# Catholic Relief Services
# Democratic Republic of the Congo
## Ditekemena emergency food security project evaluation
## September to October 2019

by Racey Henderson and Lauren Herby
FINAL

**Disclaimer**

The opinions expressed herewith are those of the authors alone, and not those of CRS or Caritas.

**Acronyms**

| | |
|---|---|
| CRS | Catholic Relief Services |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| EFSP | Emergency Food Security Project |
| HHs | Households |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IPC | Integrated Phase Classification |
| IPTT | Indicator Performance Tracking Table |
| FARDC | Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| FCS | Food Consumption Score |
| FEWS | Famine Early Warning System |
| FFP | Office of Food for Peace |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| Ind | Individual |
| IPC | Integrated Food Security Phase Classification |
| KG | Kilogram, the equivalent of 2.2 pounds |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| MARKit | Price Monitoring, Analysis and Response Kit |
| MEAL | Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, Learning |
| OCC | Office Congolais de Controle |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| PDM | Post Delivery Monitoring |
| PM | Program Manager |
| Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 | Quarter 1, 2, 3, 4 of the Fiscal Year |
| rCSI | Reduced Coping Strategies Index |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure |
| US | United States |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USD | United States Dollar |

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## 1. Introduction

In June 2016, a local Luba leader, Kamuina Nsapu, in Kasai Central contested the local government's power. His August 2016 death sparked a volatile conflict between militia fighters and the FARDC, which spread to the neighbouring provinces of Kasai, Kasai Oriental, Lomami and Sankuru. While nominally a local conflict, there were clear ties to national political dynamics surrounding the contested mandate of the Kabila government. Indiscriminate acts of repression by national security forces also amplified humanitarian needs and protection concerns throughout 2016. Violent and daily clashes claimed at least 400 lives and forced 637,000 people to flee their homes between August 2016 and early 2017.[1] In the first quarter of 2017, a succession of events increased the profile of the conflict. Throughout the crisis over 1.5 million were displaced. Most people had begun returning home in late 2017, with continued returns throughout the past two years. Many internally displaced people (IDPs) and returnees received no external aid until returns began.

In 2017, access to sufficient quantity and quality of food was one of the greatest obstacles to food security in many conflict-affected villages in the Kasais. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) at the time of returns classified several health zones in Kasai, Kasai Central, Kasai Oriental, and Sankuru in Phase 4[2] and recommended immediate emergency food assistance due to the limited farming activities of the A and B seasons[3], the burning of many households' food stocks during the conflict, and the disruption to markets in certain areas. In addition, FEWS Net classified Kasai, Kasai Central, and Kasai Oriental provinces in crisis for both the near term (June – September 2017) as well as for the medium term (October 2017 – January 2018).[4]



Figure 1: Crisis timeline in Kasai Region

In August 2017, in response to high rates of severe food insecurity in underserved, conflict-affected hotspots in the Kasais, CRS launched the *Ditekemena* ("Hope" in the Tshiluba local language) Emergency Food Security Project (EFSP) with funding from the USAID Office of Food For Peace (FFP). Catholic Relief Services' (CRS) approach used rapid response emergency mechanisms to address the dire food needs of recent IDPs, returnees and a small percentage of vulnerable host community households affected by conflict.

[1] Evaluation Consultant Terms of Reference, September 2019.
[2] OCHA Kasai Situation Report No. 9. The territories most affected are Dibaya and Kazumba (Kasai Central), Kamonia (Kasai), Kabeya Kamwanga and Miabi (Kasai Oriental), and Lusambo (Sankuru).
[3] Season A runs from August – January (wet season) and Season B runs from March to June (dry season) each year.
[4] FEWS Net DR Congo Food Security Outlook. http://www.fews.net/southern-africa/democratic-republic-congo/food-security-outlook/july-2017

In its first phase (August 2017-September 2018), Ditekemena targeted 60,000 vulnerable individuals (10,000 HHs) in conflict-affected communities in the Kasai Central and Kasai Oriental provinces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with lifesaving assistance through direct, unconditional food distributions. Following a confirmed humanitarian alert of displacement or return, CRS, and its service contract partner Caritas[5], delivered two rounds of unconditional food assistance per targeted HH. Each HH received 50% of a full food basket (a half ration) for each of two distribution cycles. These two cycles were each four weeks apart; the lifesaving food assistance was intended to last for a total of eight weeks.

The second year of the project (Phase 2), approved as a cost-modification in September 2018, targeted an additional 76,000 food insecure individuals (9,500 HH) living in the same provinces with lifesaving food assistance. To help restore livelihoods, Ditekemena's Phase 2 also targeted 24,000 individuals (3,000 HH) in Kasai Central and Kasai Oriental who had also received food assistance in Phase 1 with agricultural input support and seed protection rations.[6] CRS focused on delivering food assistance in areas where the immediate needs and gaps were the most alarming in terms of food security.

All targeted recent IDPs and returnees, as well as a small percentage of vulnerable host families, received unconditional food assistance via direct distribution or voucher fair. As in Phase 1, Phase 2 food beneficiary HHs received two rounds of unconditional food assistance per targeted HH calculated at 50% of a full food basket (a half ration) for a household size of six to eight individuals. Phase 2 conditional seed and tool assistance included two seed vouchers fairs, during season B (March-June) and again during season A (August-January), and a direct distribution of two hoes per family at the season B seed voucher fair. Along with the first seed voucher fair HHs also received a seed protection ration (via voucher fair) equal to a monthly half ration.

Overall objectives for Ditekemena were two-fold: (1) conflict affected households in Kasai Central and Kasai Oriental improved their food security (Phase 1 and Phase 2) and (2) targeted households have improvement their food self-sufficiency (Phase 2).

[5] CRS worked with Caritas Mbuji Mayi and Caritas Kananga for the duration of both phases of Ditekemena.

[6] Phase 1 total target individuals was based on an average HH size in the Kasai provinces of six. Phase 2 total targeted individuals was based on an average HH of eight people.



Figure 2: Areas of intervention in Kasai-Central and Kasai-Oriental.[7]

## 2. Methodology

Objectives of the evaluation include:

- Measure the project's achievements against the goal, strategic objectives and intermediate results and compare to the results of the individual intervention baselines
- Better understand planned and unintended results
- Document best practices and lessons learned

More specifically, the evaluation criteria will focus on:

- The relevance and appropriateness of the response
- The impact on targeted populations with aggregate on different sub-groups, particularly women
- The relevance of the partnership with caritas (What worked, what did not work, according to CRS and according to Caritas)
- The effectiveness of delivering the planned activities
- The efficiency in implementation
- Appropriateness of chosen delivery method (distribution or fair)
- Beneficiary accountability, effectiveness of mechanisms
- Mainstreaming of protection

### 2.1. Secondary Data Collection

The desk review covered all available project documentation, and revealed that all contractual obligations for reporting and record keeping were met. Prior to arrival in the field consultants received and reviewed quarterly reports, market studies, organigrams, contractual documents with

[7] Heath zones where implementation occurred in dark green. Citenge not displayed as data were not available in GIS database.

service providers and USAID, indicator tracking tables for Phase 1, Seed Security Assessments, and food purchase and quality tracking documentation. Review of targeting studies, rapid evaluations, implementation field reports, *Ligne Verte* documentation took place during the field mission. As the project was on-going, Post Delivery Monitoring (PDM) reports and updated indicator tracking tables were reviewed as, and if, they became available during the field mission.

The progressive nature of the transfer of Ditekemena project documentation delayed the consultants' understanding of certain aspects of project implementation and monitoring and evaluation. For example, the consultant was not aware of the importance of field reports to the understanding of how project implementation actually occurred until mid-way through the evaluation. The consultant spent a considerable amount of time tracking down specific documentation; this time would have been better spent in understanding and analysis. An unavoidable, yet unfortunate, consequence of an incomplete desk review due to the active nature of the project was that final project results were not stable until near the end of the mission. Thus, the consultant approached design and implementation of the evaluation without a clear understanding of all areas of overachievement, and thus analysis on causes of overachievement is limited.

## 2.2. Assumptions

The analysis plan developed for the Ditekemena Final Evaluation contained three major assumptions. These assumptions were discussed with and confirmed by the Ditekemena project team prior to the start of the field mission. First, we assumed that households who received a food distribution or food fair would have different outcomes from those that did not, and that the outcomes would be independent of project Phase. Thus, we stratified the data so as to be able to draw conclusions on these two groups separately. Second, following conversations with the Project team, we assumed that the were no major differences between the Kasai Central and Kasai Oriental provinces. Finally, we assumed that all beneficiary villages would be accessible during the time frame of the evaluation.

Analysis of the evaluation data shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between province and food consumptions score (FCS) for both strata, and thus our second assumption is potentially incorrect.




Figure 3: Food Consumption Score Chi-squared and confidence intervals.[8]

## 2.3. Primary Data Collection

The evaluation consultant was in DR Congo from September 21 and October 16, 2019 to execute the analysis plan. The calendar of field activities is provided in attached Annex 1: Primary Sample & Eval Dates. Local enumerators who had not participated in Ditekemena project implementation, but had done work with CRS in the past were short-listed by CRS to participate in a 2-day training on the household questionnaire, participatory focus group activities and key informant interviews in each region. Following the training, the consultant selected 15 enumerators in Kasai Oriental and 12 in Kasai Central to participate in the household study. During the study, each enumerator completed between four and eight 40-minute interviews per day. Those selected to carry out discussions carried out between three and six 1.5-hour focus groups or interviews per day.

[8] Chi-squared for the food strata is 0.017020 and seed strata is 0.000016. Both values are less than 0.05. Null hypothesis is rejected. Relationship between food consumption levels and province is statistically significant.

| Type | Count | Method |
|---|---|---|
| **Focus Group Discussions** | | |
| Women | 9 | Group discussions centered around two types of activities: Before and After Scoring and Pairwise Ranking Matrices |
| Men | 7 | |
| Miners | 1 | |
| Hereditary Chiefs | 1 | |
| Vendors | 2 | |
| Farmers | 8 | |
| Kasai Central | 9 | |
| Kasai Oriental | 19 | |
| Total participants | 126 | |
| **Key Informant Interviews** | | |
| CRS Staff | 16 | meeting, email, phone |
| Chiefs (or representative) | 16 | meeting |
| Provincial Authorities | 3 | meeting |
| Health Center Nurses (or representatives) | 5 | meeting |
| Caritas | 2 | meeting |
| Vendors | 2 | meeting |
| Enumerators | 27 | written feedback |

Figure 4: Qualitative Data Sample.[9]

### *2.3.1. Household survey sample*

The household survey uses a stratified two-stage cluster sampling, with strata at two levels: type of assistance and health area. Two strata are created for type of assistance: food and seed. The food stratum includes HHs that only received a food distribution or participated in a food fair, but did not participate in a seed fair. The seed stratum includes HHs that participated in a seed fair. Those HHs that participated in a seed fair also received a food distribution or participated in a food fair, but they are in the seed strata. Due to the fact that it was not logistically possible to visit all villages during the course of the evaluation, cluster sampling was used with villages as the cluster. Villages were selected using probability proportionate to size and the appropriate number of households were randomly selected within each village. Sample size is calculated to be representative for each stratum at 90% confidence level / 5% margin of error.

| Strata | N (HHs) | n (HHs) |
|---|---|---|
| Food | 20,103 | 415 |
| Seed | 3,685 | 371 |

Furthermore, the sample was proportionately stratified by health area to ensure appropriate geographic representation. This sample allows for statistically significant conclusions and comparisons to be drawn on the two sub-populations: beneficiaries of food (either via distribution or food fair) and beneficiaries of seeds. This was determined as necessary for this evaluation due to the different nature of the assistance (food consumption vs. food production) as well as selection criteria for the program where HHs benefitting from seeds needed to have food consumption score of at least 30 to be included, already putting them at a higher baseline than the food strata. This

[9] See Annex 3: List of Key Informants & Focus Group Discussions for more details.

sample does not allow for data to be extrapolated to the provincial level (i.e. inferences made back to Kasai Oriental and Kasai Central), which would have required a larger sample size and was determined by the researchers to not be a priority following feedback from the field teams that there did not seem to be major differences between geographic locations. That said, differences can be explored.

