recovery and peace processes'.<sup>66</sup>

The overarching theory for female empowerment, and thus fostering both economic and social conditions that contribute to lasting peace and cultural changes on gender values, through DCPSF activities relies largely on both economic means that are expected to yield second-order effects, as well as direct inclusion of women into decision-making bodies such as the CBRMs. In regards to the economic activities, the activities are envisioned to contribute to peace in four ways (from DCPSF's Gender Strategy):

1. 'Increasing women's access to and control over resources can generate broad productivity gains', i.e. supporting women's economic empowerment (productive capacity and decision-making authority) can improve the overall economic situation in the region;

<sup>65</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 13 June 2017.

<sup>66</sup> DCPSF Gender Strategy, 2014, p. 6.



2. ‘... women’s economic gains benefit not only themselves but also impact the gender relations and men’s acknowledgement of women’s roles in conflict resolution, thereby magnifying the development impact’, i.e. the economic empowerment of women leads to increased decision-making authority, and thus a larger role in conflict resolution as well;
3. ‘... play a positive role and become [a] catalyst for peace by spreading [a] culture of peace and values of co-existence among their children’, i.e. wider inclusion of women fosters cultural and generational change in regards to peace and co-existence;
4. ‘Improving women’s and girls’ status improves many other development outcomes (health, nutrition, etc.)’, i.e. increased economic and cultural empowerment leads to better outcomes in other vital aspects of life.

In addition to activities that target women, the strategy also considers the engagement of ‘men, youth, religious leader and non-traditional partners in combating gender-based discrimination’ to be a priority for the effective implementation of value transformative programming.

Following from these assumptions, this section will look at the evidence gathered in the evaluation in order to establish whether the projects within the fund, and the fund as a whole, have reached their objectives. The main questions that will be looked at relate to: 1) the degree to which women have taken (meaningful) roles in the CBRMs and other decision-making bodies, and how these have become viewed by themselves and the other community members; 2) the degree to which the Fund has been successful in improving women’s livelihood opportunities and economic empowerment, and whether this has led to further social empowerment; and 3) to what degree the Fund has been successful in engaging with men to build acceptance on the roles of women in economic and social decision-making. Furthermore, as the Gender Strategy states, ‘it is important... to demonstrate the activities of DCPSF have not only reached a certain number of women, but that the power dynamics between women and men have also taken a step forward’.<sup>67</sup>

### **CBRMs**

As mentioned before, most of the CBRMs are based on the logic of traditional joudia, which have been used in Darfur historically to manage conflict. From a gender perspective, it is vital to understand that the traditional joudia system is dominated by elderly males. Apart from certain domestic and family conflicts, women have not had any role in conflict resolution. Access to CBRMs also appears limited and females were considered to have the least access to CBRMs, according to 47% (n=195) of respondents. There were no significant demographic differences in respondents’ responses, suggesting that both men and women considered women’s access to CBRMs to be insufficient. Women’s exclusion from and limited access to local conflict resolution mechanisms is concerning for a number of reasons, not the least because women are disproportionately affected by conflict. Moreover, research has consistently shown that involving women in peace negotiations improves the effectiveness of the negotiations<sup>68</sup> and enhances the likelihood that agreements are implemented.<sup>69</sup> As such, there is global recognition that the involvement of women in conflict resolution is vital in order to achieve optimal outcomes.

In order to improve the peace process, the UN signed resolution 1325, followed by the establishment of UNAMIDs Gender Advisory Unit (GAU). The mandate of this unit includes but is not limited to ensuring

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<sup>67</sup> DCPSF Gender Strategy, 2014, p. 33.

<sup>68</sup> Laura Kray & Linda Babcock, Gender in Negotiations: A Motivated Social Cognitive Analysis, in *Negotiation Theory and Research* 203 (Leigh L. Thompson ed., 2006)


<sup>69</sup> Roohia S. Klein, The Role of Women in Mediation and Conflict Resolution: Lessons from UN Security Council, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 277, 309 (2012).



women's involvement in conflict resolution and the political process, and addressing gender-based violence in Darfur. To implement this mandate, the GAU established the Women's Protection Network, a network that maps the specific needs women have as a consequence of the conflict in Darfur. In addition, the network aims to engage women in the peace process. Caution is advised, however, when implementing strategies to include marginalized groups so as to avoid only tokenistic participation. So as to grant marginalized groups real agency in the peace process, they need to have a proportionally large representation on the negotiation table.

Before analysing to what degree females have obtained meaningful positions within the CBRMs, it was first analysed whether women consider the CBRMs as representative of their interests. The figure below displays the result from a factor analysis (See: Methodology) and demonstrates that whilst female respondents had largely positive views towards the CBRMs on most of the key aspects, male respondents scored more highly on all the measured aspects. Higher scores – regardless of the index – represent more positive attitudes toward CBRMs. For instance, while female respondents appear to view CBRMs as well-managed – with a score of 79.0 on a 100-point scale – male respondents gave CBRMs higher marks – 82.2 on the same scale. Of the five dimensions studied, male respondents were more favourable on each; on three dimensions, this difference was statistically significant at the 5% level and, on a fourth dimension, the difference was marginally significant, at the 10% level.<sup>70</sup> Thus, while women have significantly more negative views about the CBRMs, their overall views are still highly positive. However, this does not have to be a direct result of their inclusion in those bodies and, as such, it is important to look more closely at their involvement in such bodies.

Figure 33. Perceptions of CBRMs, by Gender



In order to assess how effective the DCPSF has included women in the CBRMs, four measures of female inclusion are analysed. The first measure involved the degree to which women are included in the CBRMs. The exact number of female members cannot be fully established, as it has not been recorded throughout the program. However, in more recent reporting (post-2016), partners have disaggregated the CBRM members

<sup>70</sup> Specifically, men were significantly more positive toward CBRMs in terms of representation, acceptance & respect, and range of conflicts; men were marginally more positive toward CBRMs with respect to effectiveness. Even in the case of management, though the difference between men and women was not statistically significant, the difference was substantively large, with a p-value equal to 0.14.



by age and gender. Based on the available information reported, women compose 21-25% of the CBRM members.<sup>71</sup> This figure is generally supported by the observations of CBRMs done by the evaluation team, as well as the household survey, which estimated the percentage of female members at 20%, with a range of 4% to 43%. The disaggregation of CBRM members by age showed, however, that young women are rarely included, consisting of only around 4% of CBRM memberships. Nevertheless, the inclusion of females in the CBRMs outlines a positive trend since some beneficiaries reported that a number of years ago, project activities focused on peace building and reconciliation were focused either on men or on women only. Subsequently, no dialogue between men and women was established and women empowerment was not even realized at the lowest level. While the current available data on this subject matter does not allow for a more in-depth analysis, the continuation of this reporting method will produce an interesting dataset and can illustrate trends in the future, and should therefore be encouraged.

The findings from the qualitative and quantitative data, and desk review thus show at least nominal presence of women in CBRMs, and this is in itself an important development given the completely male dominance of such mechanisms historically. It is also very encouraging that the presence of women was observed in all projects, including those that had already finished.

The second measure of female inclusion is whether women have reached meaningful positions within the CBRMs. In this regard, the findings from the evaluation are less clear. Particularly when interviewed by female qualitative researchers, multiple female beneficiaries expressed that they did not see their participation within these decision-making bodies as meaningful for a number of reasons. First, some of them explained they had never received any information about their role and consequently were unable to exercise any power within these bodies. In order to empower women to take more active roles within the CBRMs it is crucial to define their role within the CBRM and disseminate this information to them as well as to the male members of the CBRM. Ideally, women as well as men should be given job descriptions in order to ensure women can exercise certain formally agreed upon powers.

*“I do not feel not confident to speak out in the CBRM because I am a women and, as such, I am weaker than men. Nobody will care about my opinion and my opinion is not really taken into account if I do speak out.”*

**- Female CBRM Member -**

Secondly, none of the female beneficiaries had reached a leadership role within the CBRM. This has led them to believe that they were less capable compared to men and was reported to be an inhabiting factor for them to speak out. At this point in time, however, it does not seem possible to install women in leadership positions within CBRMs as this would likely result in significant resistance from male members and potentially lead the CBRMs to decrease in effectiveness.