A number of other characteristics were collected for data exploration in the analysis, but did not have an influence on the sample. As per the request by FFP, household level data can be disaggregated by household gender type to include:

- Female-headed household with no adult male (FNM)
- Male-headed household with no adult female (MNF)
- Male and female adult household (M&F)
- Child household with no adults (CNA)

Other demographic characteristics collected and used to explore outcomes include: displacement status, size of household, specific vulnerabilities such as pregnant/lactating women in household, handicap members, elderly, and principal livelihood strategies.

*2.3.2. Limitations to primary data*

Limitations to primary data collection stem primarily from contextual challenges that are often difficult to control. The timeline between signature of the consultant's contract and departure for the field was very short (6 days). This factor combined with limitations in review of secondary data described above delayed creation of the HH questionnaire, which was sent for coding on September 22, three days before enumerator testing was scheduled to take place. Due to these delays, issues with the digitization of the questionnaire (incorrect skip logic, missing questions and responses) lingered such that the questionnaire was not finalized until October 3rd, half way through data collection.[10]

In addition, once in the field the evaluation team revised the original random sample to take into consideration additional information received from the project team:

- On September 24th - the Kamandelena *Aire de Santé* was too remote to reach during the time frame of the evaluation and it was removed from the sample.
- On September 26th - activities in Tshiala Benyi were on-going and it was removed from the sample.
- On October 8th - the village of Tshipanda was inaccessible by car and was replaced by back-up village Dingaya. The village of Lufta does not exist and was replaced by Mutshienke Tshikomo.

## 3. Effectiveness – Attainment of program Goals

Analysis of Ditekemena's effectiveness sought to assess whether the program met all the stated goals in its logframe. Ditekemena's logframe contains 13 different indicators (see Annex 2: Program

[10] In addition, once in the field, feedback on needed revisions could only be provided to the MEAL team once per day in the evening with limited time to verify that changes had been made prior to field team departure in the morning. This required the MEAL team to be extremely diligent in their modifications. When they were not, certain questions (Q.2.2.3, Q.4.7) or responses (eg. Q.4.3.1.4 and 4.5.2.1) went a few days before modification.

Logical Framework & Results for details). Portions of six of these indicators were achieved to 100% or greater.

In December of 2018, CRS requested and received approval for a modification of two corps indicators: (1) Percentage of beneficiary HHs with poor FCS (0-28), and (2) Average FCS among beneficiary HHs. Revised targets for these indicators were 0% and 29 respectively. Final evaluation HH survey results show that 56% of food strata HHs had poor FCS at the end of the project. Seed strata HHs were better off; only 15.6% had a poor FCS.[11]

| Proportion in each Food Consumption Group | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Food | Seed |
| Poor | 56.40% | 15.60% |
| Borderline | 25.50% | 32.90% |
| Acceptable | 18.10% | 51.50% |

Figure 5: Food Consumption Scores at time of evaluation.

Project impact on average food consumption scores, were however higher, as food strata HHs achieved an average FCS of 29.2 (102% of the target) while seed strata HHs achieved an average FCS of 44.3 (104% of the target). Details, disaggregated results and limitations of these scores are discussed in Sections 6.1.1 below.

CRS achieved 120.2% of target number of people benefiting from USG-supported social assistance programming in Phase 1. In Phase 2, 87.94% of the individual target was achieved for food assistance and 69.58% for seed assistance (8,002 women and 8,669 men for seed). However, 117% of the household target was achieved for food assistance and 94.1% of the target for seed assistance. This discrepancy is due to the actual household size in the Kasai regions, which is six members as opposed to the eight as expected during planning of Phase 2.[12]

Total US dollars (USD) channeled into the program area to food vendors through local food purchases also reached their planned targets by 119% (982,530.08 USD) and 122% (2,636,585.12 USD) for Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively, as did total USD amount spent on food aid (including transport and other associated costs) to participants by 98.65% (1,644,200 USD) and 113.07% (3,515,620.22 USD), respectively. 94% (126,784.44 USD) of the targeted total USD value of seed vouchers redeemed by beneficiaries, in line with the total beneficiary achievements mentioned above. These dollars were transferred to the program area through 18 different interventions, or 106% of the target.[13]

39 vendors participated in these seed voucher fairs, or 195% of the target. Details of local vendor participation in Ditekemena can be found in Section 6.2.1.

[11] NB. Evaluation data demonstrates one point in time, and PDM data is available from which CRS could calculate a stratified FCS closer to the time of distribution. It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to clean, stratify and analyze PDM data.

[12] The project was designed based on HHs as the unit of measure, and there are some inconsistencies in the way the logframe calculates the number of Ind served. For Phase 1, baseline and results values use six people per HH to arrive at 60,000 Ind targeted. For Phase 2, the logframe uses eight people per HH as planned to calculate the baseline of 76,000 ind, but six people per HH to calculate results 66,832 ind.

[13] For the purposes of this evaluation, an intervention is defined as a distinct series of steps that can be identified independently in time (i.e. have a beginning and an end) and include mobilization, targeting, distribution/fair and post-distribution monitoring activities. Timeline and activity details of these 18 interventions can be found in Annex 8: Days to Delivery Ditekemena.

The project faced challenges in achieving self-sufficiency indicators for Phase 2. Only 14.9% of food and 24.9% of seed strata HHs reported achieving three to four months of household food self-sufficiency as a result of seed system programming. These results capture the harvest results of Season B (dry season March-June) of 2019. Only 24% of seed strata HHs reported having access to sufficient seeds to plant in either Season B or Season A of 2019, or 30% of the target. Nevertheless, 319 of 354 sampled HHs (90.1%) had any of the seeds they planted in 2019 sourced from the Ditekemena fairs, or 95% of the target.[14] Disaggregated analysis and limitations of these results are discussed in Section 6.4.2.

Four seed fair interventions were completed during Phase 2, or 200% of the target.[15]

## 4. Relevance and Appropriateness of the Response/Strategy

Analysis of the relevance and appropriateness of the project response and strategy sought to determine whether: (1) food distributions and fairs were the beneficiary HHs' preferred modality, (2) households assisted with food and seed assistance in the target areas were in need of this assistance, and if not, did they have other needs, and (3) the beneficiary HHs received seeds and tools that were suitable to their food production needs.

### 4.1. Modality – Preferences and Satisfaction

Ditekemena lifesaving food assistance and early recovery seed assistance were transferred to beneficiary HHs using three different modalities: (1) direct food distributions, (2) food fairs, and (3) seed fairs with a protection ration and direct distribution of tools. In general, while levels of satisfaction with the assistance received were high, qualitative and quantitative data show that few beneficiary HHs preferred the fair modality (19.8% food and 20.2% seed) due to their perception that both food and seed prices at the fairs were exorbitant – often twice or more the price of the same product in local markets. FGDs and KIIs confirmed this disinclination. MEAL team feedback indicates that preferences for fairs were higher during CRS surveys done at the exit to the fairs. This is not surprising; consumer preference research is a multi-billion-dollar industry, and it is not uncommon for preferences to change given context of questioning and overtime.

| Preference of modality | Food | | Seed | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| Direct distribution | 184 | 44.3% | 213 | 57.4% |
| Voucher/Fair | 82 | 19.8% | 75 | 20.2% |
| Cash | 139 | 33.5% | 75 | 20.2% |
| No preference | 51 | 12.3% | 37 | 10.0% |
| Other* | 3 | 0.7% | 0 | 0.0% |
| No response | 13 | 3.1% | 2 | 0.5% |
| Total responses | 415 | 100.0% | 371 | 100.0% |

Figure 6: Modality Preference at time of evaluation.

At the time of the evaluation, preferences were higher for cash (33.5%) and direct distribution (44.3%) among food strata HHs; seed strata HHs also preferred direct distribution (57.4%). Through FGDs and KIIs, however, it was clear that women did not prefer cash distributions, as they felt cash was often not used to meet the most urgent needs of the family (food, health, schooling). Some village chiefs and health center nurses also expressed

[14] It would be interesting to further analyze final evaluation data to determine what the other 9.9% did with their Ditekemena seeds if they were not planted.

[15] For the definition of intervention used in this evaluation, see footnote 12.

concerns with cash due their previous experience with non-CRS conditional cash programs that had caused significant problems within and between households in their villages.

### *4.1.1. Direct Food Distribution*

Food distributions provided beneficiary households with two rounds of half ration distributions one month apart. The rations included flour (corn and cassava), beans, oil (vegetable and/or palm) and salt. Distribution sites were centrally located within the *Aire de Santé*; the project aimed to keep travel distances below 5km for protection purposes.

On average following direct food distributions, food strata HHs consumed 88.6% and shared 9.2% of the food received with other HHs. Seed strata HHs consumed less of the food they received during distributions (79.4%) and shared more (14.5%).[16] Only a very small proportion of the food was sold, less than 1% of the quantity received for both groups.

90.3% of food strata HHs and 75% of seed strata HHs found the food distributions to be acceptable or excellent.

Half rations were expected to last beneficiary HHs one month, and indeed final evaluation results show that for 57.2% of food strata HHs and 62.4% of seed strata HHs the food they received from the distribution lasted four weeks or more independent of HH size.[17]

### *4.1.2. Food Fairs*

Food fairs were conducted in two rounds, also one month apart. Beneficiary HHs received $80 at each fair, which was expected to cover the equivalent of a half ration of food. Available food stuffs at the fair included: corn flour, beans, salt, vegetable and palm oil, cowpea, and cassava flour. A large majority of beneficiary HHs chose to buy corn flour, rice, salt, vegetable oil and beans at the fair. Roughly one-quarter of food strata HHs purchased cowpea and cassava flour, as compared to one-third of seed strata HHs for the same items.

Despite preference studies done prior to the intervention, final evaluation results do not show an evident trend in whether the type of food purchased at the fair was normally purchased or not, neither between strata nor within strata. 38.3% of food strata HHs and 48.1% of seed strata HHs indicated that they do not normally buy these types of food because it is too expensive, while 49% of food strata HHs and 34.5% of seed strata HHs indicated the opposite, that they normally buy this type of food. Only 11% of food and 17.4% of seed strata HHs indicated that the food at the fair was not food they normally buy because what they normally buy was not available.

[16] A small portion of seed strata HHs (7%) indicated that they planted some of the food received. There may have been some confusion on this question, as no food was given in a form that could be planted.

[17] NB. Estimated duration of stock for all food distributions in Phase 1 were calculated based on six people per HH. The single food distribution in Phase 2 for Kabuluanda was calculated based on eight people per HH. Final evaluation data can be explored to look at duration of stock in Kabuluanda specifically. See section 6.1.1. for more details.

| Food purchased was food that household … | Food | | Seed | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| Normally buys | 101 | 49.0% | 101 | 34.5% |
| Does not normally buy because its too expensive/out of their budget range | 79 | 38.3% | 141 | 48.1% |
| Does not normally buy because what they normally buy was not available | 24 | 11.7% | 51 | 17.4% |
| Total responses | 204 | 99.0% | 293 | 100.0% |

Figure 7: Normalcy of food purchased at Food fairs.

> "I was happy with the money received [in the voucher], but the quantity of food purchased was less than expected because of the high prices."- Village Chief, Kasai Central

Similarly to food distributions, 92.3% of food and 95.9% of seed strata HHs found the food fairs to be acceptable or excellent. Of the eight food strata HHs that were not satisfied with the food fairs, their complaints included high food prices (5 count), insufficient coupon value (4 count), not enough vendors (3 count), and preferred other foods (3 count). Despite price negotiations that took place between CRS, beneficiaries and vendors, 11 of 12 seed strata HHs who were unsatisfied felt the food prices at the fair were too high. Complaints of high prices at the fair also came up repeatedly during FGDs: village chiefs repeatedly recounted how prices at fairs were twice the actual costs in the market at the same time, female focus groups felt that the fairs were more beneficial to the vendors than beneficiaries. Others preferred direct distribution or cash to fairs due to high prices.

*4.1.3. Seed Fairs with protection ration and tool distribution*

Seed fairs provided beneficiary HHs with roughly 5kg ($15) of seed in April and 15kg ($30) of seed in August. Each beneficiary HH also receive a half ration during the first seed fair ($80), and at the exit to the fair they received two hand-hoes. For sampled seed beneficiary HHs, corn (95.4%) and cowpea (75.7%) were the most frequently purchased. Beans (25.6%), watermelon (24%) and peanuts (22.9%), were also popular.