Thirdly, some female beneficiaries also expressed that they felt that the men only included them because they were forced by the implementing organization. This suggests that men are not sufficiently aware of the advantages female participation in conflict resolution has on the outcome of agreements. It was, for example, common among male and female members to think that conflict resolution mechanisms consisting of male members only were more effective than conflict resolution mechanisms consisting of male and female members. In this regard, there is strong need for more training and information dissemination on the role of women in conflict resolution.

<sup>71</sup> Partner reporting. Margin of error due to lack of clarity when disaggregating both age and gender (some partners seem to include young males/females in the general male/female split, whereas others count them separately).



Fourthly, women themselves were found to support the idea that conflict resolution is a subject that should be handled by males only. Decades of male domination have led women to believe they are less valuable than men and some females support the idea that their opinions are less valuable. In the household surveys, some entrenched negative views on women's ability and role in conflict resolution were also prevalent. Up to 49% of respondents agreed with the statement that women should not be involved in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. However, it is encouraging that almost as many respondents (26% vs 28%) strongly disagree with this statement as strongly agree with it, and that the number of those who disagree are similar for both genders. In other words, some strong development against the traditional norms has been reached for a quarter of the population as a whole.

Finally, the ability of females to effectively take part in conflict resolution also varies greatly depending on the type of the conflict, and is particularly difficult in cases of inter-community conflict, which may include longer travel and is deeply both patriarchal and centred around the chiefs individually.

On the other hand, some female members did perceive their participation in the CBRMs as valuable. Some females, for example, expressed feelings of empowerment through their participation in trainings and their membership in the CBRM, regardless whether they had any decision-making power. More important, however, some cases were observed that did involve meaningful participation of females. Although those stories are far outnumbered by stories involving less meaningful participation, it is important to build on these success stories and learn from them by analysing what differentiates those women able to voice their opinion from those women unable to. In general,

however, it can be concluded from those stories that while the DCPSF can do everything in its power to provide women with meaningful positions in the CBRM, forcing more meaningful roles could lead to resistance and thus jeopardize the effectiveness of the DCPSF as a whole. It appears that in those cases in

#### Case Story: Sarra\*

**Sarra, a confident and educated woman in her thirties, is working as a teacher in her village in South Darfur. As most teachers, she has gained respect through her job and is well known within the community. Therefore, when a CBRM was established in the community, it was clear from the beginning that she should be one of the female members. In order to prepare her for her membership, Sarra received a training in conflict resolution and peace building. This provided her with sufficient knowledge and skills to actively participate in the CBRM. While most men in the community believe that women are not qualified to make decision in matters relating to peace and conflict, Sarra has ensured the male members of the CBRM listen to her opinion.**

*"If the men in the CBRM do not listen to my opinion, I would make an official complaint with the implementing partner. However, this has never happened and I am thus far considered a full member."*

**Due to her involvement in the CBRM, Sarra has become an important person within the community, especially among women. Not only do women feel well represented in the CBRM by Sarra, they also go to her for advice about conflicts within the family. As such, Sarra has now a pivotal position among the women within the community.**


\* Name has been changed



which women were able to gain more meaningful roles, this occurred naturally through the selection of highly capable women who were able to gain meaningful positions by raising their voice and showing the value of their participation to male members. Two factors were found to be especially important to ensure women could gain, by themselves, more meaningful roles within the CBRM:

- **Educational level:** Multiple interviewees, as well as partner reporting, mentioned illiteracy and lack of education as important factors as to why women did not gain meaningful positions within the CBRM. In the household survey, the gender differences were evident, as up to 54% of the female respondents had no formal education, compared to 36% among males. In communities where education is respected, this is a powerful barrier to participation and this is compounded by the attitudes towards women, which make the level that a female community member would have to reach to gain higher social status significantly higher than for males. As such, it is recommended to prioritize adult education, preferably through collaboration with other funds, to reduce the prevalence of this barrier.
- **Personality:** Observations from the evaluation teams revealed that a significant proportion of female members in the CBRM were afraid to speak out and therefore were not taken into consideration during the decision-making process. However, other female members were described as confident and willing to speak out even if men did not take their opinion seriously. This is an important quality for female CBRM members since attitudes are unlikely to change unless women are able to repeatedly show their value in the decision-making process.

Figure 34. Lesson Learned about Female Inclusion in CBRMs (Preferred Process)



While females have nominal presence in the CBRMs, stimulating meaningful participation will require the inclusion of at least one highly qualified female with the right personality in each CBRM. In addition, focus should be given to training and capacity building. While all CBRM members are given a training in conflict resolution, there is the potential for more training given to only a few members of the CBRM. While it is in no way the intention of the evaluation team to recommend women to be the sole recipient of these additional trainings, careful selection of participants for additional trainings could ensure that female members of the CBRMs gain additional knowledge about certain types of conflict, etc. This would further stimulate their meaningful participation within the CBRMs. For example, one could think about providing two different



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trainings about specific types of crime the CBRMs handles. For one of those trainings, only females are selected and for one of those trainings, only males are selected. This would create a situation in which men are better trained in the handling of one type of conflict while women are better trained on the handling of another type of conflict. For women, just being able to speak out in cases involving that type of conflict could work as an enabling effect to gain overall more meaningful roles.

The third and final measure of female inclusion is whether the participation of women is accepted by the wider community, and whether they themselves feel generally empowered by this – i.e. the change of cultural norms and values more widely. The findings are again mixed: a number of female beneficiaries did report positive changes as a consequence of their participation. Some female CBRM members, for example, explained that *“women have come to realize they are equal to men and they now exercise the power they have in the community.”* Indeed, beneficiaries report that women’s status within communities had increased due to their participation in the CBRMs. Closely related to this, some changes were observed in the household dynamics. Since the female members of the CBRMs had received training in conflict resolution, other females had approached them for advice on how to deal with domestic conflicts. Reportedly, this had led to a decrease in domestic conflicts. However, it was unclear if this was the result of better communication or if women were shying away from any request that could potentially lead into a conflict. One woman said *“In the past, I would just ask my husband for things I needed. This would often lead to conflict. Now, I wait for the right moment, when my husband appears in a good mood. I will clearly explain why I feel the purchase is needed and I will give my husband time to explain why or why not we should make the purchase.”*

Interestingly, little to no resistance from community members towards the inclusion of females into the CBRMs and other decision-making bodies was observed or recorded. This may be due to the fact that community members and community leaders were effectively included in all phases of the project and had a say in the selection of the female members. American Refugee Committee (ARC), for example, ensured that the community as well as community leaders would be accepting towards the inclusion of females in the project activities by developing a community-based project design. Before the start of the project, community members were asked to join for a public meeting in which ARC announced that it wanted to include women from all parts of society in the CBRM. ARC explained that it wants to include disabled women, women from different ethnic groups, and women from different social economic backgrounds. Once the selection criteria were established and community members were given the opportunity to voice their opinion, the task to select female members for the CBRM was left to the community leaders. In addition, members from the native administration, who are responsible for conflict solution remained in power and were kept at the highest positions in the CBRM.

In addition, it has to be considered that resistance might be low due to the fact that women currently have usually no decision-making power within these bodies. In the example above, from ARC, men were kept in all leadership positions and women were given lower level roles. As such, men may not feel threatened by their participation. Nevertheless, as highlighted before, a large role should be given for women to naturally gain more meaningful roles. IPs can only do so much to ensure the inclusion of women in CBRMs, women will need to voice their opinion within these bodies in order to actually change the perception of men, and this is likely to be a gradual process.