As with the food fairs, levels of satisfaction were high: 91.1% of seed strata HHs found the seed fairs acceptable or excellent. Of the 33 households that were not satisfied: 26 found the seed prices too high, 12 found the coupon value too low to cover needs, 10 preferred other types of seed, 7 found the organization of the fair to be poor, and 4 found the timing to be too late for planting.

99.5% of sampled households used the hoes that were distributed and 97.8% found them to be of good quality and convenient to their needs.

## 4.2. Targeting – Analysis of Beneficiary Needs

*4.2.1. General Targeting Context*

Phase 1 of Ditekemena sought to target all recent IDPs and recent returnee populations in targeted geographic areas. Specific criteria for village selection included: (1) at least 200-500 displaced and returnee HHs in the last three months due to conflict, (2) IPC Phase 4 or Phase 3, (3) average FCS of 28 or lower, (4) limited accessibility due to surrounding conflict and/or poor road infrastructure, and (5) if geographic area has received assistance from another humanitarian actor, food assistance gaps remain for at least 1,000 HHs. At least two of criteria 2, 3 or 4 had to be fulfilled to receive unconditional food assistance.

In practice, the team adjusted these selection criteria to the reality on the ground to improve impact and efficiency. Rapid evaluations carried out to identify food assistance intervention zones were carried out at the *Aire de Santé* level, not the village level as there are not markets in every village. The Food Security Clusters provided IPC classifications and confirmed lack of coverage by other humanitarian actors by *Aire de Santé*, as well. Project planning documents did not define "limited accessibility" or "poor road or market infrastructure".

These adjustments were appropriate for a few reasons. First, it is generally accepted that both Kasai regions suffer from a lack of road connectivity and limited economic activity. Second, selection at the village level could have caused significant targeting and operational challenges if villages in close proximity to each other were assisted differently. This challenge was born out at the *Aire de Santé* level as well, but only in a few cases. Third, small, geographically isolated villages tend to be the most vulnerable. Village selection by size of village would have excluded these needy populations.

Conditional seed assistance during Phase 2 targeted: (1) beneficiary HHs having received previous general food assistance support from Ditekemena or other ongoing projects, (2) FCS of at least 30, (3) demonstrated lack of access to seeds, and (4) access to land, as all targeted HHs for this activity will be returnees and should have access to land. This targeting was carried out at a household level within previously served *Aire de Santé* through surveys done at the time of targeting and Seed System Security Assessments. Eligibility was confirmed for conditions (1), (2) and (3) by targeting surveys, while Seed Assessments confirmed condition (4).

The evaluation explored access to land with the sampled population and found that fully 100% of seed strata HHs reported having access to land; an indicator that targeting was well done for this conditionality. Indeed, in some FGDs beneficiaries reported access to land being better after the crisis due to the fact that many families had either left the area or not yet come out of the forest.

However, disaggregated by vulnerability status we see that only 27.7% of seed strata HHs with access to land were either returnee or displaced, while 72% were residents who had never been displaced. In contrast, 65.7% of the food strata HHs who had access to land but did not receive seeds from the project were Returnees or displaced. This analysis indicates two key weaknesses of conditionality: (1) it favored those in the seed group who were already better off (i.e. higher FCS and more likely to be residents), and (2) it disadvantaged those who were weaker (i.e. lower FCS, suffered displacement) but may have had the means to cultivate, and may indeed have depended more on production for survival.

*4.2.2. Beneficiary Vulnerability*

In general, 62% of food strata HHs were displaced during the events in 2016, but have now returned to their villages (i.e. returnees), while 5.6% remain displaced. Surprisingly, 32.4% of food strata HHs and 72.2% of seed strata HHs indicate that they were never displaced, while only one-quarter (25.4%) of seed strata HHs are retournees. Further exploration of baseline data and final PDM data may provide clarity on the vulnerability of these residents, as some may have been host families, and others may have learned how to respond for maximum benefit.

| Beneficiary Household Displacement Status | Food | | Seed | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| Returnee (displaced by 2016 events, but since returned) | 256 | 61.8% | 94 | 25.4% |
| Resident (never displaced) | 134 | 32.4% | 267 | 72.2% |
| Displaced | 23 | 5.6% | 9 | 2.4% |
| Other | 1 | 0.2% | 0 | 0.0% |
| Totals | 414 | 100.0% | 370 | 100.0% |

Figure 8: Beneficiary Household Displacement Status

| Livelihood | Food | Seed |
|---|---|---|
| | % | % |
| Food Production | 79.8% | 82.2% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 36.1% | 34.2% |
| Gardening | 35.9% | 51.5% |
| Small Enterprise/Commerce | 30.8% | 29.9% |
| Agricultural Labor | 21.4% | 19.9% |
| Animal husbandry - poultry | 21.2% | 43.4% |
| Charcoal/Firewood | 15.7% | 7.0% |
| Mining | 14.2% | 2.4% |
| Gifts from family/friends | 10.8% | 7.3% |
| Animal husbandry - small ruminants | 8.9% | 17.5% |
| Non-qualified labor | 8.4% | 5.4% |
| Food Production for sale | 5.3% | 8.1% |
| Animal husbandry - large ruminants | 4.1% | 10.2% |
| Artisan | 3.6% | 2.2% |
| Hunting, gathering | 3.1% | 1.3% |
| Fishing | 3.1% | 3.0% |
| Qualified labor | 2.9% | 1.9% |
| Salaried | 2.9% | 3.5% |
| Other | 2.2% | 0.8% |
| Transfers | 0.7% | 0.3% |

Figure 9: Principal Livelihood Activities by strata

Beneficiaries live predominantly from food production activities, small enterprise, animal husbandry, and gardening. However, a troubling portion of both strata (36% food and 34.2% seed) also claim humanitarian assistance as a principal livelihood. This dependency is re-iterated in the ways that beneficiaries of both groups indicate that they will overcome challenges in their lives: 45% of both groups will wait or look for aid. Threats to long-term positive impact of future projects due to this dependency are explored in Section 10 below.

To note also, despite losses suffered during the crisis, both groups are engaged in raising poultry and agricultural labor. These signs of resilience are in contrast to the expressed dependency on aid, and may indicate that people have the ability to pay or trade for labor. Ditekemena Phase 3 should further explore and strengthen these resiliency characteristics (see Section 11.)

Random household surveys were conducted during rapid evaluations[18] to gather FCS data for both phases. Targeting teams were well trained in gathering FCS data, and despite beneficiary learned bias in future surveys, it seems baseline FCS data could be representative: in Phase 1 the baseline for average FCS was 20.2[19] and in Phase 2 it was 42.7.

As expected, seed strata HHs are better off than food strata HHs across many indicators. In Phase 1, at a challenging time just post crisis, they were more likely to share a portion of the food assistance they received (54% vs 42%), and they shared a larger portion – 14.5% of the ration as opposed to only 9.2% of the ration.[20] They have a more diverse diet, even when poor food

[18] These surveys were not statistically significant, and if they used a 10% sampling rate may actually have sampled more than necessary (see Section 8.1 for more details).

[19] Source: Annex to Phase 1 Annual Report IPTT December 6, 2018.

[20] Qualitative data does not confirm or deny these results; there was pressure to share independent of conditionality. The intensity of the pressure varied by location and by group and by type of assistance. As Phase 1 distributions were unconditional, it seems likely that this sharing was to households outside of target areas. Due to challenges in data management, results regarding use of the food distributed is only available for beneficiaries of direct food distributions.

consumption scores are low; they eat more times in a 7-day period, they eat animal protein more frequently, and have better access to fruit and pulses across FCS, as shown in the figures below.




Figure 10: Consumption frequency by food group

Interestingly, when final evaluation data is disaggregated by household economy status we see that households with a male adult and no female adult in both the food and seed strata were less likely to plant, more likely to have a poor FCS, and had fewer months of food stocks than a household with a female adult and no male. This may be an indicator that women are more responsible for both food production and food consumption in the family, but data should be explored further to say with confidence (See Annex 8: Key Indicators disaggregated by household status).

### 4.2.3. *Beneficiary needs at the time of assistance*[21]

Beneficiaries overwhelmingly consider Ditekemena an appropriate response to their needs; when asked if the project had responded to their most urgent needs, 92.8% of food strata HHs and 97.6% of seed strata HHs agreed.

For the small percentage of food strata HHs (7.2%) who indicated that food was not among their most urgent needs at the time of assistance, a diversity of other needs was cited: security (53%), household items (76.7%), health (50%), education (43.3%), payment of debts (36.7%), shelter (30%). These needs, particularly health, education and shelter, were echoed repeatedly as challenging just post-crisis, as well as today.

Furthermore, the use of the assistance received reflects the relevance of the program. Beneficiary households were in need of food, and ate what they received. 88.6% of food distributed in Phase 1 was consumed by food strata HHs, while seed strata HHs consumed 79.4% of what they received. Likewise, 78.3% of the food purchased at food fairs was consumed by food strata HHs, and 84% by seed strata HHs. Non-beneficiary community members were also in need of food. 60% of food strata HHs and 70% of seed strata HHs shared some portion of the food purchased at the food fair with those who had not benefitted; food strata HHs shared only slightly more of the food (15.4% versus 14.1%, respectively). FGDs and KIIs also bore out these findings, as described in more detail in Section 6.1 below.

## 4.3. Timing

In general, Ditekemena's timing was appropriate and relevant. As shown in Figure 1 of Section 1, the Kasai Region crisis began in 2016 and people were beginning to return home by mid-June of 2017, and throughout early 2018. Phase 1 began in August of 2017, and planned response times intended to provide relief to returnees and displaced within three months of displacement or four weeks of an alert that a specific population was in need. Phase 2 began in September of 2018, and planned response times intended to correlate with planting dates for both Season B (March) and Season A (August).

### 4.3.1. *Speed of Delivery – Food Distributions*




Figure 11: Timeline of Phase 1 Food Distributions

[21] Data collection for use of seed assistance was missing the option "planted" in CommCare until half-way through data collection in Kasai Oriental. During this time enumerators chose the option "consumed" if a beneficiary indicated that they had planted the seeds. Thus, results for this question are not representative of use of seeds, and are therefore not included in this section.

Figures 12 and 13 below show Ditekemena's response times for food distributions. On average, direct distributions of food assistance were delivered 134 days (4.5 months) from the time CRS management approved engagement in the *Aire de Santé* (Figure 12).[22] In Phase 1, this timing was




Figure 12: Speed of delivery,
Food distributions: go date to launch of assistance

significantly slower than planned (4-week target in proposal), and a frustrating start to the project. Delays were primarily caused by two contextual factors. First, at the time the donor was not convinced that local markets were robust enough to consider local purchase of commodities. The project therefore, purchased commodities from other parts of DR Congo (primarily Lumumbashi) and transported them by train to the Kasai region. Trains were repeatedly delayed due to crashes and company financial challenges. Second, newly introduced Food For Peace Quality Control requirements caused weeks of delays as CRS learned to work with the Office of Commodity Controls and existing laboratories in the country and in France. The most significant of these delays were experienced in the Nkusu and Kalonji Kinya interventions where days to delivery were 150% higher than average.

[22] Interventions in each *Aire de Santé* were intended to be triggered by alerts raised at the Food Security Cluster level. Due to challenges working with a partially functional cluster, these dates were not in reality available. Response times reported here are derived from the date of approval of the terms of reference for the first mobilization in an *Aire de Santé*. Mobilisation activities was either a rapid evaluation, market study or targeting. Detailed implementation dates for all activities can be found in Annex 6: Days to Delivery Ditekemena.




Figure 13: Speed of Delivery, Food distributions, by step

During this period, CRS learned from delivery challenges, and made every effort to accelerate delivery times. This is demonstrated by the Kabuluanda intervention (the only food distribution that was funded by the Phase 2 cost-extension) which achieved delivery in only 74 days (2.5 months) by transferring the responsibility for commodity quality control to the food vendors.

"We had just left the bush, and the food was very welcome." – Health Center Nurse, Kasai Oriental
"Food was received at a difficult moment for us." -Village Chief, Kasai Oriental

Despite these delays, the timing of food assistance remained highly appropriate and relevant as expressed during focus groups and key informant interviews. The project responded to a need from people who were without hope, and who had not yet had assistance of any kind.