Indeed, some male beneficiaries reported that after the inclusion of women in the CBRMs and other decision-making bodies, they had come to realize that women should also be able to express their view. Nevertheless, not all men agreed with this notion and the fact that most men explained that women are sufficiently involved in the CBRMs and other decision-making bodies indicates that resistance could become more prevalent when



women start to take on more meaningful roles. In other words, achieving meaningful participation of women in CBRMs should be seen as a long-term goal for which should not forcefully be pushed, but instead should come naturally by giving women sufficient knowledge to raise their voice. As such, it is recommended to revisit the goals the DCPSF has set in this regard.

### ***Women's Livelihood Opportunities and Economic Empowerment***

The economic situation of women is likely one of the main barriers towards women empowerment. High illiteracy rates combined with limited opportunities to secure their own source of livelihoods prevent women from gaining independent sources of income, which consequently give them little power within households to decide about matters that relate to them. However, it should also be noted that women are traditionally vital income-generators for the household, working in both agriculture and trade, and the generation of income in itself has not led to meaningful economic empowerment, i.e. the right to make decisions regarding the use of money.

*"I used to have little decision-making power in my household. My husband would decide about almost everything. Now, after participating in the training provided by [the IP], I consider myself the head of the household. Most of the decisions related to my household are made by me."*

**- Female Beneficiary -**

In general, projects funded by the DCPSF were found to have a larger focus on female economic empowerment after 2014, when the gender strategy was developed. More than 95% of the projects implemented did have an element of female economic empowerment in its project. In this regard, it can be concluded that the gender strategy has, at the bare minimum, successfully ensured a greater focus on gender and gender mainstreaming.

Evaluating the effectiveness of the gender strategy yielded mixed results. Some females did report a number of positive results relating to female economic empowerment. Some beneficiaries stated that decisions that were previously made by males, such as decisions relating to education, finances, health, food, and housing, were now primarily made by women.

Particularly good results came from the establishment of a Women's Union. The Women's Union was established in order to allow females to discuss issues that relate to them and their economic situation. Through the discussions held among the members of the Women's Union, women became more aware of their economic needs within the community. Once the economic needs of women were established, these needs were discussed with the local authorities. Again, this started a dialogue between men and women and, according to beneficiaries, resulted in the community becoming more aware that women have an important (economic) role within society. The Women's Union was also reported to be very effective in managing work taking place at the flour mill. Having such groups seems to thus support the individual women to gain meaningful empowerment from their income-generation.

Despite this, a number of issues were reported relating to the livelihood activities. First, while some women did gain an independent source of income, this was often only seasonal. The seasonal income source did not help them to increase the status and decision-making power within households because they were still economically dependent on their husbands for most of the year. In addition, and vitally, it was common that while women would generate income, they would have to give the money to their husbands. Failure to do so was feared to lead to tensions within the household, potentially leading to gender-based violence, as well as



the man leaving the woman, both of which incur higher social costs on the woman. In these cases, improved income-generation capacity did not lead to economic *empowerment*.

In addition to qualitative evidence, respondents to the household survey were asked to directly assess the extent to which their local project contributed to female empowerment. The majority of respondents believed that project activities had contributed to female empowerment in a positive way, with 83% (n=368/445) of respondents indicating that projects had contributed with greatly or somewhat to this end goal. However, the median response was that project contributed “somewhat” – a middle category that does not include the extensive transformation that is needed in the region.<sup>72</sup> These mixed results conceal important differences across state, however, which are illustrated in the table below. Female empowerment, or perceptions of female empowerment, was impacted more strongly in South Darfur than in West Darfur, with 52% of South Darfuri respondents indicated that the project had greatly contributed to female empowerment, compared to just 28% in West Darfur.

Table 15. *Perceived Project Contributions to Female Empowerment*

Perceived Role of Project	West Darfur	South Darfur	Overall
<b>Project contributed greatly</b>	28%	52%	40%
<b>Project contributed somewhat</b>	50%	36%	43%
<b>Project contributed not at all</b>	17%	12%	15%
<b>Refused to answer</b>	5%	1%	3%

Overall, the evaluation team questions whether livelihood activities targeting women at the household level are the most appropriate activity to increase women’s role in conflict resolution. First of all, with patriarchal culture norms being the main barrier for women’s empowerment, projects will need to change the attitudes of men in order to gain optimal results. To a large degree, men are currently deciding how much decision-making power women are granted and not to include them in women empowerment activities would thus be a mistake. For the majority of livelihood activities funded by the DCPSF, however, it is unclear to a large degree how men are included in gender-mainstreaming. From project reporting, it can be obtained that some sensitization occurred for women as well as men, details on the process by which this occurred were limited. Moving forward, it is crucial to tie different project activities to each other and ensure awareness raising, gender training, collective action (e.g. Women’s Unions), and community dialogue are part of the activities relating to the economic empowerment of women.

Secondly, although it is not unlikely that women will gain in decision making power at the household level if their economic position improved, it appears unlikely that such activities result in a large effect on women’s inclusion in conflict resolution at the community level. Considering this, the Women’s Union and activities alike are assessed to be more appropriate and it is recommended to focus on livelihood activities at the community level, with a component of dialogue between men and women, instead of livelihood activities at the household level.

## Youth


Youth are a major conflict driver. The simultaneous erosion of familial and communal structures, limited opportunities to create income from traditional livelihoods, and the increase in income potential from

<sup>72</sup> Importantly, female and male respondents expressed similar views regarding projects’ impacts on female empowerment. Women had slightly more positive attitudes toward the impact of projects on female empowerment, though the difference between male and female respondents was not statistically significant.



antisocial activities, have greatly incentivized harmful behaviours as well as limited the ability of the communities to deal with the issues created by youth. Indeed, the quantitative household survey supports that youth suffer from a lack of employment opportunities, with up to 80% of under 20s reporting being unemployed, and still 54% for under 25s, compared to 40% and 32% for those in their thirties and forties respectively.

Figure 35. Employment Status, by Age



DCPSF implementing partners are highly cognizant of the issue and are actively addressing both economic and social issues affecting youth. However, although DCPSF partners have included youth in a number of livelihoods activities and vocational skills trainings, the M&E system that DCPSF has, concentrating on outcomes relating to trust, is not apt in capturing the level to which youth are benefiting from economic programming. Tracer studies that include subsequent employment levels and incomes must be incorporated into employment-driving projects systematically across the program. Although difficult in the context, the linking of income-generation activities and a lower likelihood for antisocial behaviour should be further studied, as the monetary incentives would likely drive youth towards the latter.


For CBRMs, the quantitative survey reveals that the median size of a CBRM is 12 members, and all CBRMs have representation of youth to varying degrees (an average of 43% was reported by households, with some up to 100%). The variance is likely due to the presence of sub-committees, which may be composed fully of youth). Although CBRMs did not have set guidelines for their composition, respondents agreed that youth were generally well represented (53% very well, 42% somewhat well).

The factor analysis done also shows highly positive attitudes of youth towards the CBRMs. In the factor analysis, age group was less important in respondent attitudes regarding CBRMs, as shown in the figure below. Youth was defined as individuals ranging from 15 to 29 years of age, with non-youth representing anyone 30 years old and up. The differences in perceptions between youth and non-youth were neither large nor consistent. For instance, youth respondents were slightly more likely to perceive CBRMs as well-



managed, while non-youth respondents were somewhat more likely to see CBRMs as handling a range of conflicts well. However, none of the differences identified were statistically significant or even marginally so.

Figure 36. Perceptions of CBRMs, by Age Group



However, while partner reporting has only recently begun disaggregating by age and gender, recent reporting clearly shows that particularly young women are still underrepresented (or even not at all represented in some cases) in the CBRMs. This is potential the largest challenges as neither youth nor females have traditional roles in community decision-making. The tracking of CBRM representation in partner reporting will allow for better gauging the extent of this issue moving forward, as well as identifying potential outliers where CBRMs register high levels of participation for further in-depth study on the reasons for success.

In addition, elderly members of the community were claimed to have the best access to the CBRMs, as 67% (n=280) of respondents thought this was the case. Also, 51% (n=212) of respondents considered youth in the community the least likely to accept decisions made by the CBRM. This suggests that while certain groups may be represented or present in the CBRM, if the quality of their access, representation or participation is insufficient, this leads the CBRM and its decisions to lack legitimacy. In the long run, this a significant factor endangering the effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of CBRMs.