*4.3.2. Speed of Delivery – Food and Seed Fairs*

Phase 2, which began in September of 2018, also faced start-up delays due to the Congolese political context. Presidential elections in December of 2018, caused security concerns in the first quarter of 2019, and CRS' operations across the country were limited for the months of January, February and March.




Figure 14: Timeline Phase 2

Despite these delays, Phase 2 timing demonstrates CRS' ability to accelerate delivery. On average, food assistance provided via food voucher fairs was delivered within 50 days (7 weeks) from the time CRS management approved engagement in the *Aire de Santé* (Figure 15).

Speed of delivery was highest in Tshimbawu because targeting was more efficient due to the geographic concentration of the population in Tshimbawu, and because it began the day the market study ended. In effect, the market study was not confirming the appropriateness of an intervention in the Tshimbawu, but rather, which modality was more appropriate. Thus, there was no delay between assessment and targeting. By contrast in Kamandelena, while targeting was done simultaneously with the market study, villages in this area spread out and targeting took nearly 30 days.


Figure 15: Speed of Delivery, food fairs: go date to launch of assistance




Figure 16: Speed of delivery, food fairs: by step

For seed fairs, speed of delivery is less relevant, as the assistance was conditional upon access to fields and higher FCS scores (at least 30) and delivery was planned for planting time in each season (March for Season B and August for Season A). Nevertheless, on average, seed fairs were launched 56 days (8 weeks) from the time CRS management approved engagement in the *Aire de Santé*. Mobilization was well planned and as rapid as possible, and targeting went smoothly; all signs that the Ditekemena team had learned lessons from previous interventions and tightened up the efficiency of operations. Unfortunately, as CRS' operations were limited in the wake of the presidential elections in early 2019 to ensure the safety of their teams, the first round of seed distributions did not take place until the 3rd week of April. Seed strata HHs in focus groups and key informant interviews expressed that the rains needed for good germination had already stopped at this point, and so they ate the seeds instead.[23]

"A strength of the project was that people needed the food when it arrived, and the seeds helped them plant." – Caritas, Kananga
"Food and seeds came at the most critical moment of people's lives" – Kasai Oriental Enumerators

## 5. Project Impact

### 5.1. Impact on target population

#### *5.1.1. Short Term Food Access*

"This project helped us a lot to respond to our food needs. We did not know how to get ourselves out of this hunger." – Village Chief, Kasai Oriental
"It brought hope to people who were without hope; people who had not gotten support before."- CRS DRC Deputy Country Rep/Programs

Ditekemena's short term food access outcomes were evident across quantitative[24] and qualitative evaluation data. Both food and seed strata HHs spoke of the food assistance as an angel that had saved them at a time when they had nothing. Many expressed that as they had food to eat after each distribution, they were able to use their existing limited resources to satisfy some of their other needs (schooling, health care) or diversify their diets.

92.2% of food strata HHs reported consuming the food assistance they received, while 42.4% of the same group also shared some of their assistance, and 3.5% sold some. 75.3% of seed strata HHs reported consuming a portion of their food assistance, while 54.1% shared some and only 3.2% sold some.[25]

[23] Due to limitations in transcription of the household questionnaire to CommCare, quantitative data regarding proportion of seed strata HHs planting the seeds they received is not available. We know only that 98% of seed strata HHs planted or consumed the seed they received, and 38.3% shared some.
[24] Limitations in time and the structure of PDM data did not permit the evaluation team to assess FCS from the PDMs, which would provide additional information about short term food access.
[25] NB. This is describing what HHs did with the ration as a whole. Refer to section 5.2.2 for details on which portions of the ration were designated for the various uses.

| Time it took household to use food ration by household size | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Food Distribution Group | | | | | Seed beneficiary group | | | | |
| | 1-3 | 4-6 | 7-9 | 10-12 | >12 | 1-3 | 4-6 | 7-9 | 10-12 | >12 |
| Less than one week | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 11.1% |
| One week | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.3% | 5.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.3% | 5.6% | 0.0% |
| Two weeks | 6.7% | 10.4% | 17.6% | 28.8% | 40.0% | 0.0% | 1.5% | 6.3% | 8.3% | 0.0% |
| Three weeks | 26.7% | 17.9% | 17.6% | 11.5% | 10.0% | 14.3% | 11.9% | 16.3% | 5.6% | 0.0% |
| Four weeks | 40.0% | 29.9% | 28.6% | 34.6% | 50.0% | 23.8% | 40.3% | 26.3% | 38.9% | 33.3% |
| More than four week | 26.7% | 41.8% | 31.9% | 19.2% | 0.0% | 61.9% | 46.3% | 50.0% | 41.7% | 55.6% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Figure 17: Time to use food ration by household size.

As intended, the 50% ration lasted four weeks or more for the majority of beneficiaries (53.2% of food distribution beneficiary HHs and 62.4% of seed strata HHs). The one-size-fits all ration does not seem to have disadvantaged larger households; quantitative data does not show a distinct trend[26] and concerns from large families were not expressed during focus groups or key informant interviews.[27]

While these outcomes were intended and desired, project impacts on food access as measured at the time of the final evaluation are less clear. The average FCS for the food group is 29.6, yet the confidence level for these results is between 28.3 and 30.8 which skirts the threshold of 28.5; the histogram below shows that the spread of scores for this group is quite wide.




Figure 18: Spread of average FCS for the food strata

In addition, a large portion of the food strata continues to have poor FCS (56.4%), and these households do not have a better rCSI as compared to all beneficiary HHs at the endline (14.4, =/- 1.09 or between 13.3 and 15.5). Average rCSI at baseline was 15.12 and endline was 12.28 for all beneficiaries. We cannot conclude if rCSI for the food group is better than the baseline as the range is between 13.3 and 15.5. In part, these results could be a factor of the evaluation timing; August, September and October are the hungry season in the Kasais and people are likely to have poorer diets at this time. However, while we could possibly expect an improvement in the spread

[26] Please refer to Evaluation Household data to explore counts of sampled households in each size category. Only 1 household sampled in the seed group had more than 12 members.

[27] Due to limitations in transposing the household questionnaire to CommCare, data related to how long the ration lasted for beneficiaries of food fairs is not available.

towards borderline FCS, we cannot with confidence conclude that the food group has acceptable food consumption.

On the other hand, the seed group does show a distinct trend toward improved food security with an average FCS confidence level between 42.7 and 45.8 (Acceptable >42.5), and 51.5% of the group achieving an acceptable FCS. In addition, results for the reduced coping strategy index for this group (rCSI) show that households benefiting from a seed fair are more food secure than other households (10.5, +/- 1.09 or between 9.5 and 11.6). As we do not have endline data for only households benefitting from seeds we cannot conclude if the situation has improved for this sub-group.

Comparison to baseline FCS values is limited due to the stratification of the final evaluation sample, the change in indicators at the beginning of Phase 2 and the format of results reporting by the MEAL team. Any comparisons can only indicate possible trends, as the baseline values were not stratified by assistance received. Average FCS baselines were 21.3 for Phase 1 and 42.7 for Phase 2, as report in the October 21, 2019 IPTT. This could indicate a slight improvement for the food strata HHs (ignoring Kabulanda which happened in Phase 2), and no improvement for seed strata HHs. We cannot compare proportion of poor FCS for food strata HHs to the baseline because the indicator was changed, and as reported in the October 21, 2019 IPTT shows percent change. For the seed strata 20.88% of beneficiary HHs had a poor FCS at the beginning of Phase 2, showing a slight trend towards improved FCS at the end of the project for this group.

*5.1.2. Food consumption impacts by vulnerability status*

When disaggregated by displacement status and physical vulnerability status, exploration of evaluation data indicates that seed strata HHs are better off than food strata HHs (Figure 19). However, we cannot confirm that displacement status for the food group has an impact FCS, as no clear trends emerge.

In contrast, residents who received seed assistance may have better FCS outcomes than those who were displaced or returnee. Likewise, no specific physical vulnerability is more likely to result in lower FCS for either group (Figure 20).

| Food Consumption Score by displacement status | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Acceptable | Borderline | Poor |
| **Food** | **18.1%** | **25.5%** | **56.4%** |
| Displaced | 21.7% | 13.0% | 65.2% |
| Resident (never displaced) | 23.9% | 28.4% | 47.3% |
| Returnee (displaced in 2016, but returned) | 14.5% | 25.4% | 60.2% |
| Seed | 51.5% | 32.9% | 15.6% |
| Displaced | 22.2% | 66.7% | 11.1% |
| Resident (never displaced) | 58.1% | 30.3% | 11.6% |
| Returnee (displaced in 2016, but returned) | 35.1% | 37.2% | 27.7% |

Figure 19: FCS by displacement status

| Vulnerability Status | Food | | | | Seed | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Count | Poor | Borderline | Acceptable | Count | Poor | Borderline | Acceptable |
| Pregnant or lactating | 221 | 56.1% | 22.2% | 21.7% | 182 | 14.3% | 34.6% | 51.1% |
| Elderly (more than 50 years) | 153 | 52.9% | 28.1% | 19.0% | 139 | 12.2% | 28.8% | 59.0% |
| Physical Handicap | 52 | 46.2% | 32.7% | 21.2% | 51 | 15.7% | 27.5% | 56.9% |
| Mental Handicap | 20 | 45.0% | 30.0% | 25.0% | 11 | 27.3% | 18.2% | 54.5% |
| Other vulnerability | 8 | 62.5% | 25.0% | 12.5% | 8 | 25.0% | 12.5% | 62.5% |
| No vulnerability | 74 | 58.1% | 36.5% | 5.4% | 85 | 24.7% | 32.9% | 42.4% |

Figure 20: FCS by vulnerability status

### *5.1.3. Unexpected Result: Malnutrition Outcomes*

> "In June 2019, in Kabindi at the time of the first food fair, we reported 30 malnutrition cases per month. After the second distribution, we had to stretch for 10 cases per month." - Nurse, Kabindi Health Center

In the weeks following assistance, beneficiaries and key informants across both provinces reported witnessing visible changes in malnutrition rates in children whose families received assistance. The link between food quality and quantity and nutrition was expressed repeatedly during focus groups and key informant interviews. In Kasai Oriental, focus group participants related that after their children had eaten the corn flour provided by Ditekemena, parents noticed changes in their physical strength, and their health. Enumerators leading these groups confirmed that the population understood how "effective" corn can be for improving health outcomes. Health center nurses in Cikaya, Kabindi, Keena Kuna and village chiefs in Kasai Oriental and Central all noted drops in malnutrition rates in the weeks following food assistance. Caritas staff in Kasai Oriental and local food vendors in Kasai Central also reported not recognizing some beneficiaries at the second food distribution of food fair due to their significant health improvements.

## 5.2. Impact on Local Economy

Due to the self-sufficiency goals of Phase 2, the evaluation analysis also sought to answer the following questions: (1) did the program help to stimulate the local markets, and (2) did the program have any negative impact on the local markets.

### *5.2.1. Local market stimulation - use of local traders*

Ditekemena intended to increase the financial and social capital in targeted communities, as money was injected into the local economy through community-based traders. The project worked with two types of local traders: bulk traders based in Mbuji Mayi and in Kananga and retail traders based in the *Aire de Santé* that were being served by the project. Interviews and focus groups conducted with both bulk and retail food and seed traders that worked with the project demonstrated that this financial and social capital was clearly created for retail traders, but bulk traders in Kananga felt the financial gains were minimal. Retail traders in the Tshilenge Health Zone all expressed that their sources of income had both diversified as well as amplified in the wake of their engagement with the project. They began new enterprises such as motorcycle taxis and increased their sales of food products through the connections they made at the fairs. In many cases, traders were farmers first and formalized their work as traders through the project; they completed official paperwork for their trade work and all 39 traders that Ditekemena paid opened bank accounts in order to receive their payments. In one case, a trader in Kasai Oriental who was a state employee but was unpaid for eight years, used the money received from participation in food and seed fairs to

successfully complete the paperwork and logistics necessary to submit his request for salary payment to the Congolese government. He now receives his state salary regularly.

Social capital was also increased. Some were able to complete construction of their homes; one used the money to build a health center for his village. Bulk vendors in Kananga expressed that "We work in conflict resolution, too." That is, relationships were created between traders and beneficiaries that led to new employment opportunities for villagers, and a greater understanding of the challenges faced by those living in the country-side.[28]

### *5.2.2. Market Impacts*

As expected and required by FFP, CRS established a price monitoring system for Ditekemena at the beginning of Phase 1 and monitored and reported on food prices in local markets across the life of the program. CRS has established, globally approved, market price monitoring SOPs that were developed in partnership with USAID and TOPS. While the reporting requirements of these SOPs were respected, project documentation and interviews with team members did not permit the evaluation to confirm that the risk level of Ditekemena's impact on local markets was well understood by the team and feedback mechanisms integrated into price monitoring. High risk programs – those that either carry risks of being disrupted by external factors, such as security threats, or are being implemented under market conditions that have the potential to lead toward price disruptions – require more rigorous monitoring and consideration of historical price trends to determine thresholds of "normal" price changes.[29] These guidelines recommend review and evaluation when a 7.5% change is observed in weekly monitoring. While at no time in the project did prices rise after a food distribution, food or seed fair, the price of at least one commodity fell more than 7.5% after each intervention in 2018 and 2019 with the exception of the last intervention in Tshiala Benyi in September of 2019.[30]

Project documentation notes a decrease in demand following Ditekemena interventions as the explanation for price decreases in the market, and proposes that these price decreases were a positive externality for non-beneficiary households. However, while lower food prices help the consumers they do not help producers. Final Evaluation survey results show that agricultural production and small enterprise - primarily selling of leafy vegetables and food commodities - are among top five principal livelihoods for beneficiary HHs. Price changes in food commodities sustained for more than a few days or repeated drops in price during the year outside of seasonal price fluctuations could have a negative effect on all those who depend on agriculture and small enterprise for their livelihoods. In short, given SOPs established by CRS for market monitoring, Ditekemena did have an impact on markets; the question remains to what extent that impact was negative.

## 5.3. Impact on Food Production

Analysis sought to answer the following questions: (1) are beneficiary households able to participate in the 2019-2020 growing season due to the support they received from the program? (2) did the beneficiary HHs receive seeds and tools that were suitable to their food production needs?

[28] Impact of the project on the level of economic activity at a market level was beyond the scope of this evaluation.
[29] Page 11, https://www.crs.org/sites/default/files/tools-research/markit-price-monitoring-analysis-response-kit.pdf
[30] Source: Annual Report Actuals Tables 2018 and 2019.

As mentioned above, food production is the most commonly cited livelihood of the sampled population. Indeed, fully 100% of seed and 92.8% of food strata HHs report having access to land. For those that do not (30 of 415 food strata HHs), reasons for not having access to land included, among others: financial problems (20 count), no seeds (12 count), no available land (6 count), and health reasons (5 count). Disaggregated by vulnerability status, no clear trends in access to land are visible, and we cannot say with confidence whether vulnerability increases or decreases a beneficiary HHs' likelihood of access to land.

In terms of food production during Season B or Season A in 2019, nearly all beneficiary HHs planted (95.4% seed and 83.1% food). For the 70 food strata HHs who did not plant explanations include, among others: lack of inputs (22 count), lack of rain (14 count), health issues (13 count), and lack of labor (12 count).

> "In 20 years, [we] had never received such support. It was a "gift from the sky" that allowed them to put aside hand-to-mouth for a short period and work on ag production." – Village Chief, Kasai Oriental.

Food production for seed strata HHs was better in 2019, but still not above average. A large proportion of HHs that received seed planted more in 2019 than in 2018 (59%) and more than an average year (46%). 99 of 336 respondents planted the same or less (30%) as 2018 while 47.3% considered planting in 2019 the same or less than a normal year. For food strata HHs, trends indicate a possible improvement on 2018, but should be explored further to say with confidence whether food HHs planted more or less in 2019; 39.7% planted less and 31.3% planted more than 2018. Further exploration of the vulnerability profile of those in this group may also reveal resiliency characteristics. In contrast, 2019 planting seems less than an average year: 54.8% planted less than an average year. Only 51 out of 325 respondents indicated that they planted more (14.8%).

## 5.4. Impact on the Future

Project evaluations provide an opportunity to learn from experience and look toward the future. Thus, the evaluation analysis sought to answer the following questions: (1) What is the community's outlook on their food security situation in the coming 6-12 months?, and (2) Do they foresee any specific challenges? If yes, how will they address any challenges they still face?, (3) Are there any additional needs of the households? (4) Do beneficiary HHs have improved self-sufficiency?

### *5.4.1. Food security outlook and additional needs*

| Challenge | Food | | Seed | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| Food | 329 | 79.3% | 271 | 73.0% |
| Clothes | 157 | 37.8% | 104 | 28.0% |
| Health | 133 | 32.0% | 114 | 30.7% |
| Shelter | 108 | 26.0% | 114 | 30.7% |
| Money | 93 | 22.4% | 88 | 23.7% |
| Education | 76 | 18.3% | 72 | 19.4% |
| Seeds | 69 | 16.6% | 28 | 7.5% |
| Household Items | 46 | 11.1% | 58 | 15.6% |

Figure 21: Beneficiary principal challenges at time of evaluation

Food remains the number one principal challenge in the lives of sampled beneficiary HHs (79.3% of food and 73% of seed strata HHs). 90.4% of food and 69.8% of seed strata HHs sampled had problems meeting their food needs in the seven days prior to the evaluation. Most of these resorted to dietary change and rationing strategies to get by. They ate less preferred or less expensive foods, reduced

the size of meals, the number of meals and borrowed food.[31]

| Strategies used over course of 7 days | Food | | Seed | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| Consumer cheaper and less preferred foods? | 317 | 84.5% | 199 | 76.8% |
| Reduce the quantity of meals? | 306 | 81.6% | 202 | 78.0% |
| Reduce the number of meals? | 218 | 58.1% | 150 | 57.9% |
| Borrow food from friends, neighbors or family? | 208 | 55.5% | 143 | 55.2% |
| Reduce adult consumption in favor of children? | 153 | 40.8% | 97 | 37.5% |
| Response rate | 100.0% | | 100.0% | |

Figure 22: Reduced coping strategies by proportion

| Average number of days using the strategy | Food | Seed |
|---|---|---|
| Consume cheaper and less prefered food? | 4.4 | 4.4 |
| Reduce the quantity of meals? | 4.0 | 4.2 |
| Reduce the number of daily meals? | 3.9 | 4.4 |
| Borrow food or count on help from friends, neighbors or family? | 2.4 | 2.1 |
| Reduce adult consumption to benefit small children? | 3.3 | 3.3 |

Figure 23: Average number of days using reduced coping strategies

Today beneficiary needs remain similar to those at the time of first assistance in 2018; top challenges for both groups include: clothing, health, shelter and education. Indeed, coping strategies for dealing with these needs are not particularly robust. 45.5% of food and 36.4% of seed strata HHs will wait or look for external support to meet their needs, while the rest will primarily depend on agriculture (30.6% and 45.5%) and non-agricultural labor (15.5% and 13.7%).

| Beneficiary strategies to address challenges | Food | | Seed | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| Wait/look for aid | 189 | 45.5% | 135 | 36.4% |
| Farm (*Faire de l'agriculture*) | 127 | 30.6% | 169 | 45.6% |
| Work (non-agricultural) | 65 | 15.7% | 51 | 13.7% |
| Autre | 9 | 2.2% | 16 | 4.3% |
| Loans | 6 | 1.4% | 5 | 1.3% |
| Nothing | 6 | 1.4% | 4 | 1.1% |
| Get by (*débrouiller*) | 5 | 1.2% | 0 | 0.0% |
| Do Animal Husbandry | 5 | 1.2% | 5 | 1.3% |
| Don't know | 4 | 1.0% | 3 | 0.8% |
| Pray | 3 | 0.7% | 0 | 0.0% |
| Hunting and Gathering | 2 | 0.5% | 0 | 0.0% |
| No Response | 1 | 0.2% | 0 | 0.0% |
| Incomprehensible | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.3% |

Figure 24: Beneficiary strategies to address challenges.

A silent coping strategy that was evident in the evaluation, and seems to have been revealed during targeting and PDMs is beneficiary tendency to find strategies that result in additional aid to the detriment of resiliency and self-sufficiency. These observed strategies include:

- staying home from the fields when project vehicles are observed in the vicinity;

[31] Data limitation: survey did not ask about consumption of seed stock for next season due to the timing of the evaluation (post planting and pre-harvest) when no seed stocks were available.

- during targeting - invest in construction of additional living quarters to receive aid in two places, move temporarily or live separately from family members for a period of time when projects are active, erase chalk numbers on their houses used to identify already surveyed households, chiefs announce to relatives from surrounding areas when targeting will happen, community guides seek power through selective identification of community members;
- trade coupons to vendors in exchange for cash paid post-fair; and,
- express a complete lack of ability to help or feed themselves despite visible abilities.

### *5.4.2. Self-sufficiency*

Phase 2 of Ditekemena sought to improve beneficiary self-sufficiency through agricultural input support – seed fairs and tool distributions. The evaluation sought to assess the achievement of this goal by collecting data on the length of time self-produced food stocks lasted in 2019, whether beneficiary HHs had sufficient seeds to plant in 2019 and the source of those seeds, and the proportion planting seeds obtains via the fairs.

As mentioned in Section 4 above, only 14.9% of food and 24.9% of seed strata HHs achieved more than 3 months of food stocks from their own production. Due to the timing of the final evaluation during planting for Season A, the survey was only able to capture data from Season B (dry season, March-June), and as explained in Section 4.3.2 seed was distributed too late for planting in Season B. Thus, we cannot say with confidence what the duration of self-produced stocks may be for this target population, and Ditekemena Phase 3 implementation planning should look deeper into production abilities (See Section 11).

Achievement of those reporting enough seeds to plant was also low (30% achieved), but those receiving seeds were more likely to have enough (24% seed to 4.6% food[32]). Interestingly, nearly the same proportion of food strata HHs as seed indicated that they did not have enough of either gardening or food production seeds (42.9% food and 46.5% seed).

| Sufficient Seed to Plant in 2019 for either Season B or Season A | Food | | Seed | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| Neither | 178 | 42.9% | 173 | 46.6% |
| Too difficult to say | 63 | 15.2% | 18 | 4.9% |
| Enough for food production, not enough for gardening | 38 | 9.2% | 71 | 19.1% |
| Yes, enough of both | 19 | 4.6% | 89 | 24.0% |
| Enough for gardening, not enough for food production | 14 | 3.4% | 10 | 2.7% |
| No response | 103 | 24.8% | 10 | 2.7% |
| Response rate | 312 | 75.2% | 361 | 97.3% |

Figure 25: Sufficient seed to plant in 2019

There are several limitations to these results. First, the formulation of this question is not likely to bring reliable results, particularly at planting time. As a farmer never knows whether his first planting (or second or third) will survive, s/he will be most likely to answer conservatively: no, s/he does not or did not have sufficient seed to plant. Furthermore, if access to land is not a problem for either strata (as discussed in Section 5.2.1), a farmer could be likely to indicate that s/he did not have enough seed because he could have found a way to expand production. Finally, seed can always be saved from year to year, or it can be consumed, so there is very low, if any, risk in

[32] Response rates for food strata HHs responding to this question were 75%. Reasons for a voluntary lack of response are unknown, but could be related to the timing of the evaluation at planting time. Sampled HHs were told this survey would not lead to additional support, but they may still have hoped it would and therefore not answered.

having too much seed, and therefore no incentive to indicate that the need for seed has been satisfied.