Moreover, as with female members, youth were not found to occupy leadership positions in the CBRMs and there were doubts as to which their participation was meaningful at all. This likely reflects an attitude that youth do not have the wisdom make decisions regarding conflict-resolution. Traditionally, it is believed that in order to become an ajaweed (mediator, member of the joudia), one should have the following characteristics:<sup>73</sup>

- Long life experience;
- Age and reason;


<sup>73</sup> Isam, M. I. (2013) The “Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in Darfur: From an Antropological Perspective”, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 4(9):134.



- Good knowledge of peoples life and traditions;
- Gain the trust of all;
- Knowledge and wisdom;
- Patience;
- Generosity; and
- Good negotiation abilities and democracy.

Indeed, the household survey revealed that large groups within society agree that youth do not have the wisdom make decisions regarding conflict-resolution. As can be seen in the figure below, particularly older (and thus traditionally more influential) respondents agreeing more strongly with this statement. However, a significant minority of up to a third of respondents was observed disagreeing with this, which shows clear potential for support for youth engagement even among older respondents.

Figure 37: Youth Lack Wisdom to Make Decisions on Conflict, by Age




### Minorities

Results from the factor analysis (See: Methodology) were also disaggregated by respondents' household residency status. Respondents self-identified as one of five types of household: 1) members of the host community, 2) returnees, 3) IDPs, 4) non-IDP migrants, and 5) nomads. Some groups, however, were so small that analysing their aggregate scores would not be meaningful – migrants, for instance, constitute just five respondents in the entire sample. To allow more firm conclusions, the groups were condensed to just two categories. First are respondents who hail originally from their current area, whether they migrated and returned or never migrated; this group includes members of the host community and returnees.<sup>74</sup> The second group consists of respondents who are newcomers or “outsiders” to an area, whether their migration was the result of conflict (as for IDPs) or for economic or other reasons (as for migrants). Note that nomads are excluded from this particular analysis, because they did not fit clearly into either group.

<sup>74</sup> While returnees are clearly different from members of the host community who never migrated, they are expected to enjoy higher rates of inclusion in local institutions – and, arguably, more positive perceptions of local community-based dispute resolution mechanisms – than “outsiders” who have never lived in the area.



Figure 38. Perceptions of CBRMs, by Residence Status



The results of the analysis are provided in the figure on the previous page. Hosts and returnees express consistently more positive perceptions of the CBRMs than do IDPs and migrants, which is consistent with expectations. Hosts and returnees are more likely to feel represented by CBRMs, since they tend to be more closely integrated into the community and long-running community institutions and social networks; more speculatively, hosts and returnees may receive better treatment by the CBRM in terms of disputes that involve them. Across all five indices, hosts and returnees rated the CBRMs more highly. The differences observed are large; moreover, they are statistically significant in three of five cases (representation, management, and effectiveness).

### 7.3 CONFLICT SENSITIVITY

On 25 September 2015, the United Nations General Assembly formally adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It includes a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that outline the ambition to eradicate poverty. However, research suggests that poverty is likely to increasingly be concentrated in conflict-affected countries<sup>75</sup>, which face context-specific challenges. As such, SDG 16 is particularly relevant as it lines out a dedicated goal focused on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies and access to justice and accountable institutions.

In order to achieve this goal, funds and IPs need to understand the context in which they operate, understand the interaction between their engagement and the context, and take action in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on conflict and stability. It is widely accepted nowadays, that this so-called 'conflict sensitive approach' is paramount when programming in conflict-affected areas. The operationalization of a conflict-sensitive approach implies three core steps: 1) understanding the conflict context; 2) understanding how this relates to the planned interventions, and; 3) adapting the work accordingly.


<sup>75</sup> 3 OECD (2015) States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions Paris: OECD, p 9.



DCPSF conducts a conflict analysis each year. The analysis is used to identify priority issues and areas that inform the Call for Proposals (CfP). For the CfP from 2017, for example, DCPSF organized state-level conflict analysis workshops in each of the Darfur states. Participants in these workshops included IPs, UNAMID, government ministries, the Nomadic Commission, Native Administration, and other stakeholders. Peace researchers and members of peace institutes in each state were chosen to lead the workshops. The main objectives of the workshop was to identify causes (structural, proximate & triggers), actors, conflict and peace dynamics at play in Darfur, and identify and provide recommendations for strategic and programmatic priorities to be addressed by the DCPSF. UNDP's Conflict and Development Analysis Tool (CDA) was furthermore utilized to structure the workshops.

While the workshops brought about interesting results, an essential weakness to the conflict analysis done by the DCPSF is that it is static. In other words, the analysis is not updated when the situation in Darfur changes even though changes occur regularly and programmatic changes are needed accordingly. As such, the conflict analysis can only be used in a programmatic sense as long as the situation remains the same. Another weakness of the current conflict analysis is that it does not provide IPs with sufficient depth. While the conflict analysis is used as a steering tool that ensures applicants are all on the same page, validates individual conflict analysis, and validates assumptions<sup>76</sup> IPs were often found to conduct conflict analyses that go beyond the one provided by the DCPSF. The conflict analyses developed by IPs often attempt to identify power groups and shortcomings in peace building in order to design appropriate community-driven activities and in that sense is far more complex and comprehensive than the analysis developed by the DCPSF.

Figure 39. Spectrum of Aspirations in Conflict Sensitivity<sup>77</sup>



As such, it is recommended that the DCPSF shifts its approach to ensure the conflict analysis is updated on an ongoing basis. Updated information about power dynamics, emerging conflicts, and other factors in the

<sup>76</sup> Interview with Implementing Partner, 24 May 2017.

<sup>77</sup> Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (September 2017) contextualized conflict sensitivity guidance for South Sudan



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context should be available at all times in order to ensure that the DCPSF as well as its IPs can make well-informed programmatic changes.

Two additional shortcomings reduced the conflict-sensitivity of individual projects and the programme more broadly. The first concerned the capacity of partners to engage in conflict sensitivity analyses. While partners generally had extensive experience in project delivery along with knowledge of the local context, they do not always have sufficient expertise in conflict sensitivity to conduct proper conflict sensitivity analyses. Multiple IPs reported that they had conducted the conflict analysis externally, which points to a lack of internal capacity.

Furthermore, many IPs spoke about conflict sensitivity almost interchangeably with Do No Harm, which is only the minimal approach to deal with conflict sensitivity (see figure above), and does not consider in detail the potential interactions between the project activities, the context, or the way through which such interactions could be monitored either within the community or between the programming community and those outside of it.

Developing internal capacity for conflict analysis is essential, because such expertise would combine IPs' local knowledge with a strong background in conflict analysis, allowing for higher-quality analysis. It is also important that conflict sensitivity take centre stage in the early stages of project design, when community input and expert feedback can be incorporated without significant expense or delay. According to beneficiaries participating in the household survey, a significant number of projects incorporated local dynamics only partially into the project design. Overall, just 41% (n=180/439) of respondents indicated that local dynamics were incorporated “very much” in their project’s design. Although the median view was that local dynamics were incorporated “somewhat”, a significant minority of respondents (14%) believed that such local dynamics were not accounted for in the project design or that it was accounted in a very limited way. Given the volatile nature of local conflicts in the region, even a minimalist standard of Do No Harm requires careful attention to local input when designing projects.<sup>78</sup>

Critically, different respondents expressed starkly different views regarding sensitivity to local conflict dynamics. As the figure on the next page shows, minority respondents were much less sanguine regarding locally-specific conflict sensitivity. Only 25% of minority respondents believe local dynamics were well-incorporated into project design, compared to 46% of non-minority respondents, suggesting that sensitivities of local minority groups, specifically, may not have been adequately considered during project design.


Unsurprisingly, local dynamics more likely to be incorporated when respondents report that community members were consulted in a meaningful way regarding project design. This type of consultation – and, by extension, the incorporation of local dynamics – was significantly more likely to happen in South Darfur than West Darfur. In South Darfur, 73% of respondents reported that their communities were consulted extensively prior to implementation, and 54% viewed project design as accounting well for local dynamics. In West Darfur, on the other hand, just 39% of respondents reported extensive consultation, and even fewer (28.0%) were satisfied with the treatment of community dynamics in project design.

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<sup>78</sup> Notably, the primary deficiency in incorporating local conflict dynamics appears at the design stage. Respondent views were nearly identical with respect to the incorporation of local dynamics in both project *design* and project *implementation*. In other words, while a significant minority of projects did not sufficiently incorporate local dynamics into their design, the incorporation of local dynamics did not get worse at the implementation stage, suggesting that shortcomings in this realm stemmed primarily from the *design* stage. This finding buttresses the earlier recommendation that conflict analysis be conducted – and local input sought – before firm decisions regarding project design are made and sunk costs make it difficult to alter plans in response to these sources of insight.



Figure 40. Extent to Which Local Dynamics were Incorporated into Project Design, by Minority Status



Unsurprisingly, local dynamics more likely to be incorporated when respondents report that community members were consulted in a meaningful way regarding project design. This type of consultation – and, by extension, the incorporation of local dynamics – was significantly more likely to happen in South Darfur than West Darfur. In South Darfur, 73% of respondents reported that their communities were consulted extensively prior to implementation, and 54% viewed project design as accounting well for local dynamics. In West Darfur, on the other hand, just 39% of respondents reported extensive consultation, and even fewer (28.0%) were satisfied with the treatment of community dynamics in project design.

The conflict in Darfur is extremely local and extremely fluid. Conflict analyses need to be sufficiently flexible to account for both local conflict dynamics and change over time. For instance, the selection of programming locations can cause resentment among surrounding communities, and dominant groups in one area may be marginalized minorities just a short distance away. At the intra-community level, project results demonstrated a good understanding of practical conflict sensitivity. Nevertheless, it is recommended to engage IPs in additional training regarding the concept and implications of conflict-sensitive programming, and the implementation of contextually-appropriate conflict analysis.



## 8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Many findings are already included in the sections above. Here only the most relevant and larger, strategic findings are summarised, based on detail provided earlier.

The evaluation found that the DCPSF contributed to peace and trust between and within communities through a number of highly relevant and appropriate activities, confirming the Theory of Change at the basis of the Fund. Due to the high involvement of stakeholders in the project activities, it was also ensured that activities were highly relevant and beneficiaries felt ownership over project activities.

The evaluation also found that the Theory of Change, developed at an earlier stage, is still valid and fit for purpose. The evaluation sees mainly two shortcomings in the Theory of Change and its implementation:

- 1) Weak operationalisation of Output 4: More could be done to implement Output 4. IPs should be encouraged and obliged to participate in exchange of good practice and networking, for which the relevant platforms and possibilities need to be created by DCPSF.
- 2) Development of a better theory for how the Outcome level and especially the aggregation of individual grants and outputs, such as the establishment of one CBRM in one location, can be monitored and evaluated. This needs to include assumptions, risks and indicators that go beyond the individual projects. At the moment, DCPSF is not able to capture outcome beyond the sum of individual projects.

At the core of the DCPSFs activities are the CBRMs, which were mostly based on traditional conflict resolution mechanisms adjusted to the new situation when needed. Beneficiaries expressed particularly high satisfaction with these activities due to their involvement as well as their effectiveness in solving conflicts. Not only were the CBRMs found to decrease conflicts, they also resulted in higher trust between and within communities. Their support should be maintained.

While projects individually were found to be highly effective, it is unclear how they synergize within the fund. Currently, there does not seem to be a result in outcome from all the project activities that is higher than the sum of the individual parts. In order to ensure this does happen in the future, a better Theory of Change at this level is needed, but DCPSF also will need to enforce cooperation and collaboration between project partners, who currently still view each other as competitors and are hesitant to share tools and other relevant materials (which contradicts the intention of Output 4).

In addition, it needs to be taken into account that the DCPSF is only a relative small fund with regards to resources and in order to holistically address all the root causes of conflict, collaboration with other actors in the field is needed. In this regard, it could be considered to carefully start working with the government to ensure that conflict is also addressed at the policy level. However, there are significant risks related to such an approach and a clear strategy and risk mitigation plan should be developed in this regard.

### 8.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the evaluations findings and conclusions, a number of recommendations at project-, program- and process-level are proposed, as well as for crosscutting themes and management.



### *Project level*

1. **Indicators:** As a large amount of indicators under each output were not usable for comparison between partners or between states, it is advised to revisit the indicators and work towards a more standardized approach. Indicators should not be open to interpretation and should be easily comparable between partners.
2. **Operationalize key terms such as trust and confidence:** Currently, the tools that measure key outcomes for partners are insufficiently operationalised. Trust and confidence are complex terms, as is “restored”. The answer options relating to a binary yes/no imperfectly capture the nuance of increasing trust. Further work on capturing the various aspects of trust should be conducted, and the tools harmonised across partners to produce more consistent and comparable data allowing for deeper analysis.
3. **Define Output 4 activities:** Currently, Output 4, the establishment of networks and the increase of cooperation between implementers and successful peacebuilding practices is hardly addressed by DCPSF-funded activities. Partners are often confused at how this should work and prefer to not engage with it due to the risks of becoming perceived negatively. As pushing partners to engage with linking their activities to higher level agendas has risks, this should not be done in the current Output 4 formulation that does not provide sufficient guidance. It is recommended that DCPSF increases its efforts to define the activities that should be done under Output 4, and provide the requisite support for partners to engage in them. Learning from existing partners can be used to define what these activities should entail.
4. **M&E systems and conflict types:** It is recommended that the M&E systems of partners are able to capture the different types of conflicts CBRMs engage in, as has been begun in the reporting systems for the CBRM itself, when measuring perceptions in the household level.
5. **Sustainability of CBRMs:** For the sustainability of CBRMs it is recommended to create linkages for the purpose of information exchange and knowledge sharing. This should not only happen within projects, but also between CBRMs implemented by different IPs in Darfur.

### *Programme level*

6. **Follow-up system for CBRMs:** DCPSF should consider developing a post-project follow-up system for the work of the CBRMs to ensure their continuation and role in reducing and solving local-level conflicts after projects and DCPSF-funded activities have ended in a community. This could include e.g. regular follow-up visits by DCPSF’s field officers and a simple long-term monitoring system. This would help to capture the role and work of CBRMs in order to be in a better position to know about their development without external project funding. When projects are closed, future follow-on visits could also be announced to the community. This could be a relevant contribution to increasing the sustainability of DCPSF-funded activities and allow the Fund to be in a better position to speak about the impact of its own work.
7. **Capacity building for CBRMs:** It is recommended to provide additional capacity development measures, both through project implementers and through DCPSF field officers in order to ensure the CBRMs sustainability as well as to ensure they can deal with a variety of topics, such as conflict mediation, natural resource management, gender issues as well as project and finance management.
8. **Revise and further develop the Theory of Change:** It is recommended to revise and further develop DCPSF’s Theory of Change. At the programme level, a theory should be developed how the sum of projects adds up to a programme level impact and how the sum of project-level outcomes amounts to more than the sum of those parts. This includes considering and monitoring possible



positive spillover effects between communities, i.e. to monitor whether stabilizing measures and the installation of CBRMs in one community has any positive effect on neighboring communities. It is also not clear whether the contribution of DCPSF to regional peace endeavors should be horizontal (stabilization in key locations organically spreads stability across other locations) or vertical (stabilization below creates pressure for solutions at a higher level). For a meaningful discussion on DCPSFs wider contributions, a theory of change for the expected effects would be required. The current DCPSF theory of change and partner ME systems only apply to the community level, limiting conversation on the topic to highly anecdotal levels.