90.1% of seed strata HHs planted seeds sourced from the Ditekemena fair.[33] Other sources included from the season prior, purchased or "other", with likelihood of using saved seed versus purchased seed very similar across the main crops (corn, beans, peanuts, amaranth, okra, cabbage, cowpea). For example, for corn 35% indicated they planted some seed from 2018, while 26.2% purchased some. For beans, 50.5% planted some seed from 2018 and 31.8% purchased some.[34]

| Proportion of households reporting seeds from source. May have seeds from more than one source | Food | | | | Seed | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Last year's seeds | Purchased | Ditekemena Seed Fair | Other Sources | Last year's seeds | Purchased | Ditekemena Seed Fair | Other Sources |
| Amaranth | 39.5% | 66.3% | 2.3% | 25.6% | 48.5% | 45.4% | 24.6% | 9.2% |
| Peanut | 52.7% | 81.8% | 18.2% | 23.6% | 45.0% | 51.4% | 73.4% | 16.5% |
| Chinese Cabbage | 57.1% | 85.7% | 57.1% | 71.4% | 54.5% | 54.5% | 90.9% | 36.4% |
| Okra | 80.0% | 80.0% | 20.0% | 64.0% | 48.9% | 34.0% | 40.4% | 23.4% |
| Beans | 33.3% | 85.6% | 16.7% | 20.0% | 50.5% | 31.8% | 63.6% | 12.1% |
| Corn Kasais/Mussa | 43.5% | 75.2% | 7.1% | 26.4% | 35.6% | 26.2% | 85.6% | 12.9% |
| Cowpea H36 / Diamant | 31.4% | 86.3% | 23.5% | 31.4% | 10.6% | 9.1% | 95.7% | 4.3% |
| Watermelon | 28.6% | 71.4% | 7.1% | 7.1% | 6.9% | 8.6% | 93.1% | 0.0% |
| Pistachio | 45.8% | 79.2% | 0.0% | 8.3% | 20.0% | 10.0% | 90.0% | 3.3% |
| Rice | 100.0% | 66.7% | 33.3% | 33.3% | 15.4% | 7.7% | 92.3% | 0.0% |
| Soy | 42.9% | 78.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 21.4% | 73.8% | 11.9% | 9.5% |
| Other | 55.3% | 15.2% | 0.8% | 37.9% | 67.9% | 6.1% | 3.1% | 29.8% |

Figure 26: Beneficiary seed sources

Responses to these questions for the food strata HHs indicate a trend towards more purchasing of seeds than use of 2018 seed, but for some crops (rice and okra) proportions were the same or favored saved seed. patterns of seed sourcing, excluding the fair. Interestingly, 8.7% of food strata HHs reported planting seed of multiple types from the Ditekemena fairs. This may be another indicator of the prevalence of sharing and "entre-aide" within communities, resiliencies which should be strengthened in further programing.

Cooperation with CRS' Budikadidi Project may have strengthened self-sufficiency for the *Aire de Santé* of Miabi where both projects intervened successively (Ditekemena in 2018 and Budikadidi in 2019) and agricultural trainings were done for some community members. Trends in the final evaluation data can be explored further for a deeper understanding of the impact of successive programming. Likewise, similar analysis could be explored for areas where Ditekemena followed CRS' former WASH program in Kasai Central. Qualitative data from KIIs in Tshibemba (former WASH program site) demonstrated an overt, high expectation of further assistance, which can be summarized as follows: "*Some HHs that did not receive seeds complained, but we told them not to*

[33] Due to limitations in the transcription of the household questionnaire to CommCare, data from the question regarding use of the seeds received at the fair are unreliable, as the option "planted" was not available until half-way through the evaluation. 25.6% reported planting the seed while 83.8% reported consuming it; enumerators chose the option "consumed" when "planted" was not available.

[34] Data limitation: data on the source of cassava cuttings was not collected. However, many respondents included it under *other* crop planted, and the majority was sourced from 2018 production (67.9% seed and 55.3% food).

*worry, CRS will not abandon us. They will come back with additional assistance, as they have done in the past."*

## 6. Beneficiary Accountability and Mainstreaming Protection

CRS mainstreams beneficiary accountability and protection across all projects, as is witnessed by global SOPs as well as dedicated country program staff for these areas. Ditekemena put exceptional effort into their accountability to beneficiaries, particularly during targeting and implementation. Protection issues were included primarily during targeting to ensure assistance reached vulnerable populations, and less as a comprehensive cross-cutting issue.

### 6.1. Transparency

Evaluation data confirms that CRS did an exceptional job providing accessible and timely information to affected populations on project objectives, selection criteria and timing of interventions. 83% of food strata HHs and 79% of seed strata HHs new why they had been selected as beneficiaries of Ditekemena; listing poor food consumption as the main reason, and support during displacement or insecurity as secondary reasons. While one limitation of data collection was that no response option was provided for seed strata HHs to indicate their awareness that they had been chosen because of their access to fields and their higher level of food consumption, PDMs in Tshilenge reported very high food consumptions scores, and focus groups confirmed that people knew if they had higher FCS they might be able to receive seeds in future distributions. Similarly, transparency was so well achieved in Kabaluanda that HHs seemed to understand they would only benefit if they had poor FCS; numerous households sampled insisted that their families had eaten nothing for the last week, or in one case the last month.

One aspect of the project where transparency was weak drew significant negative attention from the beneficiaries. It seems that beneficiaries did not understand that prices at the food and seed fairs were not intended to mimic prices in the local markets at the time of the fairs. Negotiations between vendors, CRS and beneficiary representatives to set maximum prices did take place, but FGD feedback demonstrated that beneficiary HHs did not understand that vendor costs of transport, unloading and the time commitment to attend the fair were also included in these maximum prices. This caused significant distaste for the fairs among beneficiaries.

### 6.2. Participation

As relevant for an emergency response, community participation primarily focused on beneficiary HHs playing an active role in planning stages of the project. They helped determine appropriate modalities and composition of assistance to be provided (i.e. types of preferred food, seed and tools) through focus groups and interviews. Beneficiary HHs also acted as "*Relais Communautaires*" or guides during all project activities. These volunteer guides spent countless hours with CRS and Caritas staff identifying village limits, determining eligibility of households and participating in focus groups. The project also paid "*journaliers*" to help set up the distribution and fair sites ($5/day). This type of community participation, comparable to cash-for-work, was very attractive to beneficiaries, and came out in male focus groups as preferred over fairs.

### 6.3. Feedback

The project put in place three feedback and complaints mechanisms (hotline, suggestion boxes and feedback desk). These mechanisms seek to collect both positive feedback as well as complaints from beneficiaries. All feedback was sorted into eight categories. The three most sensitive are handled by the Country Representative directly; the others go through the field teams or directly through the hotline operators.

> "We put paper in the box, but got no response." – Nurse, Kasai Oriental
> "There were a few people who were not on the list. We asked 1001 questions and we are still without a response." – village chief, Kasai Oriental

FGDs, KIIs and some PDMs reveal two primary trends in feedback: (1) confusion in Kasai Oriental regarding where the suggestion boxes were located, when they were available, who had access to these boxes or who could call the hotline, and (2) complaints in both regions that some HHs had not received the blanket food distribution. Beneficiaries and Key Informants expressed that the CRS team came by the HH, did an interview and took their picture, but that the picture was "musheka" (burned or broken). They believed that the reason they did not receive assistance was because their picture was "burned" or unavailable after the interview.

Interviews with CRS staff indicate SOPs for feedback mechanisms were followed and spot checking of a few weeks of hotline data shows that responses were provided to feedback initiators, but no comprehensive project data is available to allow an overall assessment of either the frequency nor the type of feedback received. While the evaluation confirmed that input procedures for complaints did follow CRS DRC SOPs to the best of their abilities, frustration with a lack of response and claims of HH omission were repeatedly expressed by sampled households, particularly those in Kasai Oriental.

## 7. Efficiency

### 7.1. Transfer-to-budget Ratio

One of the key questions this evaluation sought to answer was whether CRS efficiently use resources to achieve its intended objectives. Given available budget data, the transfer-to-budget ratio was selected as an indicator of cost-efficiency. FFP expects that the value of the emergency food assistance resources going directly to program participants will constitute the majority of total proposed program costs.[35] As shown in Figure 27 below, Ditekemena's cost-efficiency improved significantly from Phase 1 to Phase 2.

[35] Value transferred includes local transportation (commodities), security services (warehouse), bags, branding of commodities (printing and stickers) and Distributions/Fair Site preparations. For Ditekemena, it also included investments necessary to ensure quality implementation for a first-time intervention in the Kasais: management of food stocks for direct distribution, strong oversight (including training, mentoring and monitoring of new staff), and the necessary enabling infrastructure (office space, communications/ internet, and in-country travel costs, for example).

| Transfer-to-budget Summary by Phase | Phase 1 | | Phase 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Actuals | Planned | Actuals | Planned |
| Total Transfer Amount | $ 1,644,618.55 | $ 1,818,330.00 | $ 2,636,585.12 | $ 2,345,810.00 |
| Total Cost of Phase | $ 3,504,764.42 | $ 3,485,299.55 | $ 3,607,256.22 | $ 4,484,257.81 |
| Transfer-to-Budget Ratio | 47% | 52% | 73% | 52% |

Figure 27: Transfer-to-budget ratio actuals

While the transfer-to-budget ratio was very strong, two examples of inefficiencies in data collection are important to note. Given the dependency of aid projects on rigorous, repetitive data collection (i.e. baseline surveys, rapid evaluations, targeting, midline, PDM, endline), seemingly small additions to questionnaire can add up to decrease project monitoring and evaluation efficiencies. First, across the life of the project, CRS' monitoring and evaluation team collected data on Dietary Diversity. On average, questions related to dietary diversity extend the length of household interviews by approximately 10 minutes. Given the frequency of household surveys in this project done during rapid evaluations, targeting and PDMs, the number of staff days to collect this unused data was very high. For targeting alone, we estimate 52.8 man-days of unnecessary staff time used based on CRS' standard operating procedures for targeting.[36] Should CRS feel that the information from this indicator is essential to assessing project impact, we would recommend including it in the Phase 3 monitoring and evaluation plan. Second, across the life of the project targeting surveys used a common, but potentially inappropriate, sampling methodology that recommends surveying 10% of the target population. This method can often lead to over sampling, and inefficient use of staff time, not to mention inappropriate use of beneficiary time.[37]

### 7.2. Asset Creation

Asset creation is an important measure to consider when assessing cost-efficiency. In addition to high transfer-to-budget ratio, Phase 2 of Ditekemena also created community assets that will provide positive impacts in the medium term. These assets included: (1) the distribution of two hand-held hoes for agricultural production (field preparation, planting, weeding, post-harvest handling), (2) two training-of-trainers in April of 2019 on good agricultural practices before seed fairs took place. In Tshingana, beneficiaries noted a decrease in soil fertility problems during Season B of 2019 due to the training they received from local animators before the seed fair.

## 8. Relevance of CRS/Caritas Partnership

CRS's partnership with Caritas Mbuji Mayi and Kananga is one of the most critical components to the achievements of the Ditekemena project, and is relevant not only to implementation needs, but also to ensuring project impacts. Caritas is seen as an enthusiastic, available and flexible partner that takes their job seriously. CRS recognizes that Caritas is indispensable with village relationships, and this was reflected in key informant interviews with village chiefs and nurses. Households have confidence in and trust Caritas and thus trusted CRS staff as well. Their unity is evident; they have a good working relationship and are seen as one team that works very hard to bring assistance to the communities.

[36] Baseline Survey = 10% of Targeted number of households for general food ration (10% x 76,000 = 7,600 surveys), staff time in man-days to collect data = 0.007 days x 7600 surveys = 52.8 days

[37] It was agreed with USAID at the end of 2018 to discontinue this approach. However, due to multiple Program Manager turn overs during the first two quarters of 2019, the targeting team did not receive this message and continued the practice throughout 2019.

Challenges in the partnership revolve around contractual complications, communication and human resources oversight. CRS experienced challenges with delayed payments to Caritas due to confusing contract amendments and cost-modifications[38] which impacted the field teams and created resentment. Communication between CRS and the Caritas Mbuji Mayi regional hierarchy in Kasai Oriental was challenged by distance and numerous PM changes. In contrast, Caritas Kananga appreciated that communication between the two partners was permanent; in their words "perpendicular and parallel".

CRS also has trouble directly evaluating Caritas staff that they work with regularly for implementation of interventions; accountability lines run directly between Caritas Diocesan Focal Points in Mbuji Mayi and Kananga and their field staff, thus CRS implementation staff have no ability to directly evaluate Caritas field staff. Often CRS' only recourse for performance issues of a specific field agent is to ask for that agent to not participate in project activities or to provide voluntary mentoring. CRS has initiated training programs for Caritas field agents related to targeting and post-distribution monitoring, but due to parallel accountability structures cannot then ensure that those trained agents are used for project activities. However, when those trained agents are used repeatedly for the same activities, results are good.

Caritas would also like to see an increase in compensation for days spent at their regional headquarters drafting field reports post-field work. They estimate that for every 10 days of field work they spend 2 or 3 days writing reports at the office, for which they are not compensated.