9. **Funding remaining relevant and informed:** To ensure that programming remains informed and relevant. More specifically, DCPSF should seek to evolve and innovate as a funding mechanism. One way in which this could take place is by ensuring a strong learning process with close communication and feedback loops. Discussed by multiple partners as a “learning laboratory”, where they have developed approaches they have used in wider programming, DCPSF should improve in its ability to systematise this learning and enable lessons to travel between the organisations, as well as feeding to the UN and donor levels.

### *Process level*

10. **Seek ways to contribute to higher level peace dialogue:** While it may well be beyond the mandate of the DCPSF, the evaluation considers the lack of higher level dialogue and solutions to be a major threat to progress made by DCPSF programming at the community level. DCPSF’s bottom-up approach alone is not sustainable. Contributing on these topics among the international community more widely is important given the knowledge and expertise DCPSF is able to mobilise.
11. **Use consortiums with higher budgets:** Multiplier effects and coordination between NGOs is limited because actors are apprehensive to share tools, as they often compete for the same funding. Consortiums have the potential to bring more NGOs together, develop a stronger plan and stronger interventions, able to deal particularly with cross-locality and cross-state issues.
12. **Proactively sharing knowledge:** It is recommended that the DCPSF secretariat proactively shares and disseminates knowledge, including conflict analyses, lessons learned, etc. more than currently.
13. **Commission an ethnographic study:** Currently, females and youth are underrepresented in CBRMs and those who have membership within these decision-making bodies often do not have meaningful positions. An ethnographic study to better understand decision-making processes and the dynamics of female and youth inclusion, and how they can be more strategically fostered, using partner reporting to identify most promising case studies is therefore warranted. Also, linking of income-generation activities and a lower likelihood for antisocial behaviour should be further studied, as the monetary incentives would likely drive youth towards the latter.
14. **Linking DCPSF activities to government:** One way of linking activities with the government is to involve the relevant line ministries. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture should be involved in conflicts about natural resources. However, individual IPs may not be able to include the government in its activities. As such, it is recommended to ensure involvement from agencies such as the UNDP. If UNDP would take on a role to include the GoS more in the peacebuilding activities, the IPs may be able to better maintain a status of impartiality.
15. **Collaboration between three UN funds:** It is recommended to continue the efforts to formalise collaboration between the DCPSF and other UN funds, which currently is often limited and occurs on an ad-hoc basis. More effective collaboration would not only make it possible to complement soft activities more effectively with hard activities and continue providing peace dividends past the



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stabilisation period, it would also provide better opportunities to address all the root causes of conflict and avoid duplication of efforts.

### *Crosscutting themes and management*

16. **Improving monitoring and reporting on gender and female involvement:** Currently, the exact number of female members in CBRMs cannot be fully established, as it has not been recorded throughout the program. However, in more recent reporting (post-2016), partners have disaggregated the CBRM members by age and gender. The continuation of this reporting method will produce an interesting dataset and can illustrate trends in the future, and should be encouraged.
17. **Better integrating peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity:** With conflict being a large driver for humanitarian need (and the potential of humanitarian activities feeding conflict) and a significant impediment to development, peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity should generally be more ingrained in any programming in Darfur, whether through DCPSF or other funds.
18. **Strengthen conflict analysis:** In order for the conflict analysis to become a useful programming tool, it needs to be strengthened. More specifically, it needs to be more in depth and it needs to be updated to accurately reflect the current situation in programming locations in Darfur.



## ANNEX 1: METHODOLOGY

In order to produce the required data to address the research questions posed, an approach including both secondary data analysis, and primary data collection and analysis was designed. Primary data collection included a quantitative survey as well as qualitative interviews (key informant interviews and focus group discussions).

Table 16. Methodology

Tool	Quantity
<b>Household Survey</b>	542 - 255 South Darfur - 287 West Darfur
<b>Key Informant Interviews</b>	60 - 13 South Darfur - 12 West Darfur - 35 Khartoum
<b>Focus Group Discussions</b>	15 - 7 South Darfur - 8 West Darfur

### QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

A household survey was designed and implemented with community members inclusive of direct and indirect beneficiaries. Originally, the aim was to conduct a total of 600<sup>79</sup> household surveys, 200 in each of the three targeted states<sup>80</sup>, 50 per locality. However, only 542 surveys were collected in two states since data collection in the third state was not possible. The household survey took place in the two targeted states in close proximity of 8 selected projects, which accounted for 21% of all projects in these states. In each of the project locations, enumerators used standard random household and respondent selection techniques *within* project locations, which would have been used regardless of the approach to project selection.

#### Selection of Projects

Two possible approaches were considered for the selecting of projects for inclusion in the sample. The first was to establish a set of characteristics that need to be represented in the sample (i.e. short projects versus long projects; projects in each state; natural resource versus livelihoods versus social cohesion projects) and then select projects to ensure that the desired mix of projects is optimal.

The drawback to this approach is that the sample is only truly *representative* of the projects that are included in the sample, rather than the broader population of projects. The benefit of this approach is that all types (i.e. sector/state/duration) of projects are *represented*. As a result, comparisons can be made across states, or across sectors, because it is known that projects of all types are included.

The second possible approach was to randomly select projects without reference to a set of desired characteristics. The benefit of this approach is that conclusions drawn from analysis of all sampled projects

<sup>79</sup> The lack of clear programmatic hypotheses on the scale of effects on key outcomes prohibited conducting a meaningful power calculation to determine sample size.

<sup>80</sup> Ultimately, data collection in North Darfur was not possible, i.e. only 2 states were covered in the end.



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combined are *representative* of the broader population of projects. The drawback, however, is that comparisons between types of projects, or comparisons of impact across projects of different duration or in different states would be very difficult. If 8 projects had been drawn randomly, the chances are quite high that a sample would be drawn with one or more of the following problematic characteristics:

- Only 2 projects in one state, but 6 projects in another;
- No projects with key activity types;
- Very few projects with long duration, and a heavy focus on short-term projects (or vice versa).

The sample would still be *representative*, but it would not represent the diversity of projects completed under DCPSF. And it would make it much more difficult to compare, for instance, the impact of projects across states or sectors, since not all states/sectors are represented.

Given a finite budget and timeframe for completing the quantitative survey, as well as the requirements from the key research questions posed in the Terms of Reference, selecting projects on the basis of *representation*, rather than *representativeness*, was deemed to be the optimal approach. In other words, the choice was made to select projects purposively and, as such, ensure representation of the full diversity of projects that DCPSF completed. This allows for comparisons across project types that would not be possible in a more traditional random sample of projects.

The selection criteria for projects took place in collaboration with DCPSF, and projects included in the sample were not chosen randomly, but instead were based on the following factors:

- **State** – an approximately similar number of projects in each of the three targeted states were included
- **Windows** – an approximately similar number of projects from each of the three windows were included
- **Type of the project** – an approximately similar number of projects of each type (e.g. capacity building, construction/rehabilitation, etc.) were included
- **Thematic areas of the project** – an approximately similar number of projects addressing different themes (governance for peace, natural resources, livelihoods, stabilisation, social cohesion, etc.) were included
- **Length of the project** – an approximately similar number of projects with a short, medium or long project duration were included
- **End date** – focus was given to projects that had already concluded as to focus on sustainability
- **Accessibility** – mainly due to logistics issues present during the rainy season, a few locations had to be ruled out

Data collection was envisioned to take place in areas where IPs, in recent years, implemented projects. Several projects were follow-up projects, building on previous DCPSF-funded projects, while others were incidental, shorter projects.



Table 17. Selected Projects and Implementing Partners

Implementing Partner	Locality	Window	Length (in months)	End date
<b>South Darfur</b>				
Mercy Corps Scotland	Beleil	1	24	2016
United Nations Habitat	Beleil	3	21	2016
American Refugee Committee	Gereida	1	15	2017
United Nations Development Programme	Kubum, Ed El Fursan, Mukjar	3	21	2015
<b>West Darfur</b>				
Adventist Development and Relief Agency	Krenik	1	15	2017
World Relief	Krenik	1	21	2014
Rural Community Development Organization	Sirba, Jebel Moon	2	12	2015
Catholic Relief Services	Habila, Mornei	1	18	2016

Table 18. Quantitative Data Collection

Implementing Partner	# Household Surveys
<b>South Darfur</b>	
Mercy Corps Scotland	72
United Nations Habitat	46
American Refugee Committee	73
United Nations Development Programme	64
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>255</b>
<b>West Darfur</b>	
Adventist Development and Relief Agency	72
World Relief	72
Rural Community Development Organization	70
Catholic Relief Services	73
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>287</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>542</b>

## QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

Qualitative data was collected with multiple types of respondents in order to elicit narrative and in-depth information about the project activities. Respondent selection for qualitative interviews followed the principle of representation rather than representativeness, maximizing the number of different voices heard in the study.

### Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

By interviewing stakeholders and beneficiaries, as well as others such as relevant experts and similar pooled funding initiative, qualitative data was collected on two levels: 1) strategic, high-level KIIs, and 2) field-based, local KIIs. On both levels, the KIIs provided insights regarding what was expected, what succeeded, or what was lacking, in DCPSF programming.



High-level KIIs with stakeholders were conducted with various groups, including the DCPSF TS, donors, and local authorities. Members of the DCPSF TS provided information on the design and motivations behind the Fund's structuring, while donors elaborated on their expectations regarding the outcomes and impact of the Fund, as well as their expectations of the future. While these interviews largely provided the input for analysis at the programme and process level, KIIs with local authorities and state-level government officials in the field also provided practical insights into the functioning of the DCPSF on a practical policy level.

KIIs also took place with both direct and indirect beneficiaries. KIIs with IPs, actors who have directly received financial or other material or non-material sources of support, were asked to elaborate about their direct experiences with the Fund, as were civil society leaders and CBRMs. Indirect Fund beneficiaries, such as community leaders, were asked about the positive and possible unintended negative effects the various projects have had on their community.

Finally, KIIs were conducted with a range of other actors to supplement data collection. Interviewing other locally active NGOs provided insights regarding the coherence and coordination of implementing partners with other relevant local actors, and informed suggestions for strengthening cooperation. KIIs with other active pooled funds in Darfur allowed for relative comparison of strengths, coverage, and complementarity. KIIs with other relevant UN agencies and topical experts, provided context and informed further analysis and future directions of the DCPSF and its activities.

### **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)**

Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were of a semi-structured, narrative nature that informed the study of the changes and results as perceived and experienced by direct beneficiaries of the individual projects. It indicated the process-based causes for these changes, both positive and unintended negative effects, and provided an understanding of how key programme outcomes can be improved and amplified, as well as how negative externalities may be minimized in the future. FGDs were conducted with beneficiaries to establish a direct conversation about progress and observed change over time, and be compared with quantitative data collection. As such, they provided insight in possible cause-effect relationships that may relate to observed changes since the initial intervention.

FGD participants were selected purposively in order to maximize the diversity of opinions represented in the study. This was particularly important to ensure that marginalized groups, particularly women, were included among the respondents for these tools. As such, separate FGDs were conducted with male and female beneficiaries in each project location.

### **ANALYSIS (CBRMs)**

CBRMs are complex organizations, which have multifaceted relationships with the communities in which they operate. On one hand, CBRMs must be well-managed, with transparent procedures for selecting members and communicating decisions to community members. At the same time, however, CBRMs must be inclusive, ensuring that all groups within society are represented, such that decisions have legitimacy regardless of the parties involved in the dispute.

Based on discussions with DCPSF staff and an extensive desk review of project documents and relevant literature, five overarching factors were identified which are expected to influence the functioning and success of CBRMs. The factors identified cover a range of intermediate outcomes with respect to the work of CBRMs:



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representation, management, effectiveness, acceptance of and respect for the CBRM, and the range of conflicts handled by the CBRM.

For each factor, a set of statements and questions was assembled that comprise different aspects of the factor. Respondents to the household survey were asked to assess their local CBRM in terms of each statement, with responses generally offered on a standard 5-point scale (strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree). Statements were assigned to one of five factors hypothesized to influence the success of CBRMs:

#### *Representation*

- It is important that the CBRM represents all groups in the community.
- Women should not be involved in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.
- Good decision-making is better than equal and good representation.
- Young people do not have the wisdom / knowledge to make good decisions in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.
- Without the involvement of pastoralists, it is impossible to successfully resolve disputes.
- There should be more women in the CBRM.
- There should be more youth in the CBRM.
- There should be more pastoralist in the CBRM.

#### *Management*

- The CBRM in my community has clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
- There is a clear and fair selection for members of the CBRM in my community.
- The CBRM in my community is well managed.
- The CBRM in my community communicates its decisions, or the outcomes, clearly and transparently.
- The CBRM members are well trained and have good knowledge of resolution techniques.
- The CBRM has clear guidelines/procedures to handle cases.
- The CBRM will continue to function without support from NGOs.

#### *Effectiveness*

- When a case is submitted to the CBRM in my community, it always manages to solve it in a peaceful way.
- Thanks to the CBRM in my community, all disagreements are now solved peacefully.
- The CBRM in my community has had an effect on the number of disputes in this community.
- The CBRM has contributed to improved relations between communities and community members.
- The CBRM is not able to solve all conflicts in the community.
- The CBRM is a good way to solve disputes in the community.

#### *Acceptance and Respect*

- The CBRM in my community makes mostly good decisions.
- The CBRM is well-known and respected in the community.
- All groups in the community accept the decisions of the CBRM.



- Decisions made by the CBRM are not followed by the involved parties/community members.
- Nomadic pastoralists do not accept and respect the authority of the CBRM.
- Sometimes the CBRM favours one group over the other.
- Sometimes tensions in the communities rise after the CBRM makes a decision (conflict sensitivity).

#### *Range of Conflict Handled by CBRM*

- The CBRM is better at solving disputes over natural resources, than family matters.
- The CBRM should not handle all types of disputes.
- Sometimes the CBRM handles cases they have no expertise in.
- The CBRM solves all types of conflicts equally well.

Each overarching factor shown above is latent; that is, they cannot be observed directly, nor can they be assessed easily by asking respondents themselves to “assess the effectiveness of your local CBRM”. However, by asking respondents whether they agree or disagree with direct statements regarding their CBRM, indexes could be created representing each latent factor – representation, management, effectiveness, acceptance and respect, and types of conflict handled.

The groupings described were established based on discussions with DCPSF and a desk review. The groupings represent hypothesized groups of characteristics that, together, represent latent concepts such as “representation”. It is important to note, however, that these characteristics may not always fit together neatly; indeed, respondents may interpret statements differently than expected, and statements that are assumed to be related to “representation”, for instance, may capture other aspects of respondents’ views toward CBRMs.

For this reason, a formal approach to validating the index groupings was applied using factor analysis, which is a statistical method for constructing measurement scales and indices, and for assessing their quality. Factor analysis quantifies the variation and correlation among a set of observed variables, distilling them into one or more factors – unobserved, overarching characteristics that are captured by some combination of the observed variables.

To illustrate, consider the “management” category outlined above. High-quality management of a CBRM is a multifaceted concept, because it includes such diverse aspects of CBRM functioning as member selection, communicating decisions to community members, and the demarcation of procedures for handling cases. A well-managed CBRM will perform well on most or all of these dimensions; therefore, responses to these various statements should be correlated – respondents who believe the CBRM is well-managed will report positively on *most* of the individual dimensions, while respondents who see the CBRM as poorly-managed will report negatively on *most* of the same dimensions.<sup>81</sup>

Confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess the quality of our proposed groupings. For each proposed grouping, a factor analysis and review of the patterns of correlations among the individual observed variables was done. In cases in which all variables have high factor loadings and they vary in the expected directions,

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<sup>81</sup> In the terminology of factor analysis, latent, overarching characteristics are called “factors,” and a set of observed variables may capture multiple factors. The extent to which a single factor is captured by the observed variables is given by the pattern of “factor loadings” for each variable – a high factor loading means that the latent factor accounts for most of the variation in an observed variable. Meanwhile, a latent factor that captures meaningful variation across multiple observed variables will have a high eigenvalue, which means that it explains a large share of the overall variation across all observed variables.



the grouping was considered validated. In those few cases in which a variable has a low factor loading or varies in a direction contrary to our expectations, the variable was removed from the grouping and subsequent index creation.