## 9. SWOT Analysis

Ditekemena's strengths include:

- Providing hope to populations that had not received aid in recent memory. It was an appropriate response to people's needs: they needed the kind of food they received when they received it.
- Delivery of food assistance to areas where immediate needs and gaps were most alarming, as defined by the humanitarian Food Security Cluster in each province.
- The longevity of certain key implementation staff such as Project Officers, Market Officer and Targeting Manager since the beginning of the project ensured that weaknesses in project archival systems could be overcome as much as possible.
- Ability to learn and improve targeting and speed of delivery for maximum impact and efficiency.
- Qualitative indication of positive malnutrition outcomes from food assistance.
- Local market stimulation and increases in social capital through the use of local traders.
- Partnership with Caritas Mbuji Mayi and Kananga which was indispensable with village relationships.

Ditekemena's weaknesses included:

- Unclear Phase 1 humanitarian alert system of displacements or returns, such that speed of delivery could not be calculated from an alert date.

[38] CRS will only issue a service agreement for the duration of a specific intervention (i.e. rapid evaluation, targeting or PDM), which will last two to three months.

- Slow start up times in both phases. In Phase 2, seed fairs were delayed for Season B until the 3rd week of April, at which point rains had already stopped in many locations and seeds could not be planted.
- Ambitious overall objectives related to self-sufficiency in Phase 2. These objectives - four months of self-produced stock and sufficient seed to plant – were based on the assumption that access to seed was the weakest link in the food supply chain from farm to plate. Timing of the project end date mid-season (end October 2019) also made it difficult to accurately capture results for these indicators as the final evaluation took place during planting for Season A and self-produced stocks for this season could not be estimated.
- Market price monitoring system feedback not clearly integrated into voucher fair implementation despite repeated changes in market prices out of the normal range (i.e. reduction in prices by more than 7.5% in weekly monitoring).
- In Phase 2, inadequate consideration of full agricultural context and assumptions that seed availability was the weakest link in food supply chains.
- Challenging communication with Caritas Mbuji Mayi where Ditekemena did not have a project office.
- Timely accessibility and reliability of project data was compromised as archival protocols and systems did not withstand departures of key MEAL and program management staff and still provide coherent, complete and accurate data, thus increasing the limitations of the final evaluation.
- Final Evaluation against baseline values and PDM results is limited due to time constraints faced by the evaluation team.

Opportunities presented by Ditekemena:

- Evidence of multiple resiliencies described in this evaluation presents an opportunity to consider strengthening EFSP programming that includes agricultural inputs or income generating activities (eg. CFW, FFW). Desire is strong for assistance with perennial activities, and silent coping strategies that negatively affect resilience are evident.
- Food remains a primary challenge for sampled beneficiary HHs, as it may well have been for decades. The persistency of this challenge within the lifetime of the project provides an opportunity to more closely study the difference between urgent and chronic needs. Humanitarian assistance may be more appropriate to respond to needs such as clothing and shelter that do not result from productive practices in which the majority of beneficiaries are engaged.
- The one-size-fits all ration does not seem to have disadvantaged larger households. This provides an opportunity to justify a one-size-fits all ration for future EFSP programming to keep targeting costs and challenges to a minimum.
- Results from this evaluation provide an opportunity to recognize that aid dependency does not require decades of aid before people begin to change their behavior to acquire maximum benefits from humanitarian actors. The recognition that humanitarian projects may be creating dependency and persistent need for aid is the first step in creating an opportunity for change. A cadeau mentality is not yet entrenched in the Kasais, and it seems that humanitarian aid for the region is decreasing.

Threats evidenced during Ditekemena

- The low proportion of seed strata HHs that were returnee or displaced may indicate another way that beneficiaries are learning to redirect aid to their benefit, as project baseline studies may show a higher proportion of returnees and displaced.
- Seed assistance timing lacks flexibility: there are tight windows that need to be hit, too early or too late and the seed will go to waste. This is complicated by changing climate patterns.
- Transparency in accountability to beneficiaries is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it provides beneficiaries with information they need to make decisions about resource and time management. On the other hand, as information transparency increases beneficiaries are more and more capable of adjusting their responses to data gathering in a way that biases needs assessments and impact. This was evidenced in Kalonji Kinya and Nkusu where beneficiary HHs learned to respond to FCS to show higher scores.
- A striking characteristic of the Ditekemena project is the prevalence of dependency characteristics that emerged from the quantitative and qualitative data. As mentioned in Seciton 5.2.2. above, roughly a third of food and seed strata HHs consider aid one of their principal livelihoods, while 45% of both groups see it as a solution to challenges in their life. Silent coping strategies include numerous tactics for capturing aid, as discussed in Section 6.4.1, some of which take labor away from food production and demonstrate a logical process of assessing the best possible outcome from expenditure of limited resources. In feedback sessions, enumerators from Kasai Central expressed their concern that the project had left the population weak and "attentiste". One village chief expressed that without the help of Ditekemena, "we would be malnourished and deformed." Surprisingly, this dependency exists despite the fact that aid is new in this area of DR Congo. As mentioned in Section 6.1.1., many of the targeted *Aire de Santé* had not received aid in living memory. In a number of FGDs, beneficiaries were unable to list other aid modalities beyond what the project did given that Ditekemena was the only support they had ever received.
- Beneficiary commentary during FGDs and KIIs also demonstrate the threat that humanitarian aid can create a repetitive cycle of feast and famine, resilience and destitution. This threat was primarily evidenced during FGDs and KIIs in Kasai Oriental. Many expressed the concern that without aid, the population would fall back to the same situation as before:
  - "Sickness and hunger today are just as bad as it was before, just after the crisis"- Nurse, Kasai Oriental.
  - "Once aid was over, people were worse than before."- Nurse, Kasai Oriental
  - "We have fallen back into a serious crisis. We are dying of hunger" – Chief, Kasai Oriental
- Evaluation data demonstrate resiliency trends that should be further explored to understand capacities and strengths of these communities and build off them. These include: tendency to share assistance, access to land and ability to plant despite various vulnerabilities, among others.
- Retail traders were village elites, who already had a leg up on life, and benefitted simultaneously from the project as "vulnerable" returnee beneficiaries and as traders. These elites included state employees, relatives of chiefs or health center nurses, or the health center nurses themselves. Furthermore, gender inequality must be closely monitored as not all women are permitted by their husbands to open the bank accounts required for payment by CRS. At least one female trader did not have access to, nor did she control, the funds received by the project because the bank account was in her husband's name.

## 10. Recommendations

The documentation of best practices and lessons learned should be prepared by project staff and reviewed during preparation for future FFP EFSP programs, as it is essential that they be owned and understood by the staff and the agency. The "lessons learned" as perceived by the evaluator are presented as recommendations here.

For future evaluations:

- Plan final project evaluations for post-intervention. To evaluate agricultural impact, ensure evaluation timing is relevant to seasonality. For example, harvest results (i.e. food security from production) cannot be known at planting time.
- Confirm analysis plan prior to start of field work. CRS and the donor need to provide clearer input from the start of the evaluation regarding their preferences on the type of analysis desired. Towards the end of the evaluation it became clear that USAID was interested in comparisons between Phases and that CRS expected the consultant to compare baseline and PDM data to evaluation results. As the evaluation analysis plan did not include these elements, there was no time available to do additional analysis. In addition, project team needs to review in detail the analysis plan and sample to confirm that travel times are realistic and that villages are accessible and relevant.

For future 12-month FFP EFSP Programming:

- Do no harm. USAID and CRS need to be very cautious that they are not providing incentives for people to become dependent on humanitarian activities. This should be an iterative process at each stage of implementation that inventories all coping strategies used by beneficiaries to garner additional aid and assesses their potential effect on household resiliency and self-sufficiency indicators. These silent coping strategies could be defined as "dependency variables" and could guide donor and NGO exit strategies by clarifying the potential harm to existing resiliency that humanitarian projects may have. This analysis should also include exploration and comparison of results in locations where other CRS projects have been active. Results should then be shared openly and broadly with all relevant cluster partners and donors.
- Do not assume access to seeds is the best way to increase food production. Seed support is only one of many inputs required to strengthen subsistence agricultural systems, particularly those systems that the humanitarian community hopes will provide enough food to improve FCS above a baseline that may have existed for decades. CRS' Seed Security Assessments, like those done during Ditekemena, start with the assumption that seeds are the weakest link in the food production chain. If possible, during FFP EFSP programs that intend to include agricultural inputs, rapid but statistically relevant and detailed baseline research should be completed to thoroughly, correctly and adequately diagnosis agricultural production weaknesses and suggest approaches that do not lead to chronic seed aid.
- Strengthen awareness raising related to prices during fairs. While pricing confusion brought down the levels of beneficiary preference for fairs, cash remains a risky modality due to serious concerns expressed by women and village chiefs in particular. Preference for fairs should be improved through increased awareness raising regarding why food and seed prices at the fair are higher. CRS should also consider decoupling the cost of transporting goods to fair sites from the cost of the food itself so that beneficiary HHs are paying prices closer to those in local markets where they exist (which may differ from main markets were price monitoring takes place).

- Consider geographic comparisons in baseline and endline evaluations. Given the extreme isolation of many Kasai communities, it is highly likely that there is greater diversity between locations than may not be immediately evident. Allow time for increased sample size in evaluations to permit comparisons between geographic locations. Ensure that baseline sampling methodology also considers these differences.
- Strengthen MEAL systems to withstand turnover of key staff (eg. database managers, PMs, Emergency Coordinators). Create clear SOPs and accompanying checklists that can be reviewed, approved and archived by management. In particular, CRS should consider creating SOPs for logframe management that could include guidance on how to consistently and clearly document: indicator descriptions, planned versus actual household size, successive funding phases and sampling methodologies.
- Treat targeting activities as an investment in project outcomes, and become the best at it. CRS DRC is already known for its rigorous, high quality targeting. Take this competitive advantage to the next level and become a leader in addressing the challenge of beneficiaries learning how to respond to targeting questions to increase their chances of receiving assistance.

For Ditekemena Phase 3:

- Target geographic agglomerations of villages to reduce targeting challenges and for maximum local impact.
- Provide blanket assistance. The evaluation reinforces Phase 3 proposed blanket approach in targeting, as displacement status seems to have been difficult to confirm in the first two Phases, and FCS score conditionality for seed fair participation may have simply diluted the effect of access to these agricultural inputs given the amount that was reportedly shared.
- Considering common health issues as a specific vulnerability in targeting. Health issues appeared in evaluation results as reasons families do not have access to land and cannot plant, as well as one of the top three principal challenges and top five for economic needs. This is a serious indication that poor health is impeding food production capacity of the sampled population. It is a life changing decision for a family whose principal livelihood is food production to skip a season of planting due to health concerns. And, it is likely to have a waterfall effect of increased vulnerability. Any agricultural input programming should be accompanied by a deeper understanding of the specific health issues that face the agricultural population.
- Explore the vulnerability of male-headed household with no adult female. If increased vulnerability of this group is confirmed, consider what support these male-headed households may need. A confirmation that this group is more vulnerable may also corroborate the current understanding that women are the experts in food production and consumption and should continued to be targeted as the recipient of assistance.
- Reconsider variable ration size. Explore further evaluation and PDM data to determine necessity of a ration by household size, as benefits from a variable ration size may be outweighed by inefficiencies and complexities of targeting.
- Seek support from CRS' Humanitarian Response Department and Markets Team to improve all aspects of market based programming. Phase 3 needs to avoid exacerbating power relationships and elite privilege, and improve understanding of project impact on vendors and markets.
- Explore alternative employment options for high performing Caritas staff in Kananga such as secondement and increase report writing time as part of field teams compensation. The CRS/Caritas relationship provides an opportunity to strengthen a local institution that has

history, roots and a future in poverty reduction across DRC. Many creative contracting mechanisms have been used by CRS across country programs to establish efficient, functional, productive contractual institutional and employment relationships.