Table 19. Variables Removed From Indexes

Index	Variables Removed from Index	Reason
<b>Representation</b>	No variables removed	
<b>Management</b>	No variables removed	
<b>Effectiveness</b>	Removed: “The CBRM is not able to solve all conflicts in the community”	This variable had near-zero loading
<b>Acceptance &amp; Respect</b>	No variables removed	
<b>Range of Conflicts</b>	Removed: “The CBRM is better at solving disputes over natural resources, than family matters”	Factor loading runs counter to expectations; question does not indicate an expanded range of conflicts that CBRM handles, but asks respondents to select which of two types of conflict the CBRM is better-suited to handle.
	Removed: “The CBRM solves all types of conflicts equally well”	Near-zero factor loading. Question is substantively distinct from the full range of conflicts that the CBRM can handle; rather, it focuses on their relative ability to resolve conflicts.

Across the five categories of outcomes, all of the indices resulted in improved explanatory power than individual variables themselves. In two of the five indices, one or two of the input variables either ran counter to expectations or did not load heavily onto the latent factor; in these cases – in accordance with standard approaches to factor analysis – these variables were removed from the index. The table below describes the construction of each index and which indices involved removing one or more variables to improve fit. Importantly, note that factor analysis was not used to create the indices; rather, factor analysis was used to validate the inclusion of specific variables. The included variables were aggregated into normalized indices running from 0 to 100.<sup>82</sup> It is also important to note that, for each index, higher scores represent more positive perceptions of the CBRMs.

## LIMITATIONS

As the study intended to focus on the DCPSF’s overall strategy and functioning, transcending solely project outputs, the information collected on individual project-level indicators was limited to aggregating secondary data. Shaped as a programmatic review rather than an end-line project evaluation, the study provides in-depth information on the functioning of structures and processes, strategies, and assumptions underpinning the DCPSF. As such, the study aims to provide a high-level review of the DCPSF, rather than a summary of individual project outputs.

At the programme level, caution is needed in relation to the interpretation of outcome findings. While

<sup>82</sup> To create a given index, each constituent variable was standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The set of variables were then added together and normalized to a scale running from 0 to 100.



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findings may suggest that the DCPSF has made significant contributions to a number of outcomes, it is impossible to conclusively attribute contributions from the DCPSF and other external influences. As such, conclusions on the results of the DCPSF need to be read with general caveats with regards to attribution from a single data point.

Since the study only includes data collection in two out of the five Darfur States, results cannot automatically be generalized to the other states. The evaluation team attempted to mitigate this through document review and through interviewing UN staff and other stakeholders in order to appropriately cover East, North, and Central Darfur to the extent possible.


Lastly, the household survey that is conducted at the household level in relatively stable communities where programming is present is likely to miss some of the most troublesome youth that do not fit in such households.



## ANNEX 2: DEMOGRAPHICS


Using a Kish grid, a fully random sample of community members was obtained, including both direct and indirect intervention beneficiaries. This led to a total of N=542 respondents, of which 45% (n=244) were male, and 55% (n=298) were female. The overall median age was 30 years old, with men being on average slightly older than women. Median ages were 34 and 27 years old, respectively. In 41% of the cases, the respondent was the head of the household and in 70% of those cases, this was a male.

Figure 41. Average Household Size, by State



Respondents were also asked to describe the status of their households. While the majority of respondents described their households as part of the host community (73%, n=397), West Darfur had significantly more IDP households (18%, n=52), while South Darfur had the highest percentage of returnee households (16%, n=41). This suggests that the situation in certain sampled areas in South Darfur are more suitable for returnees, while conditions in West Darfur remain inadequate for resettlement of IDPs. Lastly, 20% of the respondents were observed to be a minority.


Figure 42: Household Status, by State





Men were on average more likely to be literate than women, with 57% (n=140) indicating they could read and write, compared to 35% (n=104) of women. The majority of respondents had received some form of education. While 32% (n=174) had received no education at all, 21% (n=115) had attended some years of primary school, on average for one year. Overall, men were significantly more often educated than women, both overall as well as in number of years. While respondents who had some form of educational attainment had on average received six years of education, men had significantly higher levels of education. This is not uncommon in rural areas in Sudan and Darfur, where school enrolment rates of girls tend to drop as children become older and are expected to play a larger role in the household or get married. In addition to this, educational attainment was significantly higher in South Darfur than in West Darfur. This is possibly explained by the generally greater access to South Darfur as compared to other areas, which makes it more accessible for humanitarian intervention and development programming.

Figure 43: Average Education Attainment, by Gender




Data on the employment status, income, and household resilience was also collected. Among the surveyed respondents, 51% (n=280) were unemployed, only 5% (n=27) held full-time permanent labour, and 5% (n=28) held part-time permanent labour, while 38% (n=107) held casual labour. Furthermore, 78% (n=425) of households held some form of employment, although the majority of household heads (58%, n=316) held casual labour. Overall, the median income was reportedly 400 Sudanese pounds per month, with significant differences between the sampled states. While the reported median income in South Darfur was 500 pounds per week, this was 300 pounds in West Darfur. This signifies significant vulnerability for income shocks and unexpected events, from which the household may not be able to recover in the event of income loss.

Finally, resilience was assessed by asking respondents about their ability to gain access to 300 Sudanese pounds in two weeks in case of an emergency. Only 10% (n=55) said this was very likely, while 40% (n=162) said this was likely. Respondents' ability to access emergency funds is influenced by other socioeconomic factors, such as educational attainment, as well as the location. Again, significantly more respondents from South Darfur (49%, n=126) than West Darfur (32%, n=91) were very likely or 21% likely to access emergency



funds. When asked what the source of the emergency money would be, the majority answered income from work (53%), household savings (14%) or the sale of household assets (12%).

Figure 44. Source of Emergency Funds, by State





## ANNEX 3: SOURCES

The desk review conducted for this evaluation made use of the following external sources:

- Beyond Emergency Relief: Longer-term trends and priorities for UN agencies in Darfur" (PDF). *United Nations Environment Programme*. 30 September 2010.
- Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (September 2017) contextualized conflict sensitivity guidance for South Sudan
- Isam, M. I. (2013) The "Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in Darfur: From an Anthropological Perspective", *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 4(9):134.
- Laura Kray & Linda Babcock, *Gender in Negotiations: A Motivated Social Cognitive Analysis*, in *Negotiation Theory and Research* 203 (Leigh L. Thompson ed., 2006)
- OECD (2015) *States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions* Paris: OECD, p 9.
- Roohia S. Klein, *The Role of Women in Mediation and Conflict Resolution: Lessons from UN Security Council*, 18 *WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.* 277, 309 (2012).
- Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview. October 2017.
- "Sudan's Geography". [Globaldreamers.org](http://Globaldreamers.org).

The desk review further made use of the following DCPSF provided sources:


- Project Documents from all implementing partners
- DCPSF Annual Financial Report 2012 till 2015
- DCPSF Annual Narrative Report 2012 till 2015
- DCPSF Bi-annual Narrative Report 2012 till 2016
- DCPSF Call for Proposals 2017 documents
- DCPSF Impact Analysis 2012
- DCPSF Perception Survey 2015
- DCPSF Organogram
- DCPSF Gender Analysis
- DCPSF Gender Strategy
- Job Descriptions DCPSF



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## Forcier Consulting

Forcier is a development research firm that operates in challenging post-conflict environments. Established in 2011 in South Sudan, Forcier has invested in developing methodologies and approaches to research that are contextually appropriate and feasible, whilst adhering to international standards for social science research and utilising the latest data collection technology available. Our core services include population and social science research, project evaluations, market assessments for livelihoods and vocational trainings, private sector and market research for feasibility studies, strategic planning and representation, and training and capacity building workshops.



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