For future programming:

- Move out of emergency programming in the Kasais and into recovery and development. Ad hoc emergency support can be considered, but it should be linked to community participation, either in CFW or FFW. Consider FFW and communal field preparation. Target those who already trade their sweat equity for food or money. Food and seed strata HHs sampled both listed support for revenue generating activities as among their top 5 economic needs (44.8% of food and 38.5% seed). Small enterprise or commerce is also a principal livelihood of sampled beneficiary HHs (30.8% food and 29.9% seed), a strength that should be reinforced by future recovery interventions. Support to animal husbandry, particularly extensive poultry production would also contribute to existing community strengths and income generation, as beneficiary HHs consider this activity part of their current principal livelihoods and food production activities. This is particularly true for seed strata HHs, 92.8% of whom participate in poultry production currently.
- Strengthen MEAL team agricultural capacity. On-board an agriculture specialist into the MEAL team to ensure agricultural input activities adequately understand baseline beneficiary skills, knowledge and capacity in agricultural production systems (eg. sharing of inputs, "entre-aide", knowledge of soil fertility, seasonal changes, production capacity) and animal husbandry (particularly poultry). This will ensure that the program strengthens existing community resiliencies demonstrated in the first two phases of Ditekemena without causing further dependency. These specialists should also prioritize the development of relationship with relevant agricultural and livestock state and provincial institutions equivalent to the Ministry of Agriculture and/or Ministry of Livestock.
- Consider non-food item assistance in the Kasai Region.

## 11. Annexes

Annex 1: Primary Sample & Evaluation Schedule
Annex 2: Program Logical Framework & Results
Annex 3: List of Key Informants & Focus Group Discussions
Annex 4: Qualitative Database Results
Annex 5: Evaluation Household data
Annex 6: Days to Delivery Ditekemena
Annex 7: Enumerator Feedback on evaluation activity
Annex 8: Key indicators disaggregated by household status

## 11.1. Annex 2: Program Logical Framework & Results

Two different versions of Ditekemena's logical framework are used to report program results. For those indicators where source of the results was the Final Evaluation HH survey, baseline values reported in an aggregated IPTT dated October 10, 2019 were used. For those indicators were source of the results were project documents, a more recent, IPTT disaggregated by phase was used. Unfortunately, at this point it was too late for the evaluation team to re-analyze its data by Phase, as requested during the presentation to USAID in Kinshasa on October 16th.

| Indicators | Target | Baseline | Source | Results | % achievement | Results Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Cumulative Results for Phase 1 and Phase 2** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of beneficiary households with poor food consumption scores | 0.00% | 46.06% | IPTT 10.10.19 | Food Assistance: 56.4%<br>Seed Assistance: 15.6% | Food Assistance: 43.6%<br>Seed Assistance: 84.6% | Final Evaluation |
| Number of people benefitting from USG-supported social assistance programming | Phase 1: 60,000 ind<br>Phase 2: General Food Ration:76,000 ind (9,500HHs) | na | IPTT 10.21.19 | Phase 1: 72,116 ind<br>Phase 2: General Food Ration: 66,832 ind (11,175 HHs) | Phase 1: 120.2%<br>Phase 2: General Food Ration: 87.94% ind target (117.63% HHs target) | Project |
| Average food consumption score among beneficiary households | 28.5 | 42.7 | IPTT 10.10.19 | Food Assistance: 29.6<br>Seed Assistance: 44.3 | Food Assistance: 102%<br>Seed Assistance: 104% | Final Evaluation |
| Total USD amount channeled into the program area to food vendors through local food purchases | Phase 1: $829,000<br>Phase 2: $2,153,486 | na | IPTT 10.21.19 | Phase 1: $982,530.08<br>Phase 2: $2,636,585.12 | Phase 1: 119%<br>Phase 2: 122% | Project |
| Total USD amount spent on food aid (including transport and other associated costs) to participants | Phase 1: $1,667,200<br>Phase 2: $3,109,119 | na | IPTT 10.21.19 | Phase 1: $1,644,200<br>Phase 2: $3,515,620.22 | Phase 1: 98.65%<br>Phase 2: 113.07% | Project |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total number of interventions with each intervention including: a) rapid MSA, b) a market study, c) the creation of price monitoring system, c) beneficiary registration, d) food distribution, e) post-intervention evaluation. | 17 | na | IPTT 10.21.19 | 18 | 106% | Final Evaluation |
| **Indicators and Results for Phase 2 Only** | | | | | | |
| Number of months of self-reported household food self-sufficiency as a result of seed system programming (i.e. # of month HH consumed own production from seed obtained from the program) | 4 | 1 | IPTT 10.21.19 | 3 to 4 months<br>Food Assistance: 15.9%<br>Seed Assistance: 24.9% | Food Assistance: 15.9%<br>Seed Assistance: 24.9% | Final Evaluation |
| Number of people directly benefiting from seed systems/agricultural input activities by sex | 24,000 ind (3,000 HHs) | na | IPTT 10.21.19 | Women: 8,002 indMen: 8,669 indTotal: 16,701 ind (2,830 HHs) | 70% individual target(94% HH target) | Project |
| Percentage of households reporting to have access to sufficient seeds to plant | 80% | 38% | IPTT 10.21.19 | Seed Assistance: 24% | 30% | Final Evaluation |
| Total USD value of seed vouchers redeemed by beneficiaries | Phase 2: $135,000 | na | IPTT 10.21.19 | Phase 2: $126,784.44 | 94% | Project |
| Number of local vendors participating in seed fairs, disaggregated by sex | 20 | na | IPTT 10.21.19 | Women: 12<br>Men: 27<br>Total: 39 | 195% | Project |
| Percentage of targeted household planting seed obtained via fairs | 95% | na | IPTT 10.21.19 | Seed Assistance: 90.1% | 95% | Final Evaluation |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total number of interventions with each intervention including: a) rapid SSSA analysis, b) registration, c) seed fair orientation and d) seed fair and tools distribution | 2 | na | IPTT 10.21.19 | 4 | 200% | Final Evaluation |

## 11.2. Annex 8: Key Indicators disaggregated by household status

| Food Consumption Score by household status | Acceptable | | Borderline | | Poor | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| Food | 75 | 18.1% | 106 | 25.5% | 234 | 56.4% |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 4 | 13.2% | 2 | 6.7% | 24 | 80.0% |
| Male and female adult household | 58 | 18.2% | 89 | 27.9% | 172 | 53.9% |
| Femaile-headed household with no adult male | 13 | 19.7% | 15 | 22.7% | 38 | 57.6% |
| Seed | 191 | 51.5% | 122 | 32.9% | 58 | 15.6% |
| Child household with no adults | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 100.0% | | 0.0% |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 8 | 30.8% | 9 | 34.6% | 9 | 34.6% |
| Male and female adult household | 155 | 52.2% | 98 | 33.0% | 44 | 14.8% |
| Femaile-headed household with no adult male | 28 | 59.6% | 14 | 29.8% | 5 | 10.6% |
| Grand Total | 266 | 33.8% | 228 | 29.0% | 292 | 37.2% |

Figure 28: Disaggregated Food Consumption Scores by Household Status

| Average Food Consumption Score by household status | # | Avg FCS |
|---|---|---|
| Food | 415 | 29.6 |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 30 | 20.5 |
| Male and female adult household | 319 | 30.3 |
| Female-headed household with no adult male | 66 | 29.9 |
| Seed | 371 | 44.3 |
| Child household with no adults | 1 | 33.5 |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 26 | 41.0 |
| Male and female adult household | 297 | 44.2 |
| Female-headed household with no adult male | 47 | 46.7 |
| Grand Total | 786 | 36.5 |

Figure 29: Disaggregated average food consumption scores by household status

| Duration of self-produced food stocks by household status | Food | | Seed | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 16 | | 21 | |
| HH does not have food stocks/anticipates not enough to store | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 19.0% |
| Less than a month | 5 | 31.3% | 6 | 28.6% |
| One to two months | 2 | 12.5% | 3 | 14.3% |
| 3 to 4 months | 4 | 25.0% | 5 | 23.8% |
| More than 4 months | 2 | 12.5% | 1 | 4.8% |
| Too difficult to say | 2 | 12.5% | 2 | 9.5% |
| No response | 1 | 6.3% | 0 | 0.0% |
| Male and female adult household | 275 | | 290 | |
| HH does not have food stocks/anticipates not enough to store | 87 | 31.6% | 93 | 32.1% |
| Less than a month | 51 | 18.5% | 22 | 7.6% |
| One to two months | 56 | 20.4% | 51 | 17.6% |
| 3 to 4 months | 46 | 16.7% | 67 | 23.1% |
| More than 4 months | 19 | 6.9% | 30 | 10.3% |
| Too difficult to say | 10 | 3.6% | 13 | 4.5% |
| No response | 6 | 2.2% | 14 | 4.8% |
| Female-headed household with no adult male | 54 | | 42 | |
| HH does not have food stocks/anticipates not enough to store | 13 | 24.1% | 13 | 31.0% |
| Less than a month | 15 | 27.8% | 6 | 14.3% |
| One to two months | 10 | 18.5% | 4 | 9.5% |
| 3 to 4 months | 5 | 9.3% | 13 | 31.0% |
| More than 4 months | 4 | 7.4% | 4 | 9.5% |
| Too difficult to say | 2 | 3.7% | 1 | 2.4% |
| No response | 5 | 9.3% | 1 | 2.4% |

Figure 30: Disaggregated Sufficient Seed to Plant by household status

| Access to land by household status | Has land to cultivate | | | | No land | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Food | | Seed | | Food | | Seed | |
| | # | %* | # | %* | # | %* | # | %* |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 22 | 5.7% | 26 | 7.0% | 8 | 2.1% | 0 | |
| Male and female adult household | 302 | 78.4% | 297 | 80.1% | 17 | 4.4% | 0 | |
| Female-headed household with no adult male | 61 | 15.8% | 47 | 12.7% | 5 | 1.3% | 0 | |

Figure 31: Disaggregated access to land by household status

| Planted in 2019 by household status | Planted during rainy or dry season | | | | Did not plant | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Food | | Seed | | Food | | Seed | |
| | # | %* | # | %* | # | %* | # | %* |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 16 | 4.6% | 21 | 5.9% | 14 | 20.0% | 5 | 29% |
| Male and female adult household | 275 | 79.7% | 290 | 81.9% | 44 | 62.9% | 7 | 41% |
| Female-headed household with no adult male | 54 | 15.7% | 42 | 11.9% | 12 | 17.1% | 5 | 29% |

Figure 32: Disaggregated Households that planted in 2019 by household status

| Households who planted and had some portion of their CORN seeds from source | Last Years Seeds | | Purchased | | Ditekemena Seed Fair | | Other Sources | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| Food | | | | | | | | |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 10 | 76.9% | 10 | 76.9% | 7 | 53.8% | 6 | 46.2% |
| Male and female adult household | 112 | 42.4% | 199 | 75.4% | 13 | 4.9% | 61 | 23.1% |
| Female-headed household with no adult male | 18 | 40.0% | 33 | 73.3% | 3 | 6.7% | 18 | 40.0% |
| Seed | | | | | | | | |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 10 | 50.0% | 7 | 35.0% | 17 | 85.0% | 8 | 40.0% |
| Male and female adult household | 98 | 35.4% | 75 | 27.1% | 236 | 85.2% | 32 | 11.6% |
| Female-headed household with no adult male | 13 | 31.0% | 6 | 14.3% | 38 | 90.5% | 4 | 9.5% |

Figure 33: Disaggregated households who planted and had some portion of their CORN seeds from source

| Households who planted and had some portion of their COWPEA H36/Diamant seeds from source | Last Years Seeds | | Purchased | | Ditekemena Seed Fair | | Other Sources | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| Food | | | | | | | | |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 4 | 50.0% | 6 | 75.0% | 4 | 50.0% | 6 | 75.0% |
| Male and female adult household | 8 | 22.9% | 32 | 91.4% | 7 | 20.0% | 5 | 14.3% |
| Female-headed household with no adult male | 2 | 25.0% | 5 | 62.5% | 1 | 12.5% | 3 | 37.5% |
| Seed | | | | | | | | |
| Male-headed household with no adult female | 1 | 12.5% | 2 | 25.0% | 7 | 87.5% | 2 | 25.0% |
| Male and female adult household | 20 | 11.5% | 15 | 8.6% | 167 | 96.0% | 6 | 3.4% |
| Female-headed household with no adult male | 1 | 3.8% | 2 | 7.7% | 25 | 96.2% | 1 | 3.8% |

Figure 34: Disaggregated households who planted and had some portion of their COWPEA seeds from source